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Letter from the Editors

The Martin Institute at the University of Idaho fosters a holistic understanding of international systems, actors, conflicts, and ways in which to approach these multifaceted topics. Founded by Boyd and Grace Martin in 1979 and inspired by the attainment of peace in a world filled with violence and war, this entity provides a platform for collaborative research and unique educational opportunities for both International Studies staff and students.

The International Studies degree at U of I is unparalleled. The combination of individual attention and encouragement from professors, as well as collaborative problem-solving opportunities among students to tackle real-world issues has provided students with a truly irreplaceable undergraduate experience. As International Studies majors, we are so grateful for a program with this kind of foundation and dedication to globally-minded education.

As mentioned above, International Studies provides a unique degree program tailored to every student's specific interests. Throughout the program, students are able to choose a language to study, a region to focus on, and an issue emphasis to delve into. This comprehensive approach, along with the required study abroad experience, has forced students to step outside of their comfort zone and view and analyze the world through a new cultural lens.

Additionally, there are incredible educational opportunities offered by this department for students of all years, such as participating in the National Model UN in New York City, listening to guest lecturers and scholars during the annual Borah Symposium, and writing and publishing policy papers on innovative international topics through the Martin Scholars program.

The Journal of the Martin Institute, which started in 2009, is a collective piece of senior capstone White Papers that address a variety of current issues in the international community. From cooperation in space between nations to European press freedom laws, we were thoroughly impressed by both the diverse range of topics as well as the innovative solutions presented in each of the following papers.

The world is a complicated system in need of solutions that cross over multiple disciplines. In the Journal of the Martin Institute's tenth edition, these White Papers navigate suggestions in a way that is thought-provoking and exciting to read. Thank you to all of the seniors for their diligent research, and we hope you enjoy reading these papers as much we did.



Maggie Thornsberry



Emily Wesseling

It now becomes necessary for us to put our major global problems into a socially relevant global framework.

Our world has become too complex, too interdependent, to answer these questions by simplistic answers.

These problems call for creative thinking...

– Boyd A. Martin, founder of the Martin Institute and namesake of the Martin School, at the Institute's inauguration, 1980



2018

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Assuring U.S.-China Cooperation in Outer Space

– Jade Brown

ABSTRACT

Outer space is key to vital tasks like weather forecasting, communication, and military tracking. Due to a congressional bill, the United States and China have extremely limited cooperation in outer space, despite being two of the most influential actors. The lack of cooperation increases risk of military misperceptions, as well as threatens the safety and sustainability of the region. This essay explores five solutions to improve cooperation between the two states through different means of transparency, confidence building, norms creation, and collaboration. Due to the uncertain future of the U.S.-China relationship, this paper recommends a combination of two solutions. These are: the creation of a multilateral code of conduct for outer space, and technical U.S.-China collaboration on space weather. These solutions allow for the creation of responsible and sustainable norms for all space faring actors, as well as a steady familiarization of the two states' outer space programs.

OVERVIEW, HISTORY, CONTEXT, INTRO, DEFINITION

Outer space contains about 1,500 operational satellites, owned by more than 60 states.¹ These satellites allow everyday tasks like weather forecasting, communication, mapping, and military activity.² Outer Space is inherently a multilateral region that requires international cooperation. Five major players dominate outer space: United States, European Space Agency,

1 Joan Johnson-Freese. "Build on the Outer Space Treaty," *Nature* (2017), <https://www.nature.com/news/build-on-the-outer-space-treaty-1.22789>.

2 "Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities" (United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, New York, 2013), 8, <https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/assets/publications/studyseries/en/SS-34.pdf>.

China, Russia, and now, private corporations like SpaceX.

China and the United States have historically grappled in outer space. China is a rising star in the realm, however, their outer space program is opaque.³ In 2007, China launched a ground based anti-satellite missile to destroy an old Chinese satellite, which drew controversy from the international community fearing weaponization, and creation of space debris.⁴ Over ten years after the test, China has not released the decision making behind it.⁵ In 2011, U.S. Congress added in a budgetary bill, a limitation that disallowed National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) to fund projects that cooperate with China, due to fears over information security and espionage.⁶ Despite this, China has a flourishing space program with a strong commercial satellite market, lunar exploration program, orbiting space station, deep space exploration, and more.⁷ China has partnered with Russia, the European Space Agency, Brazil, Venezuela, and others, cementing their status as a space power.⁸ China's space program is intrinsically tied to the Communist Party's ideas of power and nationalism, as well as the People Liberation

Army's (PLA) military capabilities.⁹ Unlike the U.S., China does not have distinct military and civilian space sectors.¹⁰ Some U.S. officials fear that China is pursuing space capabilities to disrupt U.S. national security infrastructure, in order to gain leverage in terrestrial conflicts, or trigger a space war.¹¹ In the 19th Party Congress, President Xi Jinping solidified leadership, ensuring that China would continue its endeavor toward terrestrial and outer space prestige, with no sign of political reform.¹²

The United States is a historic outer space hegemon, and perceives outer space intrinsically tied to national security.¹³ Outer space holds critical infrastructure, as the U.S. relies on satellites for 80% of communication and intelligence gathering.¹⁴ At the end of 2017, President Trump passed a directive to return NASA's focus to the moon, and then to mars.¹⁵ Space policy leaders believe this is a move to symbolically restore U.S. leadership, showing that, like Xi Jinping, Trump sees

3 Brian Weeden, "US China Cooperation in Space: Constraints, Possibilities and Options," *Anti-satellite Weapons, Deterrence and Sino-American Space Relations*, *The Stimson Center* (2013): 115, <https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Anti-satellite%20Weapons%20-The%20Stimson%20Center.pdf>.

4 Ibid, 115.

5 Ibid, 116

6 Kevin Pollpeter, Eric Anderson, Jordan Wilson & Fan Yang, "China Dream, Space Dream," *Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation* (2015): vi, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%20Dream%20Space%20Dream_Report.pdf.

7 "Full Text of White Paper on China's Space Activities in 2016," *Information Office of the State Council*, last modified December 28, 2016, http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2016/12/28/content_281475527159496.htm.

8 Pollpeter et al., "China Dream, Space Dream," 27-38.

9 Dean Cheng, "Prospects for U.S.-China Space Cooperation," *Testimony before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate* (2014), <https://www.heritage.org/testimony/prospects-us-china-space-cooperation>

10 Xiaodan Wu, "China and Space Security: How to Bridge the Gap Between its Stated and Perceived Intentions," *Space Policy* 33, (2015): 23, https://ac.els-cdn.com/S0265964615300023/1-s2.0-S0265964615300023-main.pdf?_tid=17088435-87d6-41fc-9c94-d9bafd324dae&acdnat=1525974180_6d7a40225a90724e11fbcb93aa63683.

11 Michael Nacht, "The United States and China in Space: Cooperation, Competition or Both?" *Anti-satellite Weapons, Deterrence and Sino-American Space Relations*, *The Stimson Center* (2013): 109, <https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Anti-satellite%20Weapons%20-The%20Stimson%20Center.pdf>

12 Rebecca Nadin, "National People's Congress 2018: Fulfilling Xi Jinping's Chinese Dream," *ODI* (2018): <https://www.odi.org/comment/10619-national-peoples-congress-2018-fulfilling-xi-jinpings-chinese-dream>

13 Gregory L. Schulte, "China and the New National Security Space Strategy," *Testimony Before the U.S.-China Security and Economic Review Commission* (2011): 2, <https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/5.11.11Schulte.pdf>.

14 Nacht, "The United States and China in Space," 104.

15 Bryan Bender and Jacqueline Klimas, "Making America Great Again – In Space?" *Politico* (2017): <https://www.politico.com/story/2017/12/11/trump-moon-landing-us-policy-218129>.

space as key to national pride.¹⁶ Furthermore, Trump has discussed creating a ‘Space Force’ military branch and characterized space as a “war fighting domain.”¹⁷ The two leaders are poised to aggressively pursue space for military and civilian uses. With both states reliant on outer space infrastructure, lack of cooperation increases the chance of misperception, and an arm’s race.¹⁸ Furthermore, with little existing international space law, cooperation between two of the largest space actors is necessary to ensure the safety of astronauts, satellites, and the long-term sustainability of the domain.¹⁹ The growing chasm between the two states’ programs fuel suspicion towards the others’ goals and capabilities.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

APPROACH 1

Maintain the Status Quo

China and the United States both have well developed space programs. They both have partnerships and collaborations with other space faring nations to explore science and technology. The two states have successfully avoided miscalculation in outer space, despite both developing military capabilities.²⁰ China and the United States have basic interaction on necessary capabilities, like space situational awareness (SSA).²¹ The hostile political climate, coupled with distrust in cyber security might dissuade greater collaboration further than the status quo.²²

In 2014 the Department of Defense initiated

a space strategic portfolio review, which increased abilities to identify threats in space, withstand aggressive counter space programs, and counter adversary capabilities.²³ Furthermore, the interconnected economic relationship between the two countries suppresses potential conflict.²⁴ While this ignores much of the complex goals of both countries, as well as possible loss in scientific cooperation and development, the status quo already has safeguards in place for the security of space capabilities, which is the largest magnitude threat. Furthermore, outer space cooperation is much more contingent on the overall relationship, rather than lead the exchange.²⁵ It is important to not overstate the diplomatic benefits and remember that other parts of the relationship may need enhancement for successful outer space collaboration.

APPROACH 2

Bilateral Agreement on Confidence Building and Transparency Measures

The Report of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBM) in Outer Space Activities recommended a series of implementable measures to increase cooperation and transparency in outer space. Both China and the United States had representatives in the creation of this group report.²⁶ TCBM include informational measures such as sharing budgets, consultative modalities such as facilitating dialogue, notification requirements such as reasonable notification of launches, constraint mechanisms such as prohibition of ground based anti-satellite tests, and access measures such as launch site inspections.²⁷ The GGE

16 Ibid.

17 Zachary Cohen, “Trump Pushes Idea of Adding ‘Space Force’ to US Military,” *CNN* (2018): <https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/01/politics/trump-space-force-us-military/index.html>.

18 Brian Weeden, “An Opportunity to Use the Space Domain to Strengthen the U.S.-China Relationship,” *The National Bureau of Asian Research* (2015): <http://nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=602>

19 Ibid.

20 Pollpeter et al., “China Dream, Space Dream,” 16.

21 Cheng, “Prospects for U.S.-China Space Cooperation.”

22 Ibid.

23 Brian Weeden et al., “The United States, China, and Space Security: Issues for the Trump Administration,” *Secure World Foundation* (2017): https://swfound.org/media/205709/jw_uschinaspacesec_17012017.pdf.

24 Nacht, “The United States and China in Space,” 101.

25 Pollpeter et al., “China Dream, Space Dream,” 115.

26 “Report of the Group of Governmental Experts,” 4-6.

27 Jana Robinson, “Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures for Space Security,” *Space Policy* 37 (August 2016): 134, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.spacepol.2016.11.003>.

report contains specific policies to consider, as well as a guidelines to test transparency and confidence building measures shown in Appendix 1.

Space situational awareness (SSA) is a key part of transparency, and a bilateral agreement to make this information available to China, satellite operators, and the public, would improve transparency, as well as mitigate accidents and misperceptions.²⁸ Currently, only the U.S. Air Force Space Command possesses comprehensive capability of accurate spacecraft and debris position, future trajectories, and collision probability.²⁹

Using this document as a guide, the two countries could engage in diplomatic discussion to create a bilateral agreement to implement these measures. However, governments could regard a bilateral agreement as unpopular, if they believe they are exposing sensitive national security information, a key concern of both states.

APPROACH 3

Multilateral Adoption of an International Code of Conduct

In 2008 the European Union published a draft proposal of the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities.³⁰ The EU proposed this voluntary agreement with no formal enforcement mechanism, to complement existing treaties and agreements, like the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.³¹ Participating states should negotiate the Code of Conduct and finish it past the May 2014 edit. Acceptance of the five major outer space powers (United States, China, ESA, Russia, and private corporations) is key to the code's influence.

The code is predicated on three principles: freedom of access to space for peaceful

purposes, preservation of the security and integrity of space objects in orbit, and due consideration for the legitimate defense interests of the states.³² Similar to approach 2, the code has TCBMs as well as improvements to SSA.³³ The code also outlines a way to conduct diplomatic consultations, a central point of contact, and regular meetings of subscribed states.³⁴ While it would not establish a direct point of cooperation between China and the United States, it would reinforce international norms and responsible behavior in outer space. Furthermore, a multilateral option might be more feasible due to international pressure. The ESA has outer space partnerships with both parties, and a deep understanding of their goals and programs.³⁵ The European Union strives to act as a normative force in outer space negotiation and could mediate disputes between the United States and China.³⁶

APPROACH 4

Direct Cooperation on Space Weather

Space weather is the environmental conditions near Earth caused by sun and solar wind that deal with plasma, radiation, particle flows, etc.³⁷ It can have a large effect on space based systems, ground based systems, and even the health and safety of astronauts.³⁸ Scientists can collaborate on space weather projects through solar monitoring, and building and launching satellites for the Earth Sun L1 point.³⁹ This is a relatively bottom up approach to collaboration, as scientists in NASA and the China National

32 Ibid.

33 "International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities," (Working Document, European Union): 7, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/non-proliferation-and-disarmament/pdf/space_code_conduct_draft_vers_31-march-2014_en.pdf.

34 Ibid, 11—13.

35 Pollpeter et al., "China Dream, Space Dream," 28.

36 Robinson, "Transparency and Confidence-Building," 141.

37 "About Space Weather," *European Space Agency: Space Situational Awareness*, accessed April 2, 2018. <http://swe.ssa.esa.int/what-is-space-weather>.

38 Ibid.

39 Weeden, "US China Cooperation in Space," 124.

28 Weeden, "An Opportunity to Use the Space Domain."

29 Robinson, "Transparency and Confidence-Building," 138.

30 Micah Zenko, "A Code of Conduct for Outer Space," *Council on Foreign Relations* (2011), <https://www.cfr.org/report/code-conduct-outer-space>.

31 Ibid.

Space Administration (CNSA) would lead the collaboration, rather than heads of states, or other government entities.⁴⁰ As a direct NASA-CNSA project, congress must repeal the limitation on funding in the Fiscal Year 2011 bill.

Space weather collaboration is low risk in technology transfer and cyber espionage.⁴¹ Furthermore, these collaborations would be relatively low cost, so neither country would need to invest high amounts of funding for the project.⁴² China has cited high interest in bilateral collaboration on space weather.⁴³

However, while this is a potentially safe and low risk venture, the public is not likely to hold significant interest, limiting the possible effectiveness towards the greater relationship.⁴⁴ The collaboration might not solve high level military misperceptions, however it would open the door to future partnerships, and begin a path of mutual understanding.

APPROACH 5

Direct Cooperation on Manned Lunar Mission

Human spaceflight can include a variety of missions, however as both states plan lunar expeditions, this could be the most fruitful. The Chinese Chang-e lunar program, and recent U.S. presidential directive show overlap which could be a means for cooperation. The U.S. directive cited interest in international and corporate partnerships.⁴⁵ Human spaceflight is high profile, which receives significant attention from the public, as well as heads of state. Human spaceflight comes with a large degree of nationalism and prestige, which creates positives and negatives. Heads of state and higher up officials are more likely to hold interest, pushing the project faster and ensuring

more funding than scientists could alone.⁴⁶ Manned lunar missions are expensive, and by collaborating, the two countries can decrease the overall cost.⁴⁷ This close collaboration on a very public mission could quickly improve the relationship between higher ups, clarify goals that both states have in outer space, and decrease misperception.

However, human space flight requires high technology transfer, which could raise security concerns between the two states.⁴⁸ Furthermore, differences in goals and technology might make this collaboration fruitless scientifically, and just for show. Since both states have a perception of prestige linked to a manned lunar mission, they might be less likely to make concessions that are necessary in a technical partnership.

RECOMMENDATION

Creation and Adoption of an International Code of Conduct and Direct Cooperation on Space Weather

Outer space will morph and adapt over continued use. It is difficult to create lasting solutions in a realm with such a high rate of technological advancement. A combination of approach 3 and 4 are the recommended actions. These solutions combine multilateral norm creation, with direct bilateral collaboration, to foster sustainable changes in the way all space faring actors treat outer space, and in the U.S.-China relationship. The current international treaties on outer space are not enough amidst the complex relationship between actors, and constant evolving use. The code of conduct is a strong establishment of soft law, which outer space policy has come to rely on.⁴⁹ While it is non-binding and non-enforcing it creates necessary norms that have been absent in this realm. Oceans have generally accepted norms and rules in which it is easy to identify rogue

40 Ibid, 125.

41 Ibid, 125.

42 Ibid, 125.

43 "Full Text of White Paper on China's Space Activities in 2016."

44 Weeden, "US China Cooperation in Space," 125.

45 Bender and Klimas, "Making America Great Again - In Space?"

46 Ibid, 122.

47 Ibid, 121.

48 Ibid, 122.

49 Peter Jankowitsch, "The Background and History of Space Law," in *Handbook of Space Law*, ed. Frans von der Dunk and Fabio Tronchetti (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2015), 25.

actors, a code of conduct would aid in creating the same culture for outer space.⁵⁰ Diplomatic consultations and meetings create groundwork that members could share evolving concerns. Furthermore, the ICOC will impact non-state entities, necessary for the rise of private corporations in space.⁵¹ The European Union is uniquely qualified to lead the negotiation of this code of conduct, and to mediate and resolve issues between states.⁵² All space faring and non-space faring states should contribute to the development of the code into its creation. The code includes improvements in TCBMs and SSA that incorporate the positives of approach 2, while releasing the pressure and security concern of a bilateral agreement. Furthermore, the code would be longstanding, and more likely to survive changes of administration, and adverse political climates to create a lasting solution.

Cooperation on space weather science would complement the development of an International Code of Conduct and place more focus on the direct bilateral relationship. The study of space weather would have scientific benefit for the two states, and the international community.⁵³ The collaboration is low risk, and the ESA has already collaborated with China on similar areas, without security complication.⁵⁴ U.S. and Chinese scientists can familiarize programs, while working mostly outside of the pressure of the greater relationship. A project like this is more likely to survive a potential scare in relations, while states are likely to cancel a manned lunar mission if something goes awry. With ongoing friction in trade, and the South China Sea, the U.S.-China relationship is uncertain. Therefore, it is beneficial to start small and increase flow of communication and understanding, rather than immediately committing to a high cost, high risk project. China does not need to cooperate with the United States to advance in outer space.

Regardless of cooperation, China will continue to develop outer space technology, and military applications. This direct collaboration is important, because continuing to ignore China in the realm of outer space will not prevent them from becoming a major space actor, it will only restrict technological development and increase danger and misperception. 

50 Robinson, "Transparency and Confidence-Building," 135.

51 Jankowitsch, "The Background and History of Space Law," 23.

52 Ibid, 144.

53 Weeden, "US China Cooperation in Space," 125.

54 Pollpeter et al., "China Dream, Space Dream," 28.

APPENDICES

Appendix A

Testing transparency and confidence-building measures

	<i>Implementation</i>	<i>Demonstration</i>
Who	Who should implement the measure?	Who will be able to confirm that the measure has been implemented?
What	What is the measure that should be implemented? Is it clearly identified and understood?	What should be demonstrated to confirm implementation?
Why	What is the value or benefit of performing the measure?	Does a clear understanding of why it is important to be able to confirm or demonstrate implementation exist?
When	When should the measure be implemented?	At what point is demonstration or confirmation performed?
How	How should the measure be implemented?	How is implementation of the measure validated, demonstrated or confirmed?

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Improving Global Resilience against Coercive Geoeconomic Strategies

– Briggs Jackson

ABSTRACT

The use of geoeconomics has been increasing in popularity among states' when making foreign policy decisions. Increasing economic interdependence among the international community leaves states subject to morally questionable practices of economic coercion. This paper evaluates examples of coercive geoeconomics, discusses its impact on vulnerable states, and observes several policy recommendations to increase states' levels of resilience. After observing the recommended courses of action, it is concluded that states should begin creating internal national government agencies specifically dedicated to geoeconomic affairs. This would allow states to begin more effectively implementing geoeconomic strategy as a means of defense and help establish a more mutually understood concept of the ethical boundaries involved.

OVERVIEW AND HISTORY

Geoeconomics as a technique of statecraft is becoming increasingly sophisticated; and it seems that its potential for innovation is only limited by creativity. As the balance of power between states continually shifts, governments constantly look for new strategies to achieve their political objectives. In its most basic conceptual framework, geoeconomics can be defined as “the use of economic instruments by states to achieve beneficial geopolitical results”.¹ Over the past few decades, rapid advancement in technology created intensified levels of globalization and economic integration. This growth in interdependence has created new channels for states to exercise power over one another; giving those with larger economies

¹ Blackwill, Robert D., and Jennifer M. Harris. *War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft*. USA: First Harvard University Press, 2016.

a huge political advantage.² Recent evidence of the leverage that geoeconomics can possess has states' investing more into its use and is quickly becoming the preferential technique in foreign policy. While it has proven effective at reaching diplomatic agreements, serious concerns arise when it assumes a more coercive form.³ When lacking moral integrity, aggressive economic tactics imposed on weaker states can leave them without a sense of autonomy or self-determination; ultimately forcing them to submit to the political will of the sender. Some scholars have even considered its possibility as a functional equivalent to war.⁴

Since WWII, considerable effort has been made to more strictly define economic coercion's status under international law.⁵ Concerns around its lack of definitive moral boundaries grew in the post-Cold War era due to globalization. Since 1965, the UN has passed several declarations and resolutions addressing the disapproval of coercive economic measures. However, conflicting interpretations by member states have created a lack of progress and no specific policy changes have taken place. According to the last report to the UN Secretary-General in August 2017, there is a consensus of disapproval among member states, even though some are responsible for such behavior.⁶ Certain states' display of geoeconomic power is a direct threat to the welfare of individual states, the stability of the international economy, and the global balance of power.

Several examples can be provided where states use coercive geoeconomic strategies that push moral boundaries to compel support for their policies. For example, China has provided more loans to Latin American countries than the

International Monetary Fund and World Bank combined. Their loans give credit to states that are incapable of repaying them so they can use the debt as political leverage.⁷ Russia commonly uses product bans and shuts off sources of energy/transportation to Eastern European countries to deter support for NATO and the EU.⁸ The United States' trade embargo on Cuba has effectively stalled development and reduced the state's quality of life.⁹ These forms of economic aggression are a signal that states must find ways to mitigate existing vulnerabilities and increase resilience against coercive geoeconomic influence attempts.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

APPROACH ONE

The Creation of Geoeconomic Agencies

As concerns against economic coercion grow, states must deal with its increasing complexity and how to respond most effectively. States can reevaluate their bureaucratic structure to appropriately incorporate the increasing role that geoeconomics will play in foreign policy. Through the creation of an agency solely dedicated to its understanding and implementation, states can more efficiently start shifting their power into these economic sources of political influence.¹⁰ Such an agency would play a few fundamental roles that are suggested.

First, it should draft a strategic geoeconomic plan that seeks to answer important questions regarding objectives, analysis, risk

2 Munoz, J. M. *Advances in Geoeconomics*. New York: Routledge, 2017.

3 Global Agenda Council on Geo-economics. "The Age of Economic Coercion: How Geo-politics is Disrupting Supply Chains, Financial Systems, Energy Markets, Trade and the Internet."

4 Baldwin, David A. *Economic Statecraft*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985.

5 Carter, Barry E. "Economic Coercion." *Oxford Public International Law*.

6 United Nations. "Unilateral economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion against developing countries."

7 Sanderson, Henry, and Michael Forsythe. *China's Superbank: Debt, Oil and Influence - How China Development Bank is Rewriting the Rules of Finance*. Singapore: Jon Wiley and Sons Singapore Pte. Ltd, 2013.

8 Ibid.

9 Schreiber, Anna P. "Economic Coercion as an Instrument of Foreign Policy: U.S. Economic Measures Against Cuba and the Dominican Republic." *World Politics* 25, no. 3 (1973): 387-413. doi:10.2307/2010117.

10 Prestowitz, Clyde. "China's Not Breaking the Rules. It's Playing a Different Game," *Foreign Policy Journal*. 2012.

assessment, funding, and implementation.¹¹ Once a framework has been set, the agency should focus on establishing rules of economic engagement.¹² This will provide a blueprint for a more specified code of conduct that can be discussed with the international community. The agency should also optimize geoeconomic leverage through policies regarding trade, foreign direct investment, sovereign wealth funds, assistance, and other instruments.¹³ Lastly, it should serve as a watchdog of geoeconomic activity to increase levels of accountability and awareness. States can more thoroughly collaborate with allies to advise one another on the implications of economic agreements, interdependence, and multilateral options.

APPROACH TWO

Invest in Energy Independence and Development Aid

Pairing these two strategies can help states reduce the geoeconomic leverage that other states have over them, while creating advantages of their own. Since energy is the single most important resource for welfare and productivity, energy dependence serves as the largest geoeconomic vulnerability for states. States can invest more in renewable energy and capital to extract domestic resources to minimize the power that energy-rich states have over them. Russia's abundant stock of energy serves as its primary geoeconomic instrument. The state commonly uses the construction of pipelines and threats of energy shutoffs to tamper with EU policy and prevent Eastern European support for the EU and NATO. They have also begun providing "no strings attached" nuclear energy to Gulf states, which will surely

create future political advantages in the Middle East.¹⁴

Economic assistance is a classic example of geoeconomics. A larger focus on symbiotic solutions with trusted states is an ideal principle for increasing global resilience against economic coercion. States should begin providing more development aid to emerging economies as a long-term geoeconomic investment because the political influence tends to be magnified due to their initial vulnerability. Mutually beneficial economic strategies like development aid can help increase the relative geoeconomic influence of both the sender and receiver. It is a powerful way to achieve support for policies, form alliances, and stimulate growth.¹⁵

APPROACH THREE

Negotiate More Economic Treaties Between States

The suggestive nature of international law usually sparks debate between member states over how the provisions should be interpreted. States will usually value the principle of sovereignty over international policy whenever there is conflict between the two, which leads to a lack of compliance.¹⁶ In contrast, the provisions of treaties tend to be more defined and there is a higher sense of obligation to comply.¹⁷ The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), later replaced by the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), serve as examples of economic agreements that effectively regulate the behavior of states (Appendix A).¹⁸

States should focus on building more treaties to protect their geoeconomic interests. Trade agreements that eliminate bilateral market

11 Ibid.

12 Bayne, Nicholas, and Stephen Woolcock. *The New Economic Diplomacy: Decision-Making and Negotiation in International Economic Relations*. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2011.

13 Judkins, Benjamin. "Economic Statecraft and Political Influence: A unified approach to positive and negative sanctions." *Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Le Centre Sheraton Hotel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada*. March 17, 2004.

14 Alexandris, Ioannis. "Russian Energy Policy and the Art of Geoeconomics." IDIS.

15 Global Agenda Council. "Geo-economics Seven Challenges to Globalization."

16 Wood, Michael. "International Law and the Use of Force: What Happens in Practice?" United Nations.

17 Farer, Tom J. "Political and Economic Coercion in Contemporary International Law." *The American Journal of International Law* 79, no. 2 (1985): 405-13. doi:10.2307/2201710

18 World Trade Organization. "WTO legal texts."

barriers can increase economic productivity between countries while reducing the potential for aggressive economic interaction.¹⁹ Such agreements can include provisions that explicitly protect them from economic coercion, which can be mutually and more specifically defined between the participating states.²⁰ Due to increasing levels of economic interdependence, a higher frequency of active treaties could effectively reduce the use of coercive geoeconomic measures.

APPROACH FOUR

Regional Economic Coalition Building

Countries should begin aligning their economic interests with states at a regional level before pursuing geoeconomic objectives on an international scale. According to the WTO, there are six levels of economic integration: trade areas, customs unions, common markets, economic unions, monetary unions, and fiscal unions.²¹ Through regional integration agreements (RIA), states can create mutually beneficial alliances that will help integrate their markets, synchronize business cycles, and strengthen economies.²² The involvement of multiple states can also soften the burden required to stimulate effective development of the area's weaker states. States that have successfully built regional economic coalitions also become more persuasive at the international level because they can collectively advocate for policies that advance their geopolitical goals.²³ This strategy can be effective at reducing economic leverage held by less trustworthy states due to a shift in the

pattern of trade and investment. States will become more reluctant to exercise coercive tactics because of the coalition's ability to respond multilaterally.²⁴

RECOMMENDED COURSE OF ACTION

Due to the varying geopolitical circumstances of states, governments should create internal national agencies exclusively for conducting geoeconomic affairs. While the other solutions presented are likely to be appropriate responses, they are far too specific for universal application. The primary advantage of an agency is that options for implementing policy is not limited. There is a need for specialization in the field because of its rapidly evolving and unpredictable nature. States can then maximize the efficiency of human capital needed to address the geoeconomic vulnerabilities that exist relative to their unique situation.

Councils that currently exists, like the United States' National Economic Council, oversee a range of economic policy that is far too broad, which undermines the potential for the constant implementation of geoeconomic strategy. This new agency would seek to innovate how states use geoeconomics and differ from existing institutions because of its narrow focus. A governing strategic plan would ensure that the agency is acting within a set of defined parameters that keeps its operations to those of a strictly geoeconomic nature. It would constantly identify any geoeconomic action needed to optimize strength and address any vulnerabilities. It would ease the process of collaboration between allies by constraining discussion strictly to geoeconomic strategy, rather than opening the possibility for larger disagreements. A newly defined set of rules for economic engagement is also critical. Not only would it provide an individual ethical framework for states, but it opens new international discussions for finding a more widely accepted, but more narrowly defined set

19 Pastor, Robert A. "Shortcut to U.S. Economic Competitiveness: A Seamless North American Market." *Council on Foreign Relations* (March 5, 2013).

20 Ibid.


21 Geneva: World Trade World Trade Report. *World Trade Report 2011*.

22 Te Velde, Dirk Willem. "Regional Integration, Growth and Convergence." *Journal of Economic Integration* 26, no. 1 (2011): 1-28. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23000906>.

23 Capanelli et. al. "Economic interdependence in Asia: developing indicators for regional integration and cooperation." *The Singapore Economics Review*. 2010: 55(1): 125-161

24 Buthe, T. and Milner, H. "The politics of foreign direct investment into developing countries: Increasing FDI through international trade agreements?" *American Journal of Political Science*. (2008): 52: 741-762

of moral boundaries for geoeconomic practice. This would make holding aggressive states accountable much easier by prompting larger multilateral responses from the international community.

It should be noted that the formation of an international moral standard is not guaranteed, which is why a national agency could also serve as a domestic geoeconomic watchdog. Increased activism will contribute toward higher levels of accountability and help raise a new awareness of the topic for disadvantaged states. Many states have already begun using some of the recommended solutions such as treaty-building, development aid, and energy independence to protect themselves from coercive behavior. This can be seen through existing free-trade agreements, foreign investment in the emerging economies of Africa and Latin America, and the increased use of renewable energy sources. These sorts of trends have proven to be effective ways of strengthening ones geoeconomic status and protection from coercion. States must be ready to protect themselves from the future of foreign policy. By recognizing the importance of geoeconomics and committing to a shift in preferences, states can more aptly defend the balance of power from shifting into the immoral hands of a few economic giants. 

APPENDICES:

APPENDIX A

Explanation of International Economic Treaties

The GATT was a legal agreement formed in 1947 between countries that aimed to reduce trade barriers such as tariffs and quotas to promote mutually advantageous economic interaction. This agreement created seven rounds of discussions between participating states until the final round of discussions, known as the Uruguay Round, established the WTO in 1994 to act as a formal intergovernmental organization that regulates trade through a comprehensive list of international legal agreements. The WTO works with its 123 participating states by providing a framework for negotiating trade agreements and a dispute resolution process.



Addressing Water Insecurity in the Andes

– Alma Delic’

ABSTRACT:

The Andes Mountains of South America are home to a unique freshwater landscape in the form of tropical glaciers. Because of increased warming and changing weather patterns, the glaciers are depleting at rapid rates, and may disappear altogether in the upcoming 20 years. The glaciers provide essential freshwater melt, and their depletion has begun to exacerbate existing water conflicts. In order to address water insecurity in the Andes, solutions are proposed to increase access to water technology, improve governance and open dialogue, address inequity in water access, and mitigate freshwater pollution. Because of the complicated state of public relations between the governments of Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Colombia, and their citizens, the recommended solution prioritizes efforts to improve water management before addressing social conflicts. A multilateral approach allows the region to address immediate concerns like pollution, and water scarcity, while building a base for long-term solutions in the future.

OVERVIEW:

Access to clean water is a basic human necessity, one that can prove difficult to provide even in countries with freshwater resources. According to the World Health Organization, water scarcity affects 4 in 10 people, and worldwide, over 2 billion people do not have access to adequate drinking water services.¹ In South America in particular, this issue has become more visible through the increasing loss of water security in the Andes. The UN defines water security as, “the capacity of a population to safeguard sustainable access to adequate quantities of acceptable quality water,” and use it to sustain well-being, development,

¹ "Water". Un.org, 2018. <http://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/water/>.

and livelihoods.² While natural topography, infrastructure, and weather events like El Niño can affect access to water under normal circumstances, climate change has begun to impact water security by further changing the landscape and weather patterns.

Increased warming has had devastating effects in the Andes' tropical glaciers which are located primarily in Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Colombia. Exposure to temperature changes, coupled with effects from humidity and El Niño rainfall, have increased the speed and severity of glacial retreat.³ In Peru, where approximately 70% of the tropical glaciers exist: glaciers declined by 22% in the period between 1970 and 1997.⁴ Other countries in the Andean region, including Bolivia, Ecuador, and Colombia have seen similar serious levels of decline, and are facing a wide range of effects that will increase without proper mitigation strategies: including the threat of extreme drought or flood, and overall reduced water availability.⁵ For example, deadly floods occurring from glacial lake overflow in the Peruvian Ancash region under the Cordillera Blanca mountain range have killed nearly 25,000 people since 1941.⁶ Glacial retreat in the Andes has also had significant effects on water availability, impacting industries such as agriculture and

energy production⁷ The relationship between the government and the public regarding water was significantly altered by neo-liberal policies enacted in the 1990s, which supported the desires of companies (in sectors like energy production) to commercialize the water, over what many considered to be proper water management.⁸

Tensions regarding water insecurity in the Andes increase because of factors including disparities between rural and urban access to water, protests from local indigenous populations when confronted with non-traditional water management strategies, and costly water management without immediate visible benefits. Every nation in the Andes faces significant impending water concerns that cannot improve without the cooperation of the public, strategic changes to governmental policy, and the financial assistance of outside NGOs and investors. Because governments cannot control the climate's negative impacts on glaciers, in the short term, their focus should be on improving the management of freshwater in the region. In order to address the issue of water insecurity in the Andes, nations need to confront conflicts within their own borders, including the need for more government accountability, and existing gaps in proper water management and access.

2 "What Is Water Security? Infographic | UN-Water". UN-Water, 2013. <http://www.unwater.org/publications/water-security-infographic/>.

3 Mishra, Anil, and Koen Verbist. 2017. *The Impact of Glacial Retreat In The Andes: International Multidisciplinary Network For Adaptation Strategies; Accomplishment Report*. Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0025/002581/258168e.pdf>, See Appendix A.

4 Miroff, Nick. 2017. "As Peru's Glaciers Melt, Its Problems Are Only Beginning". *Washington Post*. http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/world/2017/08/07/peru-glaciers-have-made-it-a-laboratory-for-adapting-to-climate-change-its-not-going-well/?utm_term=.84f0899cd14d, Mishra and Verbist, *The Impact Of Glacial Retreat In The Andes: International Multidisciplinary Network For Adaptation Strategies; Accomplishment Report*.

5 Rangelcroft, Sally, Stephan Harrison, Karen Anderson, John Magrath, Ana Castel, and Paola Pacheco. "Climate Change and Water Resources in Arid Mountains: An Example from the Bolivian Andes." *AMBIO* 42, no. 7 (2013): 852-63.

6 Carey, Mark. *In the Shadow of Melting Glaciers: Climate Change and Andean Society*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

SOLUTION 1

Expanding access to water technology

The maintenance of natural aquifers is essential to the efficient use and distribution of water. In the Andes, glacial runoff is the key to the economy of the entire region, be it through

7 World Bank. *Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru – Adaptation to the Impact of Rapid Glacier Retreat in the Tropical Andes Project* (English). Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2014, <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/578191468009593969/Bolivia-Ecuador-and-Peru-8211-Adaptation-to-the-Impact-of-Rapid-Glacier-Retreat-in-the-Tropical-Andes-Project>

8 Paerregaard, Stensrud, and Andersen. "WATER CITIZENSHIP: Negotiating Water Rights and Contesting Water Culture in the Peruvian Andes." *Latin American Research Review* 51, no. 1 (2016): p 199.

hydroelectricity or farming⁹ For that reason, increasing access to technology, and using it as a tool to inform both governmental policy, and private use, is critical step toward addressing water insecurity. In Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia, modern glacial monitoring technology, like satellites, can help analyze runoff rates.¹⁰ The technology, supported by funding from local governments and outside entities like the World Bank, allows researchers to make estimates regarding the amount of remaining freshwater through glacier mass balance.¹¹

Additionally, states can address water insecurity by using new floodwater mitigation technology in historically flood-prone areas.¹² By using new technology like water probes to measure increases in glacial meltwater year-round, water agencies can both recognize when to release water to prevent flooding disasters more efficiently, and know how much of the released water can be distributed to communities.¹³ Conservation-based farming technologies such as drip-sprinkler systems can also be implemented.¹⁴ Unfortunately, these technologies are expensive, and, even alongside assistance from NGOs or IGOs, private citizens, in the case of sprinklers, are responsible for paying at least 10% of the cost.¹⁵ Andean governments should expand access to technology with initiatives, such as tax breaks, and cooperation with international partners.

SOLUTION 2:

Improve governance strategies with a focus on creating open dialogue

Water insecurity in the Andes, compounds due to poor governance. Regional presidents and legislators cannot stop the climatic warming that is impacting water security by way of glaciers receding, but they have historically created divisive water policies that have negatively impacted trust and open dialogue between governmental leaders and their people. Many of these policies prioritized neo-liberal economic desires which ultimately resulted in increased water access for financially-productive industries and large urban areas, but left rural residents, and traditional watershed control behind.¹⁶ In the Andes, indigenous populations often view water as a right, not a commodity to manipulated by the government for financial gain.¹⁷

Increased water insecurity because of previous policies has threatened livelihoods, which has historically incited protests and increased governmental distrust among Andean peoples.¹⁸ In order to address water insecurity, regional governments need citizens to actively participate in healthy water practices, and to contribute taxes that help maintain or build new water infrastructure.¹⁹ Citizens are more likely to adapt to new regulations or policies if they feel that the policy will benefit them directly.²⁰ Therefore, to achieve participation, governments in the Andes need to invest in better community relations: including facilitating open dialogue, and supporting

9 Vergara, Walter. "Economic Impacts Of Rapid Glacier Retreat In The Andes". EOS 88, no. 25 (2007).

10 World Bank. Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru – Adaptation to the Impact of Rapid Glacier Retreat in the Tropical Andes Project, p. 3.

11 Mishra, Anil, and Koen Verbist. 2017. The Impact of Glacial Retreat In The Andes: International Multidisciplinary Network For Adaptation Strategies; Accomplishment Report. 9.

12 Carey, Mark. In the Shadow of Melting Glaciers: Climate Change and Andean Society. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

13 Miroff, Nick. 2017. "As Peru's Glaciers Melt, Its Problems Are Only Beginning".

14 Stensrud, Astrid Bredholt. "Commodifying Water in Times of Global Warming." NACLA Report on The Americas 46, no. 1 (Spring2013 2013): 32-37. Academic Search, EBSCOhost.

15 Ibid., p. 35.

16 Paerregaard, Stensrud, and Andersen. "WATER CITIZENSHIP: Negotiating Water Rights and Contesting Water Culture in the Peruvian Andes."

17 Murtinho, Felipe. "What Facilitates Adaptation? An Analysis of Community-based Adaptation to Environmental Change in the Andes." International Journal Of The Commons 10, no. 1 (2016): 119-41.

18 Orlove, Ben. "Glacier Retreat: Reviewing The Limits Of Human Adaptation To Climate Change". Environmentmagazine.Org, 2009. <http://www.environmentmagazine.org/Archives/Back%20Issues/May-June%202009/Orlove-full.html>.

19 Paerregaard, Stensrud, and Andersen. "WATER CITIZENSHIP: Negotiating Water Rights and Contesting Water Culture in the Peruvian Andes."

20 Murtinho, Felipe. "What Facilitates Adaptation? An Analysis of Community-based Adaptation to Environmental Change in the Andes."

participation in community-based governance of water resources. Improving relations will not only foster better dialogue, but also help create more inclusive policy and adaptive planning for future water issues.²¹

SOLUTION 3

Addressing issues of equity in water access

In the Andes, citizens in rural communities often have less access to water due to historical priorities in terms of infrastructure. Also, in many situations where there is access to water, there is still not equity in water distribution or water quality. For example, even when drinking water access among rural populations in Latin America reached 65%, only 36% of the overall population had a household connection to safe drinking water.²² To mitigate water insecurity, governments must revisit policies and practices that negatively affect poor and rural citizens. The governments of Andean countries view water as a finite resource and have decided to treat it as a commodity, taxing citizens for its use in order to create and maintain water infrastructure.²³ However, the creation of this infrastructure is dependent on funding that comes from taxes, as well as tariffs and transfers, that private citizens in urban areas often have more influence over because they typically pay more regularly into the system²⁴

Additionally, governmental policies, (e.g. the 2009 Peruvian Water Law,) support the use of incentives which have allowed corporations to pay less while profiting from the water, while smaller, often rural, communities

have shouldered the burden.²⁵ In order to combat such policies, citizen participation in governance, and activism is needed.²⁶ When treated unfairly by companies acting on warped incentives, people have a right to demand that corporations pay a social water payment as compensation to the people living in the headwaters they use.²⁷ Recent laws in Peru and Ecuador have demonstrated that activism yields results.²⁸

SOLUTION 4

Addressing freshwater pollution

Tropical glaciers in the Andes provide freshwater to millions through tributaries that flow to the Pacific coast.²⁹ Those tributaries are especially important to semi-arid areas, because more than 80% of freshwater available in the tropics originates in the mountains.³⁰ In order to address increasing water insecurity, freshwater in rivers and lakes needs to remain viable for human use. Unfortunately, due to poor wastewater (fecal and graywater) management, pesticide use, and mining pollution, freshwater sources are becoming increasingly polluted despite sanitation initiatives.³¹ Water pollution is not a new challenge for the region, as pollution

21 Urwin, K. "Does Public Policy Support or Undermine Climate Change Adaptation? Exploring Policy Interplay across Different Scales of Governance." *Global Environmental Change* 18, no. 1 (2008): 180-91.

22 Pearce-Oroz, Glenn. *Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Challenges in Latin America for the Next Decade: Lessons from the "Cusco 10" International Seminar, 2011, Water and Sanitation Program Guidance Note.*, See Appendix B.

23 Felgendreher, Simon, and Paul Lehmann. "Public Choice and Urban Water Tariffs—Analytical Framework and Evidence From Peru." *The Journal of Environment & Development* 25, no. 1 (2016): 73-99.

24 Ibid.

25 Harriman, Lindsey. *Where Will The Water Go? Impacts Of Accelerated Glacier Melt In The Tropical Andes.* Ebook. UNEP, 2013. https://na.unep.net/geas/archive/pdfs/GEAS_Sep2013_Andes.pdf.

26 Stensrud, Astrid Bredholt. "Commodifying Water in Times of Global Warming."

27 Roa-García, María. "Equity, Efficiency and Sustainability in Water Allocation in the Andes: Trade-offs in a Full World." *Water Alternatives* 7, no. 2 (2014): 298-319.

28 Ibid., p. 312. See Appendix C.

29 Harriman, Lindsey. *Where Will The Water Go? Impacts Of Accelerated Glacier Melt In The Tropical Andes.* Ebook. UNEP, 2013. https://na.unep.net/geas/archive/pdfs/GEAS_Sep2013_Andes.pdf.

30 Ibid., p. 1.

31 Williams, Heather. "WHAT LIES BENEATH: AN ECO-HISTORICAL VIEW OF HIGH ANDES WATER POLLUTION." *Ambiente and Sociedade* 18, no. 1 (2015): 175-89. See Appendix C.

from mercury mining began as far back as 1400 B.C. and has only increased through gold placer mining.³²

Gold placer mining has been particularly detrimental to fluvial systems in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru, because gold particles left in the floodplain can, "cause toxicity in human and living beings."³³ The result of decades of environmental neglect of freshwater is visible today in water bodies like the Yacuambi river system in Ecuador, that is been labeled, "inadequate for human consumption, the preservation of aquatic life, and unsuitable for irrigation due to measures of chemical and fecal pollution."³⁴ Initiatives to combat pollution have been set back historically by the monetary gains of high gold prices, poor management of information by water authorities, and limited options for adequate disposal of waste.³⁵ In order to mitigate and manage freshwater pollution, state water and health agencies must work together with NGOs and local populations to create water quality monitoring projects, and improve water treatment infrastructure.

RECOMMENDED SOLUTION:

A multilateral approach

Tropical glaciers are an essential part of the fluvial, ecological, and economic systems of the Andean region.³⁶ Their decline at the hand of climate change threatens to exacerbate water insecurity that is already present due to poor water management, internal conflicts,

and inequitable distribution of water. While new laws that refer to water as a public good exists in Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia, water remains managed by the state.³⁷ Because of the diverse challenges present regarding water insecurity, the best approach is a multilateral effort to improve water management in order to understand and use the remaining water efficiently. This approach is a combination of solutions 1-4, that prioritizes solutions one, three, and four. Solution two is equally important, but in order to create more open dialogue and improve government/community relations, the community must first have access to information that they feel will provide visible results.³⁸ Therefore, to provide viable solutions, government initiatives should be expanded, with support from NGOs and IGOs, to study conservation-based water management options, be it through technology or wastewater infrastructure. Technology should be made more accessible regionally because it can both improve water conservation efforts and allow governing bodies to understand the state of local aquifers, like glacial lakes.³⁹

Inequity is another resounding issue within water insecurity, and if it continues to grow in the region, then cities will continue to see an influx of climate migrants who can no longer survive without water access.⁴⁰ New legislation, in Peru and Ecuador, is a positive step forward, allowing for increased rights to water and new avenues for participation in water management.⁴¹ Also, it is critical that as glacier water depletes, freshwater in rivers and lakes either remains consumable, or is made to be more viable for both humans and animals. If unsafe mining and wastewater dumping practices continue,

32 Cooke, Colin A, Prentiss H Balcom, Harald Biester, and Alexander P Wolfe. "Over Three Millennia of Mercury Pollution in the Peruvian Andes." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 106, no. 22 (2009): 8830-4.

33 Villa-Achupallas, Rosado, Aguilar, and Galindo-Riaño. "Water Quality in the Tropical Andes Hotspot: The Yacuambi River (southeastern Ecuador)." *Science of the Total Environment* 633 (2018). p. 51.

34 *Ibid.*, p. 50.

35 Pearce-Oroz, Glenn. *Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Challenges in Latin America for the Next Decade: Lessons from the "Cusco 10" International Seminar, 2011, Water and Sanitation Program Guidance Note.* p. 14., Williams, Heather. "WHAT LIES BENEATH: AN ECO-HISTORICAL VIEW OF HIGH ANDES WATER POLLUTION."

36 Orlove, Ben. "Glacier Retreat: Reviewing The Limits Of Human Adaptation To Climate Change".

37 Mirhoff, Nick. 2017. "As Peru's Glaciers Melt, Its Problems Are Only Beginning".


38 Paerregaard, Stensrud, and Andersen. "WATER CITIZENSHIP: Negotiating Water Rights and Contesting Water Culture in the Peruvian Andes."

39 Mishra and Verbist, *The Impact Of Glacial Retreat In The Andes: International Multidisciplinary Network For Adaptation Strategies; Accomplishment Report.*

40 Harriman, Lindsey. *Where Will The Water Go? Impacts Of Accelerated Glacier Melt In The Tropical Andes.* Ebook. UNEP, 2013. https://na.unep.net/geas/archive/pdfs/GEAS_Sep2013_Andes.pdf.

41 Orlove, Ben. "Glacier Retreat: Reviewing The Limits Of Human Adaptation To Climate Change".

lakes like Titicaca, and rivers like the Yacuambi will continue to make humans and animals ill, because there will be no local water alternatives for daily needs.⁴²

Additionally, good governance practices and partnerships with international groups like the United Nations, and the World Bank have already proved to be successful in addressing both pollution and overall water insecurity due to glacial depletion: bringing over 30 million dollars to the region in the last ten years.⁴³ Partnerships should be expanded both regionally and globally, because the states in the Andes hardest hit by this issue do not have the financial power to solve insecurity unitarily.⁴⁴ The issue of water scarcity is very complicated as it touches upon every aspect of human life, but it can be mitigated in the Andes if good governance is prioritized to help manage remaining freshwater through an increase in water technology access, the recognition of equity as policy priority, and the halt of further pollution. These solutions, alongside the promotion of open dialogue between governments and their citizens, are good building blocks toward other long-term solutions for water insecurity in the region. 

42 Williams, Heather. "WHAT LIES BENEATH: AN ECO-HISTORICAL VIEW OF HIGH ANDES WATER POLLUTION."

43 World Bank. *Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru – Adaptation to the Impact of Rapid Glacier Retreat in the Tropical Andes Project (English)*. See Appendix D.

44 Miroff, Nick. 2017. "As Peru's Glaciers Melt, Its Problems Are Only Beginning"

APPENDIXES:

APPENDIX A:

Changes in Length and Surface Areas of 10 Tropical Andean Glaciers from Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia between 1930 and 2005⁴⁵





FIGURE 2 > Change in length and surface area of 10 tropical Andean glaciers from Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia between 1930 and 2005.

APPENDIX B:

Percentage of Urban and Rural Population in Latin America and the Caribbean With Access to Drinking Water and Improved Sanitation 1990–2000.⁴⁶



45 Mishra, Anil, and Koen Verbist. 2017. *The Impact of Glacial Retreat In The Andes: International Multidisciplinary Network For Adaptation Strategies; Accomplishment Report*. Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0025/002581/258168e.pdf>, p. 6.

46 Pearce-Oroz, Glenn. Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Challenges in Latin America for the Next Decade: Lessons from the "Cusco 10" International Seminar, 2011, Water and Sanitation Program Guidance Note. p. 9.

APPENDIX C:

Manifestations of the Struggle over Equity in Water Allocation⁴⁷

Table 4. Manifestations of the struggle over equity in water allocation.

Obstacles for equity on water allocation		
Colombia Water Code, 1978	Ecuador Water Law 1972, Agrarian Reform, 1997	Peru Water Law rules, 2010
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Onerous requisites for water rights • Limited capacity of authorities • Discretion in decision making • 70% small users do not have water rights 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Water rights proportional to land • 1% landowners with 64% water allocated 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Communities are required to formalise their rights using bloc licences and registering individual water users with fixed amounts of water
Drivers of equity in water allocation		
Colombia Water Code, 1978	Ecuador Constitution, 2008	Peru Water Law, 2009
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Potable water as a social right • Healthy environment as collective and environmental rights • Active constitutional court defending the human right to water (since 2003) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Redistribution for equitable water rights, food sovereignty (two years) • Human right to water 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The state respects uses and customs of peasant and indigenous communities and their right to use water in their territories
<i>Summary</i>		
Discriminatory water rights but active constitutional court	Strong emphasis on equity but aspirational	Inconsistent legislation

ADDITIONAL WORKS CONSULTED:

Kathryn Hicks. "Bolivia's Next Water War Historicizing the Struggles over Access to Water Resources in the Twenty-First Century." *Radical History Review* 2013, no. 116 (2013): 130.

Campos, Marco. "Making Sustainable Water and Sanitation in the Peruvian Andes: An Intervention Model." *Journal of Water and Health* 6, (03, 2008): 27-31. <http://ida.lib.uidaho.edu:2048/login?url=https://ida.lib.uidaho.edu:2096/docview/1943088980?accountid=14551>.

Trawick, Paul. "GOING WITH THE FLOW: The State of Contemporary Studies of Water Management in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review* 40, no. 3 (2005): 443-56,481.

⁴⁷ Roa-García, María. "Equity, Efficiency and Sustainability in Water Allocation in the Andes: Trade-offs in a Full World." *Water Alternatives* 7, no. 2 (2014). p. 312.



Mitigating Russian Influence in Ukraine through European Union Sanctions

– Jamie Mustard

ABSTRACT

The issue of the Russian Federation illegally annexing the Crimean Peninsula has resulted in a multitude of economic sanctions from the international community. The European Union (EU) has introduced three waves of economic sanctions that have contributed to the Russian Recession in 2014. However, these sanctions have not deterred Russian influence in Eastern Ukraine. Ongoing conflict is still seen in the Donbass region as the Minsk Agreement is violated every day. The failure of a ceasefire agreement and the use of economic sanctions have not resolved the issue of Russian aggression into Eastern Ukraine. With the high dependency of Russian oil and gas, the EU struggles to implement sanctions that won't hinder their supplies or the relationship to Russia. I propose an alternative way to implement sanctions through positive sanctions that pose the opportunity for cooperation rather than economic deterrence.

OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND

In 2014, restrictive measures were introduced by the European Union (EU) against the Russian Federation for the illegal annexation of Crimea and deliberate destabilization of Eastern Ukraine.¹ President Vladimir Putin has made efforts in Crimea based on his counter position with the expansion of NATO with Ukraine, the loss territory from the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the geopolitical ambitions made available due to instability within the Ukrainian government.² Current EU restrictions were designed into a multidimensional system; one

1 Europa.eu. "EU sanctions against Russia over Ukraine Crisis" *European Union Newsroom* March 2018 https://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu-sanctions-against-russia-over-ukraine-crisis_en

2 Marcin Szczepański, "Economic Impact on the EU of Sanctions over Ukraine Conflict" (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2015) Briefing. Page 2-3

restriction having an adverse effect towards another, with the intent to create enough economic strain on the Russia economy to deter further economic influence into Ukraine.³⁴ Although the EU has expressed the desire of their sanctions are not to hurt the population of Russia but rather its government, there has been an indirect effect placed on Russian civilians.⁵

As a response to EU's financial sector sanctions, the Russian Federation introduced anti-crisis measures to prevent further currency depreciation. Budgetary cuts were made on financing health care, infrastructure, and government salaries, having a consequential effect on the Russian population.⁶ The most significant economic impact of sanctions have been the decline in EU exports to Russia.⁷ A countersanction made by the Russian Federation placed an embargo of certain agricultural products affecting various EU member states due to previous trade flows. However, the inter-sectoral linkages within the EU's economy, and the increase trade flows of Russian embargo goods into Belarus, Serbia, and Macedonia as alternative trade routes into Russia, contradiction of both EU and Russian sanctions have made them unsuccessful with their intended outcomes.⁸

Overall, the effectiveness of EU sanctions has been undoubtedly insufficient. Considered to be used as only a pressure tool on Russia's economy, EU sanctions have failed to deter Russian influence in Crimea and mitigate

further economic influence into Eastern Ukraine. They have caused a temporary economic stain on Russia's economy with a result of a countersanction affecting trade relations. While having minimal affect using economic warfare, political tensions have increased significantly while Ukraine and Crimea's economies show small economic improvement from 2014.⁹ For the EU to create sanctions that put pressure on Russia's economy and those affecting foreign policy decisions while fulfilling their humanitarian goal of minimal effect on Russian civilians, have created a significant challenge for the EU to minimize further Russian economic influence in Eastern Ukraine.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Increasing Political Pressure on Business Elites

While economic sanctions are used to threaten a target state to change certain policies, little success has been shown if there is not substantial pressure on political elites who influence policy making.¹⁰ Rather than solely focusing on creating economic strain, the EU could create a sanction that moves towards political cost that affect Russian business elites in order to create pressure towards foreign policy reform. With close ties to President Putin, ninety-three percent of Russia's wealthiest are directly linked to the resource-finance sector; Russia's highest earning revenue industries.¹¹ Although there is no official link towards political influence, these business elites are considered to be the most powerful subjects considered after the president.¹²

3 Europeans Parliament's Committee on International Trade. "Russia's and the EU's sanctions: Economic and Trade Effects, Compliance and the way Forward" (European Parliament's online database, 2017), [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/603847/EXPO_STU\(2017\)603847_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/603847/EXPO_STU(2017)603847_EN.pdf)

4 For current EU sanctions, see Appendix A

5 Emma Ashford, "Not-So-Smart Sanctions: The Failure of Western Restrictions against Russia" (The Council of Foreign Relations: 2016) v. 95. Pages 114-119

6 Anna Borshchetskaya, "Russia's Anti-Crisis Plan: Old Solutions To New Problems?" *Forbes/World Affairs*. 31 Jan 2015. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/annaborshchetskaya/2015/01/31/russias-anti-crisis-plan-old-solutions-to-new-problems/#192a4f436210>

7 Valentina Pop, "Multi-Billion Losses Expected from Russia Sanctions" *euobserver* 28 Jul 2015 <https://euobserver.com/economic/125118>

8 For illustration on trade routes, see Appendix B

9 Riana Teifukova, "The Economic Effect of the Crimean Annexation" *Ankasam* 2017. <https://ankasam.org/en/economic-effect-crimean-annexation/Appendix C>

10 Arne Tostensen and Beate Bull, "Are Smart Sanctions Feasible? (World Politics: 2001) Vol. 54 pp 373-40

11 Catherine Locatelli, "The Russian Oil Industry Restructuration" *Institut d'economie et de Politique* January 2003 <http://citeserx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.633.3163&rep=rep1&type=pdf>

12 Valdai Discussion Club Grantees Analytical Report, "Russian Elite-2020" (Council on Foreign and Defense Policy: 2015)

If the EU were to strengthen their existing restrictive measures on asset freezes and visa bans not only on the people who were deemed responsible for the actions against the Ukraine territory, but also on Russian business elites who have strong political ties, it could create enough political pressure towards compliance on foreign affairs. More specifically, compliance with restricting further Russian influence in Ukraine.

Minimizing Financial Restrictions

By reducing sanctions that are directly targeted at the finance sector, it could minimize the possibility of large-scale defaults by Russian debtors. In which case, if either economy were to experience mass currency depreciation or a recession, it would minimize the risk of destabilization for European banks who have pre-established loans with Russia.¹³ It would also place downward pressure on the government to make budgetary cuts on public spending which have had a direct effect on the population of Russia.¹⁴ Although there is no certainty that minimizing financial restrictions would cause re-consideration of domestic policy, it raises the opportunity for a larger capital budget.

With current financial restrictions, the EU has pushed Russia to seek foreign investment in alternative markets while having an direct effect on the population of Russia; contradicting their intended outcome of sanctions. Previously dependent of foreign investment, Russian oil companies are heavily affected by EU financial restrictions.¹⁵ They have obtained wo alternative ways to obtain funds and equipment; In the Asian financial institutions or in the National Welfare Fund. Although both options are undesired due to high interest rates and strict terms of investment, they are available for the Russian government to capitalize on creating

an alternative to the EU's financial restrictions allowing their economy to avoid lasting effects.¹⁶ Reducing these financial restrictions would minimize the indirect effect placed on Russian citizens, improve financial relations, and avoid the risk of losing EU Banks losing capital due to Russian defaults.

Positive Sanctions on Tariff Reduction Approach One

Positive sanctions involve a promise or agreement of a benefit for the target state in which case they fulfill the requirements made by the sanctioner state.¹⁷ Rather than using economic warfare to deter further influence, providing incentives for the Russian Federation could lead to a better outcome. Current restrictions on traded goods have led to countersanctions that have put temporary economic stain on both economies. To counteract the ineffectiveness of current trade embargos made by both states, the EU could use positive sanctions to better trade relations that could potentially lead to better foreign affair cooperation.

With a positive sanction, the EU could lower the tariffs on certain goods such as energy-related equipment and technology if Russia were to remove the strict embargo on agriculture-goods. Not only would the supply for necessary tools for sustainable energy extraction be provided, this type of positive sanctions could better political ties rather than worse trade relations which have shown to have economic suffrage for both countries.¹⁸ Galtung's assessment on positive sanctions align with Russia's response to EU tariffs; a target state could diversify their national economy to decrease their reliance upon certain exports, creating minimal vulnerability to sanction measure targeting trade.¹⁹ By providing incentives for cooperation rather than restrictions that have had minimal

13 Ibid pg 6

14 Ibid pg 46

15 Anastasiia Silakova, "Western Sanctions against Russia and Russian Countermeasure: Implication and Perspectives." (Faculty of Law Lund University: Spring 2017) pages 8-14
<http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordId=8909691&fileId=8909698>

16 See Appendix D

17 Arne Tostensen, "Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?" (World Politics: 2002) Vol. 54 No.3 page 374

18 Economic effects due to worsening trade relations, see Appendix E

19 Brendan Taylor, "Sanctions as Grand Strategy" *The International Institute for Strategic Studies* 2010. Page 19

effect, it places a better opportunity for EU's desired outcome in Ukraine.

Positive Sanctions on Tariff Reduction Approach Two


Current sanctions that are seen as a threat to high revenue industries such as oil and gas exploration, have seen little effect due to alternative markets for Russia to capitalize on. If the EU were to create a positive sanction that offered higher capital incentives such as investment loans towards oil and gas exploration if Russia were willing to agree on the limitations of economic intervention within Ukraine and other Surrounding Eastern European countries, it could lead to better foreign affair cooperation. Rather than threatening economic destabilization, it provides investment to improve Russia' highest revenue while places greater political incentives for foreign policy agreement.

Consequently, this places the possibility for an increase in dependency for the EU on Russian oil. Investment loans made by EU member states could include contractual agreements to prohibit high dependency.

PROPOSED SOLUTION

With the Minsk agreement failing to stop violence between the Russian backed separatist groups and the Ukrainian army, there is needed action not only from the European Union, but from the international community as well. Current sanctions that threaten economic destabilization have had little impact on the Russian economy while failing to achieve their intended goals. They show minimal success while possessing the qualities of negative sanctions; harmful/ threatening measures taken towards the Russian Federation due to incompliance. The high dependency of Russian oil and gas have created an obstacle for the EU to implement sanctions that could potentially deter Russian influence in Eastern Ukraine. Stronger economic sanctions could harm the trade relations of natural resources imported into the EU.

I propose the use of positive sanctions that could pose a larger possibility of agreement in Ukraine, while not damaging trade relations or imported natural resources. Rather than targeting sectoral cooperation and exchange relations with Russia, positive sanctions could provide incentives through trade relations to deter their efforts in Ukraine while minimizing the direct harm to the populations in both Ukraine, Crimea, and Russia caused by economic warfare. Incentives to provide investments and loans to the Russian Federation in return for foreign policy cooperation in Ukraine, could be beneficial for both parties. As Russia's economy is highly dependent on revenue from oil and gas, incentives for investment raise a better opportunity for negotiation on foreign policy.

The viability of good trade relations through positive sanctions, could increase the possibility of prohibiting the furthering of economic influence in Eastern Ukraine with compliance rather than sanctions posing threats. As previously discussed, the impacts of worsening trade with Russia have not influenced further progression while putting economic strain on various member states.²⁰ Creating incentives for the Russian Federation, in return for foreign policy cooperation may help deter further destabilization of Ukraine while strengthening political relations and economic growth for both economies. 


20 EPCIT pg 13

APPENDIX A

Annex – Overview of EU sanctions against the Russian Federation

Diplomatic measures
In 2014, a G7 summit was held in Brussels instead of a G8 summit in Sochi. The EU has also suspended Russia's negotiations on joining the OECD and the International Energy Agency.
The EU-Russia summit was cancelled and EU Member States decided not to hold regular bilateral summits. The negotiations with Russia on visa matters, as well as on the New Agreement between the EU and Russia, were suspended.
Restrictive measures
Asset freezes and visa bans have been applied to 151 persons, while 37 entities have been subjected to a freeze of their assets in the EU.
Restrictions for Crimea and Sevastopol
Imports originating from the Crimea and Sevastopol are prohibited in the EU unless accompanied by a certificate of origin from the Ukrainian authorities.
Investment in the Crimea or Sevastopol is forbidden. Europeans and EU-based companies may not purchase real estate or entities there, finance Crimean companies or supply related services.
EU operators are no longer allowed to offer tourism services in the Crimea or Sevastopol. European cruise ships may only call at ports in the Crimean peninsula in case of emergency. This applies to all ships owned or controlled by a European or flying the flag of an EU Member State.
The export of certain goods and technology to Crimean companies or for use in the Crimea has been outlawed. These include the transport, telecommunications and energy sectors as well as the prospecting, exploration and production of oil, gas and mineral resources. Furthermore, technical assistance, brokering, construction or engineering services related to infrastructure in the same sectors must not be provided.
Economic sanctions (targeting sectoral cooperation and exchanges with Russia)
It is forbidden for EU nationals and companies to buy or sell new bonds, equity or similar financial instruments with a maturity exceeding 30 days, issued by five major state-owned Russian banks and their subsidiaries outside the EU, three major Russian energy companies and three Russian defence companies. Services related to the issuing of such financial instruments are also banned.
EU nationals and companies may not provide loans to five major Russian state-owned banks.
There is an embargo on the import and export of arms and related material from/to Russia, applying to all items on the EU common military list (unless for use by the EU space industry).
Exports of dual-use goods and technology for military use in Russia or to Russian military end-users, including all items in the EU list of dual-use goods, are prohibited. Export of dual-use goods to nine mixed defence companies is also forbidden.
Exports of certain energy-related equipment and technology to Russia are now subject to prior authorisation by the Member States. Licences for products destined for deep water and Arctic oil exploration and production, as well as shale oil projects will be denied.
Services necessary for deep water oil exploration and production, Arctic oil exploration or production and shale oil projects in Russia may not be provided.
Measures concerning economic cooperation
The European Council requested the European Investment Bank suspend the signing of new financing operations in Russia. The Member States will also coordinate their positions within the Board of Directors of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, aiming also to suspend financing of new operations in the Russian Federation.


Figure 12: Percentage changes in agrifood exports of Belarus, Serbia and Macedonia to Russia, 2013 to 2016



Source: UN Monthly COMTRADE, WFO calculations.


APPENDIX B

Figure 11: Percentage changes in agrifood EU exports to Belarus, Serbia and Macedonia, 2013 to 2016



Source: UN Monthly COMTRADE, WFO calculations.

Figure 2 – Agrifood exports values to Russia, selected Member States (in € million)



Data source: European Commission, DG Agriculture, 2015.


APPENDIX C

Economic effects in Crimea after annexation


		2013	2014	2015	2016	Trend
Export	Mln USD	849,30	98,60	73,50	40,40	█
						█
Import	Mln USD	976,70	66,40	93,30	48,80	█
						█
Saldo	Mln USD	-127,40	32,30	19,70	-8,40	█
Crimean Budget	USD	600,00	577,60	1020,00	1008,00	█
	UAH	4,80	10,00	23,50	25,70	█
	RUB	18,00	31,80	66,30	67,40	█
Living wage	USD	147,00	96,50	128,23	145,10	█
	UAH	1176,00	1640,50	2950,00	3700,00	█
	RUB	4410,00	5300,00	8335,00	9696,00	█

		2013	2014	2015	2016	Trend
Unemployment rate	%	5,40	5,70	6,30	6,90	█
Economically active population	USD	921,80	917,10	947,20	896,10	█
	UAH	152,20	90,00	91,80	112,30	█
Minimal salary	USD	1218,00	1530,00	2111,00	2863,00	█
	UAH	4566,00	4944,00	5965,00	7500,00	█
	RUB	356,10	206,50	315,10	362,30	█
Average monthly nominal wage	USD	2850,00	3510,50	7247,50	9238,60	█
	UAH	10683,00	11360,00	20500,00	24200,00	█
	RUB	187,50	186,50	151,23	173,60	█
Average amount of pension	USD	1500,00	3170,50	3478,30	4426,80	█
	UAH	5625,00	10260,00	10500,00	11600,00	█
	RUB					█

GDP of Ukraine



Real GDP Growth in Ukraine vs. Eastern Europe and World: 2011-2017




APPENDIX D

Alternative foreign investment options

Table 2: Scenarios of oil and gas projects under sanctions

Sanctions	Scenario	Critics
Equipment	Import by third countries (Kazakhstan)	In terms of open borders, it is impossible to hide the way of import.
Copying		Suppliers do not take the risk because fines are huge
		Does not let to develop own production.
Finance	Asian investments	Always a step lag
		Can cause prosecution
	National Welfare Fund	Limited on resources

Figure 4: Interest rate of central banks (Central Bank Rates, 2016)



APPENDIX E

Economic impacts of trade reduction

Figure 5: Sectoral breakdown of EU exports to Russia, 2013 and 2016




Table 2: Comparison of economic impacts

	Christen, E. et al., 2014				Christen, E. et al., 2015				Christen, E. et al., 2016			
	Employment		Value added		Employment		Value added		Employment		Value added	
	In 1 000	% of total employment	mn €	% of total value added	In 1 000	% of total employment	mn €	% of total value added	In 1 000	% of total employment	mn €	% of total value added
AUT	-9	0.2	-570	0.2	-15	0.4	-990	0.3	-7	0.2	-550	0.2
BEL	-8	0.2	-570	0.2	-15	0.3	-1 010	0.3	-8	0.2	-600	0.2
BGR	-16	0.5	-70	0.2	-20	0.6	-155	0.5	-5	0.1	-40	0.1
CYP	-1	0.3	-30	0.2	-5	1.4	-205	1.4	0	0.0	-10	0.1
CZE	-19	0.4	-450	0.3	-45	0.9	-1 015	0.8	-29	0.6	-760	0.6
DEU	-101	0.2	-6 650	0.3	-145	0.3	-9 475	0.4	-97	0.2	-6 050	0.2
DNK	-7	0.3	-460	0.2	-10	0.4	-580	0.3	-4	0.1	-290	0.1
ESP	-34	0.2	-1 440	0.2	-60	0.3	-2 525	0.3	-15	0.1	-750	0.1
EST	-14	2.3	-290	1.8	-40	6.5	-800	4.9	-6	1.0	-120	0.7
FIN	-10	0.4	-700	0.4	-15	0.6	-1 200	0.7	-8	0.3	-540	0.3
FRA	-31	0.1	-1 950	0.1	-40	0.1	-2 460	0.1	-23	0.1	-1 630	0.1
GBR	-21	0.1	-1 350	0.1	-20	0.1	-1 570	0.1	-19	0.1	-1 020	0.1
GRC	-8	0.2	-190	0.1	-15	0.4	-590	0.4	-5	0.1	-100	0.1
HUN	-12	0.3	-280	0.3	-15	0.4	-390	0.5	-12	0.3	-300	0.4
IRL	-6	0.3	-630	0.4	-5	0.3	-305	0.2	-2	0.1	-120	0.1
ITA	-52	0.2	-2 710	0.2	-75	0.3	-3 820	0.3	-18	0.1	-950	0.1
LTU	-11	0.8	-160	0.5	-85	6.6	-1 010	3.2	-12	0.9	-210	0.7
LUX	0	0.1	-50	0.1	0	0.0	-55	0.1	0	0.0	-30	0.1
LVA	-3	0.3	-40	0.2	-10	1.1	-175	0.8	-7	0.8	-150	0.7
MLT	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	-10	0.2
NLD	-13	0.1	-790	0.1	-25	0.3	-1 450	0.3	-16	0.2	-970	0.2
POL	-72	0.5	-1 110	0.3	-135	0.9	-1 945	0.6	-78	0.5	-1 360	0.4
PRT	-8	0.2	-190	0.1	-5	0.1	-170	0.1	-2	0.0	-40	0.0
ROU	-20	0.2	-170	0.1	-20	0.2	-235	0.2	-6	0.1	-90	0.1
SVK	-9	0.4	-180	0.3	-15	0.7	-380	0.6	-10	0.5	-300	0.5
SVN	-2	0.2	-70	0.2	-5	0.5	-150	0.5	-2	0.2	-80	0.3
SWE	-8	0.2	-630	0.2	-10	0.2	-815	0.2	-6	0.1	-510	0.1
EU 27	-497	0.2	-21 760	0.2	-870	0.4	-33 485	0.3	-397	0.2	-17 600	0.2

Source: WIFO calculations.

ADDITIONAL WORKS CONSULTED

Baev, Pavel. "From European to Eurasian energy Security: Russia Needs and Energy". *Peace Research Institute*. 27 November 2014
Journal of Eurasian Studies

Grove, Thomas. "Russia Moves to Scrap Accords to Send Gas to Ukraine" *The Wall Street Journal* 3 March 2018



Cruise Control: Reducing Air and Water Pollution Produced by Cruise Ships in European Waters

– Liz Daniel

ABSTRACT

The cruise industry has posed environmental threats since its institution, yet has remarkably flown under the radar of most consumers. Throughout the last several decades, cruise ships have adversely impacted air and water quality by producing large quantities of pollution. Cruise companies continue to do a poor job implementing eco-friendly practices aboard their ships, while European states fail to come to a cohesive solution for this problem. As Europe struggles to find effective mechanisms to combat cruise ship pollution, the problem escalates. This paper analyzes the current issues posed by international laws regarding ships and proposes six possible solutions to help combat European states' battle against cruise ship emissions. The suggested solution recommends a combination of port state facility improvements and exhaust gas cleaning system requirements. By implementing this solution, Europe can begin to make progress in reducing air and water pollution from cruise ships in and around its waters.

OVERVIEW HISTORY, AND DEFINITION OF THE ISSUE

The modern cruise industry originated in the late 1960s, emerging from the demand for large passenger ships designed with comfort and travel in mind.¹ Throughout the last few decades, cruising has evolved into an industry comprised of over 300 ships with a capacity to carry 26 million passengers annually.² The cruise ship industry is now a predominant

1 Jean-Paul Rodrigue and Theo Notteboom, "The Cruise Industry," in *The Geography of Transport Systems* (New York: Routledge, 2017): 143-147.

2 "2018 Worldwide Cruise Line Passenger Capacity," Cruise Market Watch, accessed March 19, 2018. <https://www.cruisemarketwatch.com/capacity/>. See Appendix A

mode of tourism and the demand for cruising has increased by almost 70% within the past ten years.³ According to recent statistics, the direct and indirect spending generated by this industry leads to an annual impact of \$119.9 billion on the global economy.⁴

Despite the ability of cruise ships to bring increased revenue to port states, the cruise ship industry poses several environmental burdens on port states and the surrounding waters. While cruise companies claim their vessels are more eco-friendly than ever before, reports show that mid-size⁵ cruise ships burn 150 tons of fuel a day, releasing as much particulate matter into the air as about one million automobiles.⁶ Moreover, cruise ships carrying thousands of passengers are compared to “floating cities” because the amount of waste these ships produce and dump in the ocean is greater than the amount of waste small cities on land create.⁷

Cruise ships produce and release various types of harmful pollutants through both air and water contamination. These pollutants include blackwater comprised of sewage; graywater comprised of wastewater from sinks, showers, and laundry facilities; bilge water comprised of oil, gas, and solid wastes; and ballast water comprised of a wide range of biological materials including non-native species.⁸ During a single week, one 3,000-passenger cruise ship generates 210,000 gallons of sewage, 1 million gallons of graywater, 37,000 gallons of bilge water, and millions of gallons of ballast water.⁹ Cruise ships also emit large amounts of particulate matter into the air, contributing

to ozone degradation and leading to adverse health effects.¹⁰ However, neither governments nor companies know exactly how much contaminants ships are dumping on any given day because there are no sufficient monitoring or reporting systems in place.

Though Europe strives to be a well-integrated continent when it comes to implementing transnational policies through the European Union (EU), there are many discrepancies among its port states’ strategies to mitigate the impact of cruise ship pollution. The 1978 International Maritime Organization and International Convention For the Prevention of Pollution From Ships Agreement (MARPOL) and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) were both established with the aim of protecting and preserving the marine environment. However, neither convention is very effective in attaining these objectives due to inconsistent national regulations and the fact that cruise ships have different practices based on jurisdiction. European states have shown concern over cruise ship pollution, yet individual governments in the region have difficulty tackling each of the different types of waste that cruise ships emit. Inconsistent standards and policy regulations hold cruise ships to various standards across Europe, leading to the perpetuation of marine and air pollution.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Parties to MARPOL Give the IMO Enforcement Power

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is the most significant organization that deals with the prevention of marine pollution and was the organization to adopt the MARPOL Convention and its annexes.¹¹ MARPOL includes six annexes and technical requirements to eliminate intentional marine pollution, but the

3 CLIA, “The Cruise Industry” last modified October 2015. http://cruising.org/docs/default-source/research/2015_clia_economic-impact-infographic.pdf

4 Ibid.

5 Mid-size cruise ship capacity is around 3,000 guests

6 “NABU 2017 Cruise Ship Rankings: Still Dirty,” *NABU*, last modified September 5, 2017, <https://en.nabu.de/news/2017/23046.html>

7 Claudia Copeland, *Cruise Ship Pollution: Background, Laws and Regulations, and Key Issues*, publication (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 2008), 2, <https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc87283/>

8 Copeland, 3-6.

9 Louise Gerdes, *Endangered Oceans: Opposing Viewpoints* (Detroit: Greenhaven Press, 2009), 16.

10 Ibid., 6. See <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0272771405003999> for more information on the decline of marine species due to cruise ship pollution.

11 Selim Dayioglu, “Marine Environment Regulations on Cruise Ships: A Special Focus on the Influence of EU Candidacy of Turkey” (Master’s thesis, Lund University), 2010, 25, <http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordId=1698583&fileId=1698586>

framework MARPOL provides is not sufficient enough to protect the marine environment from the discharge emitted by ships if signatory states do not actually enforce the Convention's standards.

Each signatory nation is responsible for implementing domestic laws to ensure its state-flagged ships are complying with the standards set forth by MARPOL.¹² However, the IMO has found that many member states' governments fail to send in required reports regarding their implementation of the Convention, and noticed that most accusations against offending ships do not result in prosecutions.¹³ The current system regarding MARPOL depends on voluntary compliance, but if the IMO were able to hold more control over member states, the organization could create an ultimate, unbiased authority figure. Streamlining the enforcement process by making the IMO the sole monitoring entity of MARPOL standards would help alleviate confusion surrounding coastal state and flag state disputes.¹⁴ On the other hand, states value their sovereignty, and the benefits of giving the IMO more enforcement power may not outweigh states' desire for sovereignty. It would be difficult to convince member states to contribute their support and money for a fund to create this type of IMO enforcement program.

Eliminate Flags of Convenience

International law allows individual states to set specific conditions for vessel registration, and many states allow foreign companies to register ships in their territory.¹⁵ Cruising companies are tempted by this opportunity and choose to register their ships in foreign nations where registration fees, taxes, and labor costs are lower.¹⁶ This practice of registering ships under

another country's flag has been in existence since the creation of the cruise industry, but the manifestation of "flags of convenience" (FOC) regimes became increasingly popular within the last few decades.¹⁷

If FOCs were eliminated, cruise corporations would have to register ships in their home countries.¹⁸ This solution could keep cruise companies more accountable and raise many cruise ships' standards, yet EU states fail to endorse this eradication because FOCs offer enticing benefits.¹⁹ European and American corporations own most major cruise lines and save thousands of dollars in taxes and administrative fees each year by registering their ships under foreign flags.²⁰ Furthermore, eliminating FOCs would have a negative economic impact on flag states, which are often developing nations that rely on registration fees as a major source of revenue.²¹ While the elimination of FOCs seems like a solution that could ameliorate the enforcement of international vessel pollution, this plan would greatly alter the economic prosperity of cruise ship industries and developing countries alike, rendering FOCs a difficult entity to completely abolish.

Increase Port State Regulatory Powers

International law divides the world's oceans into four jurisdictional zones,²² which are labeled as territorial seas, contiguous zones, exclusive

12 Copeland, 8.

13 Rebecca Becker, "MARPOL 73/78: An Overview in International Environmental Enforcement," *Georgetown International Environmental Law Review* 10, no.2 (1998): 634, http://ida.lib.uidaho.edu:2226/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/gintenlr10&div=28&start_page=625&collection=journals&set_as_cursor=0&men_tab=srchresults.

14 *Ibid.*, 638.

15 Schulkin, 115.

16 See Appendix B

17 Bonnie Magnuson, "Flags of Convenience: Improving the Implementation of Maritime Policy," *Journal of the Martin School International Studies* 3, no. 1 (December 2011): 60-67, <http://www.uidaho.edu/-/media/UIdaho-Responsive/Files/class/departments/international-studies/martin-journal-2011.ashx?la=en&hash=ED6B33B0545681897BAD84BFB9AE4A674C28E4F0>.

18 *Ibid.*, 61.

19 *Ibid.*, 61.

20 *Ibid.*, 61.

21 Schulkin, 125.

22 See Appendix C

economic zones (EEZs),²³ and high seas.²⁴ A state may only possess exclusive jurisdiction over its territorial sea²⁵ and partial jurisdiction over its EEZ.²⁶ The remaining oceanic areas are considered the “high seas” and are not under the autonomy of any nation.²⁷ When cruise ships sail the high seas, they are bound only to the laws of their flag states, and without an effective international agreement, all pollution released by cruise ships on the high seas is easily able to occur without ensuing repercussions.²⁸ Under MARPOL, foreign vessels are subject to vessel pollution laws unique to coastal states, but only when they are in operation within said coastal state’s territorial sea.²⁹

In order to reduce pollution from cruise ships, policymakers could grant both coastal and port states³⁰ the power to enforce international anti-pollution measures outside of their jurisdictional waters. Coastal states have a stronger incentive to enforce pollution regulations against flag states because their ecosystems incur the most consequences of cruise ship pollution. These states could use greater authority to press charges against offending vessels. While some expansion of port state powers is necessary to incite cooperation among foreign-flagged ships, granting all coastal states complete power to enforce MARPOL standards could cause major backlash. Giving port states too much authority could create an imbalance among states party to MARPOL and could delegitimize the Convention if not distributed properly.

Improve Waste Disposal Facilities at Ports

The EU and IMO have agreed that port states should improve waste disposal facilities in order to reduce marine pollution, and have begun to collaborate on ideas to enhance these facilities. European Directive 2000/59/EC ascertains that all ships stopping at European ports must deliver onboard waste to the port in which they have stopped, unless they can prove their waste can be stored until the next port stop.³¹ According to this Directive, each ship intending to dock at EU ports would have to pay a fee to contribute to the costs of dumping at port facilities.³² Ship size would determine a ship’s fees, and ideally, this “polluter pays” principle would reduce the incentive to illegally dump waste in open waters.³³ A few large-scale EU ports have already begun implementing this system, including the Port of Helsinki, Stockholm, Tallinn, and Copenhagen Malmö, and are successfully incentivizing cruise ships to handle waste correctly.³⁴

A major disadvantage to this solution is that it would be at the discretion of each EU member state to decide upon a national tariff system for this Directive, which could cause competition among EU members to draw more ships to their country’s ports. However, European states could consider implementing a flat fee for all ships that stop in European ports. In this sense, ships would pay a fee each time they stop in a port regardless of whether they are dumping waste at the port, so as to give ships an incentive to consistently dump their waste responsibly. This solution could provide consistency to currently unregulated dumping practices and grant European ports the funds to operate proper waste disposal services.

23 The EEZ is an area adjacent to the territorial sea, extending two hundred nautical miles from shore

24 Andrew Schulkin, “Safe harbors: Crafting an international solution to cruise ship pollution,” *Georgetown International Environmental Law Review* 15, no. 1 (2002): 114-118, <https://ida.lib.uidaho.edu/2096/docview/225519597/fulltextPDF/22F2CD9C7DA54ED6PQ/1?accountid=14551>

25 The territorial seas of a coastal state extends twelve nautical miles from shore

26 Schulkin, 114.

27 *Ibid.*, 118.

28 *Ibid.*, 118.

29 International Maritime Organization. *MARPOL Consolidated Edition 2011* (London: IMO Publishing, 2011), 1311.

30 Coastal states may also be considered port states if vessels are stopping in a coastal state’s harbor

31 Ivone Pérez, “Size matters? Evaluating the drivers of waste from ships at ports in Europe,” *Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment* 57 (2017): 404-405, <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1361920917306806>.

32 *Ibid.*, 404.

33 *Ibid.*, 405.

34 See <http://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/9/5/699> for a more detailed report on port waste management in the Baltic Sea area.

Compulsory Utilization of Liquefied Natural Gas

Cruise ships' diesel engines burn high sulfur content fuel, emitting damaging amounts of air pollutants in the form of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and black carbon particulate matter.³⁵ Currently, the most widely consumed marine fuels include heavy fuel oil (HFO) and marine gas oil (MGO), which produce copious exhaust gases that contribute to negative ecological and anthropological health affects.³⁶ The utilization of liquefied natural gas (LNG) enables ships to reduce their emissions of sulfur and nitrogen oxides, fine particulate matter, and heavy metals.³⁷

If utilized correctly, LNG would serve as an important agent for reducing air pollutants. However, some scientists are skeptical about using LNG because it predominantly consists of methane, a substance with a global warming potential 25 times higher than that of carbon dioxide.³⁸ If cruise companies are not meticulous in performing precise transportation and combustion processes, LNG could end up doing even more harm than traditional fuel types.³⁹

Likewise, LNG is a fossil fuel and is therefore not a long-term solution to limit cruise ship emissions. As the EU is deeply involved in and committed to the Paris Agreement, the use of this non-renewable resource would not be in accordance with the Agreement's plan to mitigate climate change.⁴⁰ Although LNG could serve as an intermediate step on the way to finding a renewable fuel source for ships, experts must perform further research and development before recommending laws that dictate the use of LNG.

Obligatory Installation of Exhaust Gas Cleaning Systems

In addition to lacking proper fuel quality, cruise companies also fall short when it comes to installing exhaust gas cleaning systems (EGCS) aboard their ships, and only one out of five ships are equipped with EGCS.⁴¹ According to recent IMO and EU policies, fuel sulfur limits will become more heavily enforced by 2020, so cruise companies are looking for lower sulfur fuel options. In fact, Carnival Cruises recently stated that the company is prepared to invest \$1 billion in EGCS by 2020 to comply with these regulations.⁴² Most low sulfur fuels are more expensive than residual fuels and are therefore less desirable to cruise companies.⁴³ Yet those companies not willing to spend more money on fuel alternatives such as LNG have the option to use exhaust gas scrubbers alongside HFO as an alternative method to lower sulfur emissions.⁴⁴

Scrubbers function as tools to wash sulfur from ships' engines and reduce HFO sulfur emissions by over 90 percent, particulate matter emissions by 60-90 percent, and nitrogen oxide emissions by 10 percent.⁴⁵ Unfortunately, this cleaning system comes with drawbacks. Because scrubbers release wash water and have the potential to impact ocean acidification, using LNG is an overall more eco-friendly decision.⁴⁶ Despite this disadvantage, installing scrubbers costs less than using LNG, which leads corporations to lean toward utilizing EGCS rather than cleaner fuels.⁴⁷ Cruise corporations should highly consider implementing an EGCS if they are to meet the

35 Copeland, 6.

36 Sönke Diesener, Dietmar Oeliger, and Daniel Rieger, *LNG as Marine Fuel*, publication, 2016, 1, <https://en.nabu.de/imperia/md/content/nabude/verkehr/161125-nabu-info-lgn-en.pdf>.

37 *Ibid.*, 1. See Appendix D

38 *Ibid.*, 1

39 *Ibid.*, 1.

40 *Ibid.*, 2.

41 Soo, Kim, "Air Quality on Cruise Ships '20 Times Worse' Than in a Busy City Centre," February 1, 2017, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/cruises/news/air-pollution-levels-200-times-higher-on-cruise-ships/>.

42 Unni Einemo, "Carnival Committed to EGCS as Its 2020 Compliance Solution," The International Bunker Industry Association, May 26, 2017, <https://ibia.net/carnival-committed-to-egcs-as-its-2020-compliance-solution/>.

43 Eelco Den Boer and Maarten Hoen, *Scrubbers: An Economic and Ecological Assessment*, publication, March 2015, 5-40, <https://www.nabu.de/downloads/150312-Scrubbers.pdf>.

44 *Ibid.*, 5.

45 *Ibid.*, 5.

46 *Ibid.*, 40.

47 *Ibid.*, 40.

IMO's low sulfur fuel requirement but should be aware that this solution will not provide ships with all of the tools necessary to combat air pollution.

RECOMMENDED SOLUTION


The complete eradication of pollution produced by cruise ships is not feasible in the near future, but there are steps that European states can take to ensure that this pollution is greatly reduced. Cruise ships pose a threat to coastal states and the surrounding waters, and this threat is sustained through incoherent policy instruments and inadequate port state infrastructure. As the cruise ship industry continues to grow, strategies regarding pollution mitigation must keep up in order to keep cruise companies accountable and environmentally sustainable.

The aforementioned solutions each offer unique advantages in reducing cruise ship pollution, but many fall short in proposing a harmonious resolution for European states as a collective. While the IMO should continue to amend MARPOL's framework, parties to the Convention may not be willing to comply with harsher standards, rendering structural changes futile. Even if the IMO were given more enforcement power, the organization would not have authority over ships registered under flags of non-signatory states. Due to this context, it would make sense to eliminate FOCs, yet FOCs provide developed and developing states with considerable monetary benefits. It would also seem logical to give port states increased control since they are most impacted by ship pollution. Again, while some expansion of port state powers is useful in creating a strong precedent for foreign-flagged ships, giving one set of states too much influence would create a power struggle between coastal and non-coastal countries.

Ultimately, the most practical and effective long-term solution to combat water pollution is to improve the availability, functionality, and enforcement of waste disposal facilities at ports. Requiring ships to pay a fee based on vessel size at each port stop they make would


provide port states with adequate funds to develop facilities in which they could dispose of vessel pollution ecologically. Cruise ship companies would not only be economically incentivized to responsibly dump their waste, but would also be closely monitored to ensure they are in compliance with environmental standards.

Waste disposal facilities are useful in reducing marine contamination, but do not provide a solution for air contamination. Therefore, the obligatory installation of EGCS aboard cruise ships should also be implemented. Using exhaust gas scrubbers would be more of a short-term solution to aid ships in meeting criteria for the IMO's 2020 global sulfur limit, which is aimed at the goal to improve air quality impacted by ship emissions. In order to ensure ships are installing EGCS European ports could either charge ships without EGCS a supplementary docking fee or simply not allow these noncompliant ships to dock. This added pressure would help ensure that FOCs do not stand in the way of EGCS installation.

Through a combination of port state facility improvements and EGCS requirements, Europe can make progress in reducing the air and water pollution produced by cruise ships. By enacting these concepts through a cohesive transnational approach, Europe will be able to succeed in reducing cruise ship pollution in and around its waters. 


APPENDICES

Appendix A: 2018 Worldwide Cruise Line Passenger Capacity




Source: “2018 Worldwide Cruise Line Passenger Capacity,” Cruise Market Watch, accessed March 19, 2018. <https://www.cruisemarketwatch.com/capacity/>.

Appendix B: Cruise Industry Flag State Usage by Tonnage




Source: William Terry, *Cruise Ship Tourism: 2nd Edition* (Oxfordshire: CAB International, 2017), 74.

Appendix C: Maritime Zones and Boundaries



Source: “Maritime Boundary Definitions,” Geoscience Australia, accessed March 19, 2018. <http://www.ga.gov.au/scientific-topics/marine/jurisdiction/maritime-boundary-definitions>.

Appendix D: Average Emissions from LNG Relative to HFO



Source: Ahmed M. Salem, Mohammed M. Elgohary, and Ibrahim S. Seediek, “Overview of Alternative Fuels With Emphasis on the Potential of LNG as Future Marine Fuel,” *Engineering for the Maritime Environment* 1, no. 11 (January 2014), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/259934521_Overview_of_alternative_fuels_with_emphasis_on_the_potential_of_LNG_as_future_marine_fuel.

ADDITIONAL WORKS CONSULTED

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Addressing the Trafficking of Live Animal Specimens Native to the Amazon Rainforest

– Senna Pankopf

ABSTRACT

The Amazon Rainforest is a particularly unique global region not only due to its status as the “lungs of the world” but also because it is home to some of the most diverse and captivating animal species on the planet. However, the attraction of these animals to humans is so strong that many desire them as pets, thus creating the opportunity for their illegal trade. Focusing on the present and historical driving factors and catalysts for animal trafficking, this paper offers four possible solutions to address the issue: enhanced monitoring of trafficking networks, addressing corruption within Amazonian countries, addressing demand for these animals, and increased activity by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The recommended course of action is a combination of addressing demand and increased NGO work as these solutions can be implemented immediately and pave the way for other strategies to combat this issue to take place in the future.

HISTORY AND OVERVIEW

The issue of illegal trafficking of live animal specimens is neither a new nor unusual phenomenon. As of 2010, worldwide the trafficking of live animals was the third most profitable illegal business, worth around \$25 billion per year.¹ Fueled by the demand for exotic

¹ Peter Laufer, *Forbidden Creatures: Inside the World of Animal Smuggling and Exotic Pets* (Conneticut: Lyons Press, 2010), xi.

or wild pets² and exacerbated by corruption,³ lack of regulation,⁴ and inadequate resources to combat it,⁵ this trade poses a complex problem for species worldwide. And species native to the Amazon Rainforest have especially suffered exploitation. The most commonly abducted animals in the Amazon are birds, reptiles, and mammals, with birds and reptiles targeted mostly for the pet trade.⁶ The Brazilian state of Amazonas alone reported a total of over 2,500 seizures of trafficked wildlife (not including lost records) between the years 1992 and 2011.⁷ Peru struggles particularly with domestic wildlife trafficking due to establishing itself as one of the largest exporters of wildlife in the 1960s and 1970s: a frequent surplus of captured animals were sold in the local markets if they could not be sold abroad.⁸ Presently, this problem continues and Peru additionally suffers from a poorly regulated aquarium fish trade

that threatens overexploitations of species such as tetra.⁹

Perhaps the most important international agreement in dealing with the trafficking of live specimens is the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). With a current total of 183 parties, including all Amazonian states,¹⁰ it aims to aid countries in implementing legislation with the goal in conserving wildlife populations by the regulation of their trade and the designation of a government agency to take charge of the logistics of the convention within the country.¹¹ Many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF),¹² TRAFFIC,¹³ and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (ICUN)¹⁴ also use their resources to work to combat wildlife trafficking.

Yet despite the efforts of the governments and the international community the problem of trafficking specimens from the Amazon persists. This is particularly troubling for three major reasons. First, it is a major stressor on animal populations, a vital part of a state's natural resources and ecosystems,¹⁵ that already struggle with other threats such as deforestation. Secondly, individual animals inevitably suffer during their journey from

2 Ragnhild Sollund. "Expressions of Speciesism: The Effects of Keeping Companion Animals on Abuse, Animal Trafficking, and Species Decline." *Crime Law Social Change* 55, (2011): 438. Accessed February 12, 2018. <http://ida.lib.uidaho.edu:2153/10.1007/s10611-011-9296-3>

3 Amy L. Sonricker Hansen, Annie Li, Damien Joly, Sumiko Mekaru, John S. Brownstein. "Digital Surveillance: A Novel Approach to Monitoring the Illegal Wildlife Trade." *PLoS ONE* 7, no. 12 (2012): 1, Accessed February 27, 2018. Doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0051156

4 Sandra E. Baker, Russ Cain, Freya van Kesteren, Zinta A. Zommers, Neil D'Cruze, and David W. Macdonald. "Rough Trade Animal Welfare in the Global Wildlife Trade." *Bioscience* 63, no. 12 (2013): 934. Accessed February 27, 2018. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/bio.2013.63.12.6>

5 Sonricker Hansen, Li, Joly, Mekary, and Brownstein, 1.

6 "Illegal Wildlife Trade in the Amazon." WWF, 2017. http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/where_we_work/amazon/amazon_threats/other_threats/illegal_wildlife_trade_amazon/

7 Carlos Augusto Rodrigues do Nascimento, Robson Esteves Czaban, Rômulo Romeo Nóbrega Alves. "Trends in Illegal Trade of Wild Birds in Amazonas State, Brazil." *Tropical Conservation Science* 8, no. 4 (2015): 1100. Accessed February 27, 2018. <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/194008291500800416>

8 Elizabeth F. Daut, Donald J. Brightsmith, Markus K. Peterson. "Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in Combatting Illegal Wildlife-Pet Trade in Peru." *Journal for Nature Conservation* 24, (2015): 73. Accessed February 27, 2018. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jnc.2014.10.005>

9 Marie-Annick Moreau and Oliver T. Coomes. "Aquarium Fish Exploitation in Western Amazonia: Conservation Issues in Peru." *Environmental Conservation* 34, no. 1 (2007): 13. Accessed February 10, 2018. <http://ida.lib.uidaho.edu:2048/login?url=https://ida.lib.uidaho.edu:2096/docview/21180373?accountid=14551>

10 "Lists of Parties to the Convention." CITES, Accessed March 16, 2018. <https://www.cites.org/eng/disc/parties/index.php>

11 "How CITES Works." CITES, Accessed March 29, 2018. <https://www.cites.org/eng/disc/how.php>

12 "Our Global Goals." WWF, 2017. http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/how_we_work/our_global_goals/index.cfm

13 "What We Do." TRAFFIC The Wildlife Trade Monitoring Network, Accessed March 29, 2018. <http://www.traffic.org/overview/>

14 "Overview of the ICUN Red List." The ICUN Red List of Threatened Species, Accessed March 29, 2018. <http://www.iucnredlist.org/about/overview>

15 "Illegal Wildlife Trade in the Amazon." WWF

the wild to captivity.¹⁶ Whether it be anxiety, depression, or disease, trafficked individuals are especially susceptible to distress due to the nature of the illegal, unregulated business. Finally, trafficking and illegal trade of wild specimens has the potential to harm humans and threaten economic activity through the spread of disease.¹⁷ Those directly exposed to the animals in this trade include the trappers, middlemen, and consumers.¹⁸ Yet, considering the interconnectedness of the globalized world, there are infinite possibilities for pathogens to spread from these hosts indirectly to many more populations and economic sectors such as agriculture. Thus, the following possible solutions and recommended course of action aim to combat this delicate issue.

OPTION 1:

Enhanced Monitoring of Trafficking Networks and Activity

Unfortunately, the foundational knowledge of the trafficking Amazonian specimens is largely incomplete, especially concerning the movement of individuals from their habitat to the markets.¹⁹ Factors that impair the collection of such information include the sheer size and density of forest itself²⁰ and the clandestine nature of the trade which makes government seizure records some of the only primary sources of information available.²¹ Yet even these records are insufficient as governments are logistically unable to seize every trafficked animal. Finally, animal welfare in the trade is also largely under-researched by scholars likely due to comparatively little interest in the subject.²²

Without such information, implementation of effective solutions to combat the smuggling of live animals from the Amazon is extremely difficult. Therefore it is vital that all actors interested in solving this problem, especially governments, conduct further research to better understand these networks. And with the innovations of the digital age, this is more possible than ever. For instance, Amazonian governments could take advantage of websites such as HealthMap, which monitors illegal internet sales of exotic wildlife.²³ Blockchain technology, originally developed for Bitcoin and other forms of cryptocurrency also has the potential aid in trade monitoring.²⁴ Trials for prototypes of real-time video monitoring systems have also been developed.²⁵ Though far from perfected and potentially costly,²⁶ such systems would aid immensely in Amazonian governments achieving an understanding of animal population characteristics and how they are affected trafficking networks within their borders.

OPTION 2:

Addressing Corruption and Capacity Building within Amazonian Countries

Corruption, defined as “the unlawful use of public office for private gain,” has an enormous potential to hinder animal population conservation efforts as it can affect any part of the supply chain of the live animal trade.²⁷ According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, each of the Amazon countries suffer from fair amounts

16 Baker, Cain, van Kesteren, Zommers, D’Cruze, and Macdonald, 933.

17 William B. Karesh, Robert A. Cook, Elizabeth L. Bennett, and James Newcomb. “Wildlife Trade and Global Disease Emergence.” *Emerging Infectious Diseases* 11, no. 7 (2005): 1001. Accessed February 27, 2018. <http://www.cdc.gov/eid>

18 Karesh, Cook, Bennet, and Newcomb, 1000.

19 Rodrigues do Nascimento, Esteves Czaban, and Nóbrega Alves, 1099.

20 “Illegal Wildlife Trade in the Amazon.” WWF.

21 Sonricker Hansen, Li, Joly, Mekary, and Brownstein, 1.

22 Baker, Cain, van Kesteren, Zommers, D’Cruze, and Macdonald, 928

23 Sonricker Hansen, Li, Joly, Mekary, and Brownstein, 9.

24 “Could Blockchain Save the Amazon Rainforest? The Economist.” YouTube Video, 3:53, Uploaded by The Economist April 10, 2018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nSY1pHXM69Y>

25 Luis Camacho, Reynaldo Baquerizo, Joel Palomino, and Michel Zarzosa. “Deployment of a Set of Camera Trap Networks for Wildlife Inventory in Western Amazon Rainforest.” *IEEE Sensors Journal* 17, no. 23 (2017): 8000-8007. Accessed February 13, 2018. Doi: 10.1109/JSEN.2017.2760254

26 *Ibid*, 8005-8006.

27 Robert J. Smith and Matthew J. Walpole. “Should Conservationists Pay More Attention to Corruption?” *Oryx* 39, no. 3 (2005): 251-252. Accessed February 27, 2018. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0030605305000608>

of corruption.²⁸ On a scale of zero to 100, with zero being the most corrupt, the Amazonian countries range from scores of 18 (Venezuela) to 37 (Brazil).²⁹ Comparatively, the highest score of 2017 was 89 (New Zealand) and the lowest was nine (Somalia).³⁰ As such addressing issues of corruption within the supply chain in these countries may ease the effects of animal trafficking³¹ while also constructing a more transparent government. However, given the current situation of some of these countries, particularly Venezuela, this is one of the more challenging options in combatting the illegal wildlife trade. Nevertheless, a good place to start would be by strengthening legal and enforcement systems already in place in each of the countries. In 2011, Brazil expressed its support for strengthening its own implementation of CITES through increased cooperation between law enforcement systems, capacity building, and participation in the Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services.³² Such a commitment could allow Brazil to lead by example in the region, however due to the current administration's current rollbacks of significant environmental protections,³³ this could prove to be problematic. But it may be an opportunity for other Amazonian countries to take the lead.

OPTION 3

Addressing Demand

Examining and addressing the demand for exotic species, also offers an opportunity to ease the stress on Amazonian animal populations by influencing the supply. One of the primary

reasons for trafficking live animals is for the purpose of becoming pets.³⁴ In the case of the Amazon, there are both international and domestic markets for animals native to this region: fish are mainly exported outside of the region to areas such as North America³⁵ while animals such as birds are often sold domestically.³⁶ And in many cases these pets are often valued for the sense of comfort that they bring and even regarded as equals.³⁷ By understanding the illegal market for Amazonian species and the relationship owners develop with their pets, a successful strategy to combat the illegal trade may be through educational campaigns that illuminate the issue. As opposed to indiscriminate trade bans on animals, which have been shown to be ineffective due to their difficulty to enforce, their lack of consideration for culture, and their possibility to be counter-productive,³⁸ these campaigns could target certain populations and utilize animal-loving culture to their advantage to reduce the demand for illegally trafficked animals. Already, similar campaigns, such as iTHINK (an Eastern Asian campaign that involves local celebrities in raising awareness about the harms of illegal animal trafficking) have proven to be effective.³⁹ Additionally, allowing people to keep such exotic animals rather than eliminating their legal trade can increase the incentive to conserve their populations in the wild, as being pets keeps them "in the public mind."⁴⁰

OPTION 4

Increasing the Involvement of Wildlife and Conservationist Non-Governmental Organizations

28 "Corruption Perceptions Index 2017." Transparency International, 2017. https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 Smith and Walpole, 252

32 "Brazilian Support for Strengthening Implementation of CITES." CITES, June 1, 2011. https://www.cites.org/eng/news/sundry/2011/20110606_sg_brazil.shtml

33 "Brazil 'Invites Deforestation with Overhaul of Environmental Laws.'" The Guardian. March 1, 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/01/brazil-amazon-protection-laws-invite-deforestation-ngo>

34 Sollund, 443

35 Moreau and Coomes, 12.

36 Daut, Brightsmith, and Peterson, 73.

37 Sollund, 438.

38 Rosie Cooney and Paul Jepson. "The International Wild Bird Trade: What's Wrong with Blanket Bans?" *Oryx* 40, no. 1 (2006): 18. Accessed February 27, 2018. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0030605306000056>

39 "Celebrities Join Asia's Campaign against Wildlife Trafficking." USAID. March 10, 2016. <https://www.usaid.gov/results-data/success-stories/campaign-helps-raise-awareness-wildlife-trafficking>

40 Ibid, 22.

The role of government can be overwhelming to say the least. In addressing every kind of issue within its borders, prioritization is inevitable and issues such as the trafficking of live animals are not always of the highest importance. As such, governments dedicate an insufficient amount of resources towards them.⁴¹ Where governments are unable to deal with trafficking, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can step in due to the knowledge acquired from on their on the ground presence and their specialization in the issue.⁴² In Peru, local NGOs have already been very successful in combatting the illegal pet trade of Amazonian species through research, educating the general public, conservation strategies, and rehabilitation of individuals harmed by trafficking.⁴³ In fact, those that have been most successful have adopted combining both conservation and animal welfare approaches, meaning that these NGOs care both about endangered populations as well as individual animals affected by the trade, even if the population to which they belong is not in endangered (a subgroup of animals which is often ignored).⁴⁴ Given the success of NGOs and their expertise in such a specific issue, it would be extremely advantageous for governments to expand and their partnerships with them as well as developing new ones.

RECOMMENDED COURSE OF ACTION

Trafficking of live animal specimens from the Amazon Rainforest is not only damaging to the animals themselves, but also to humans and economic activity through the possible spread of diseases. As such it is vital that solutions implemented to solve this problem have immediate results. In order to best combat this trade in South America, the recommended solution is a combination of addressing demand and increasing the involvement of NGOs. First

of all, by increasing the public's awareness on how they themselves might be harming animals through the purchasing of exotic animals with unknown origins, consumers will take action to make smarter decisions and therefore decrease (and hopefully eliminate) the demand side of the market for trafficked animals. With no economic incentive to continue the illegal wildlife trade of Amazonian species, suppliers would be forced to abandon their endeavors.

By increasing the activity and involvement of NGOs in this area, much of each of the other solutions could be accomplished. For instance, research-oriented NGOs would aid immensely in furthering the understanding of the illegal wildlife trade network in this region or providing empirical data. And such information would be extremely valuable to the Amazonian governments that do not always have (or dedicate) the resources to collect it themselves.⁴⁵ NGOs may also be able to provide governments with aid in addressing corruption and law enforcement issues, as they see the effects that these have on both populations and individuals firsthand. Finally, advocacy-oriented NGOs would be able to address the demand side of the equation through educational programs or campaigns to raise awareness about the realities of trafficking live animals. Furthermore, through these programs or campaigns, advocacy-oriented NGOs can potentially influence the overall public opinion on the importance of the issue, which in turn could influence governments to consider combating this illegal trade a higher priority.

A potential caveat to the increased involvement of NGOs, however, would be the competition between foreign interests and national or local interests. For example, an international NGO could overlook the fact that their conservation strategy exacerbates local poverty.⁴⁶ In addressing the illegal wildlife trade, solutions should never compromise the wellbeing of the local human populations of these countries. Thus with increased NGO involvement also

41 Elizabeth L. Bennet. "Another Inconvenient Truth: The Failure of Enforcement Systems to Save Charismatic Species." *Fauna & Flora International*, *Oryx* 45, no. 4 (2011): 476. Accessed February 27, 2018. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S003060531000178X>

42 *Ibid.*, 478.


43 Daut, Brightsmith, and Peterson, 76.

44 *Ibid.*, 76.

45 Andrew Balmford and Tony Whitten. "Who Should Pay for Tropical Conservation, and How Could the Costs Be Met?" *Oryx* 37, no. 2 (2003): 238. Accessed February 27, 2018. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S00306053033000413>

46 Cooney and Jepson, 18.

comes the responsibility of the governments to ensure that its population is not worse-off due to NGO activity. To avoid this potential problem, local conservation and animal welfare NGOs should especially be encouraged to either continue or expand their work.

While each of the previously listed four solutions are viable, this combination allows for more immediate action to be taken and ensures that animals and animal populations are cared for presently while long-term issues such as corruption can be solved in the future. With their implementation, Amazonian countries can approach the problem of trafficking live animals from multiple angles, address some of the issues that lay the foundation for this illegal trade, and contribute to a vision of the world where both humans and animals alike are cared for. 

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Improving the Adherence of Member States to European Union Press Freedom Laws

– Graham Zickefoose

ABSTRACT:

While EU member states boast some of the best press freedom scores in the world, and while the EU Charter enshrines pluralism in the media and prohibits government intervention in press activities, some EU member states still have problematic or bad press freedom scores. There is also evidence that press freedom is deteriorating in some countries instead of improving. Properly addressing problems with EU press freedom requires a multifaceted approach and this white paper presents six possible solutions. The possible solutions are implementing and improving media education programs, homogenizing ethical codes, engaging in online activism, creating stricter regulations for PSM, incentivizing investment from transnational media companies, and regulating media company ownership. The recommended solution would combine media education programs and regulating media company ownership to create the means and opportunity to improve adherence to EU press freedom laws, while incentivizing investment from transnational media companies to sustain ethical journalistic practices.

OVERVIEW:

Europe boasts some of the best press freedom scores in the world according to the Reporters without Borders (RSF) World Press Freedom Index¹ and the Freedom House (FH) Freedom of the Press Index.² High scores imply high levels of pluralism, transparency and independence in the media. However, these scores are not characteristic of the entire continent and not even of the entire European Union. Six EU

1 “2017 World Press Freedom Index.” Reporters without Borders, last modified 2017, <https://rsf.org/en/ranking>.

2 “Freedom of the Press 2017: Press Freedom’s Dark Horizon,” Freedom House, last modified 2017, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2017>.

member states (Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Italy and Poland) all have scores that range from “problematic” to “bad” according to RSF (appendix)³, as well as rank only “partly free” according to FH.⁴ Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU Charter) states that the public has the right to “receive and impart information and ideas” without government interference and that EU member states should respect pluralism in the media.⁵ Despite the proximity to and association with EU member states with outstanding press freedom records, press freedom in some of these countries has worsened over the past few years.⁶ This trend is troubling for two reasons in particular. First, press freedom is essential to a fully functioning democracy. There is a strong correlation between press freedom, political knowledge and higher voter participation, all bastions of democracy.⁷ Second, the deterioration of press freedom within the EU can potentially delegitimize it, since national trends of press freedom deterioration directly contradict the principles of the EU Charter.

There are many factors that contribute to a lack of press freedom in Europe, all of which are evident in the six aforementioned countries in some form. Government intervention is ubiquitous in press activities, taking the form of repeated police investigations into media personnel, prohibition of investigation or reporting on certain topics, direct control of public broadcasting, and in the case of Hungary, rewriting the constitution to disadvantage the media in criticizing the government.⁸ The 2008 economic crisis negatively affected many media organizations in Europe, which forced foreign investors to withdraw from countries in Central

and Eastern Europe.⁹ The power vacuum left behind was in some cases filled by local business moguls, who could afford to support financially struggling newspapers at a loss, if it meant using those papers to further their political interests.¹⁰ The lack of a consensus on a definition of journalism and concepts of autonomy leads journalists to surrender unknowingly freedoms that should be implicit in their profession.¹¹ Many EU countries also lack well-established codes of ethics and media education programs for journalists.¹²

While instances of each of these issues are evident across Europe, this paper will focus on how to improve press freedom in the six aforementioned countries. Their press freedom scores indicate that they suffer from the highest concentration of the circumstances that lead to a lack of press freedom, and if the proposed solutions are successful in the countries that are the worst offenders against press freedom, it stands to reason that the application of those solutions might be easier in other EU member states.

SOLUTIONS:

Implementing and improving media education programs

The absence of well-established media education programs is a pervasive problem in some EU member states. Education about media ethics and practices contribute to a more stable and continuous journalistic culture. Many of the EU member states with undesirable press freedom scores suffer from a lack of consistency in media education over time.¹³ This trend is especially invasive in Central and Eastern Europe, where media organizations were merely purveyors of

3 “2017 World Press Freedom Index”
 4 “Freedom of the Press 2017: Press Freedom’s Dark Horizon”
 5 “Article 11,” *Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union*
 6 “Freedom of the Press 2017: Press Freedom’s Dark Horizon”
 7 Leeson, Peter T, “Media Freedom, Political Knowledge, and Participation,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 22, no. 2 (2008): 155-169.
 8 Bairrett Jr., Richard L, “Executive Power and Media Freedom in Central and Eastern Europe,” *Comparative Political Studies* 48, no. 10 (2015): 1260-1292.

9 Stetka, Vaclav, “From Multinationals to Business Tycoons: Media Ownership and Journalistic Autonomy in Central and Eastern Europe,” *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 17, no. 4 (2012): 433-456.
 10 Ibid.
 11 Lauk, Epp; Harro-Loit, Halliki, “Journalistic Autonomy as a Professional Value and Element of Journalism Culture: The European Perspective,” *International Journalism of Communication* 11, (2016): 1956-1974.
 12 Ibid.
 13 Ibid.

Soviet propaganda for decades.¹⁴ While many journalists who lived through the Cold War value press freedom and professional codes of ethics, younger journalists, pressured by a post-2008 financial crisis economy, are willing to work for less money and are less concerned with ethics and editorial freedom so long as they have a job.¹⁵ Since educated journalists exist in these countries, and are having trouble finding employment as journalists, they could have the opportunity to impart their knowledge on the next generation as educators of media ethics and professional journalism. Additionally, the European Journalism Centre (EJC), an organization providing professional training for journalists with an emphasis in Europe¹⁶, has the framework and online resources from which potential educators could draw. Acquiring funding for this project might be difficult, but there are a number of organizations whose central mission is the promotion of press freedom in Europe, and all of them subsist on charitable donations and grants from a variety of sources. Many organizations in Europe are interested in funding press freedom initiatives.

Establishment of an EU-wide Journalism Code of Ethics and Regulatory Body

The necessity of a homogenized code of journalistic ethics in the EU is a different approach to solving the same problem that improving media education would attempt to solve. Few media organizations in EU member states have standard definitions for “journalism” and concepts of autonomy vary widely.¹⁷ In EU member states such as Bulgaria, Poland or Hungary, reporters will tend to run unsubstantiated quotes from government officials, are susceptible to bias against smaller political parties in their coverage, will omit details from stories and run them without proper context, and in some cases will accept

payments to spread incorrect information.¹⁸ All of these acts stem from either a lack of or disregard for an established, overarching code of ethics. In 2011, *News of the World*, a British newspaper, ceased publication after 168 years after it involved itself in a scandal in which its journalists hacked the phones of celebrities, politicians and the royal family.¹⁹ In responses to this, a report issued by the British Parliament known as the Leveson Inquiry proposed the formation of a new, overarching regulatory body for the newspaper and magazine industry in the United Kingdom.²⁰ This body, known as the Independent Press Standards Organization (IPSO), came into being in 2014 and holds over 1500 newspapers and magazines throughout the UK accountable for their actions.²¹ The EU could take a similar approach to regulating the press. The body, like the IPSO, would be independent of any government regulation and hold the press accountable throughout the EU.

Online Activism for Press Freedom

In the information age, it is easier for activists to disseminate information that governments want to hide. The internet has provided a new and more easily accessible platform for solidarity among like-minded individuals to promote their causes. This was the case for Milla (short for One Million for Freedom of the Press in Hungary), a Hungarian activist group that gained traction by promoting press freedom through a Facebook page.²² Milla used “light materials such as funny pictures and videos” to relate to a younger audience, which was largely disillusioned with politics, with some measure

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 “Mission Statement,” European Journalism Centre, last modified 2018, http://ejc.net/about/mission_statement.

17 Lauk and Harro-Loit, 1956-1974.

18 Kostadinova, Petia, “Media in the New Democracies of Post-Communist Eastern Europe,” *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures* 29, no. 2 (2015): 453-466.

19 “Timeline: News of the World phone hacking row,” BBC (London, UK), July 11, 2011. <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-12253968>

20 Fenger, Susanne, et al., “How effective is media self-regulation? Results from a comparative survey of European Journalists,” *European Journal of Communication* 30, no. 3 (2015): 249-266.

21 “About IPSO,” Independent Press Standards Organization, last modified in 2016, <https://www.ipso.co.uk/about-ipso/>

22 Wilkin, Peter, et al., “Digital Activism and Hungarian media reform: The case of Milla,” *European Journal of Communication* 30, no. 6 (2015): 682-697.

of success.²³ After the ultra-conservative Fidesz Party took nearly 70 percent of the seats in the Hungarian Parliament and proposed new media laws, Milla's Facebook page membership gained 40,000 members in just three days.²⁴ At their height, Milla had 135,000 members.²⁵ In Greece the use of social media has led to greater audience participation in the media, as well as to providing a wider, timeless platform for journalists to publish stories with fewer restrictions imposed by editors.²⁶ Fewer boundaries to publication of news stories can improve press freedom in countries where governments and media organizations seek to control what the press releases. While the ultimate goal of Milla was not to remain on the web, but to be a platform for activist groups to meet and organize for protests and other actions in real life²⁷, online activism has shown promise as a starting point for promoting real change in EU member states struggling to maintain viable levels of press freedom.

Legal Protections and Safeguards for Public Service Media

The Council of Europe has found that public service media (PSM) has been useful in promoting pluralism in the news.²⁸ However, the Platform for the Protection of Journalism and the Safety of Journalists received a growing number of alerts across Europe about government interference in the composition of staff of PSM organizations.²⁹ Specific cases concerning the aforementioned EU member states include Bulgaria, where the body responsible for selecting the directors

of their PSM is appointed by the president and parliament majority, and Italy, where management of PSM is determined by the President of the Republic and Minister of Economy.³⁰ These arrangements and others like them obscure the objectivity PSM organizations are supposed to uphold. While the Council of Europe and other international organizations have recommendations regarding PSM, none of the recommendations are legally binding.³¹ While the EU holds that PSM is vital to democratic processes and ensuring that it meets social and cultural needs that the market fails to provide³², the EU leaves the decision on PSM laws and regulations up to the national governments.³³ If the EU Commission were to include PSM laws and regulations under its priorities for legislation to propose to the EU Parliament and Council of the EU, the EU could decrease the susceptibility of states to political overreach through PSM. One idea might be to appoint directorship of PSM organizations based on their experience in the media industry, or any other set of objective criteria.

Encouraging foreign investment from Western European media organizations

On whole, EU member states in Western Europe, particularly in the north, have better track records for press freedom, consistently ranking in the top 20 countries globally for press freedom.³⁴ Some of the reasons for this include higher levels of journalistic professionalism and lower levels of political parallelism in governments.³⁵ Some attribute the political parallelism that exists in many of these countries to “non-media diversifiers,” or business moguls that do not at first glance have a financial interest in the media sector, but have bought out media organizations, particularly newspapers, in Central, Eastern and Southern

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Serafeim, Katerina, “The Impact of Social Media on Press Freedom in Greece: Benefits, Challenges and Limitations,” *Journal for Communication Studies* 5, no. 1 (2012): 163-191.

27 Wilkin, et al., 682-697.

28 Psychogiopoulou, et al., “The Freedom of Public Service Media in Europe: International Standards and Their Domestic Implementation,” *International Journal of Communication* 11, (2017): 1936-1955.

29 “Public Service Media Leaflet,” Council of Europe, accessed April 1, 2018. <https://rm.coe.int/leaflet-public-service-media-en/1680735c27>

30 Psychogiopoulou, et al., 1936-1955.

31 Ibid.

32 “Audiovisual and Media,” Official Website of the European Union, last modified April 3, 2018. https://europa.eu/european-union/topics/audiovisual-media_en

33 Psychogiopoulou, et al., 1936-1955.

34 “2017 World Press Freedom Index.”

35 Lauk and Harro-Loit, 1956-1974.

European countries after the 2008 financial crisis.³⁶ They then subsidized these news outlets at a loss with earnings from other business activities and used them to further their own political agendas.³⁷ This trend started soon after transnational media companies based in Western Europe withdrew their investments in Central and Eastern European media.³⁸ It stands to reason that creating incentives to bring back private investment from these Western Europe-based transnational media companies might at the very least decrease media organizations' financial reliance on non-media diversifiers, and at most encourage greater pluralism and better established journalistic professionalism. However, in order to incentivize investment in Central, Eastern and Southern European countries, these countries need a better educated generation of journalists that write hard-hitting, factual stories.

Regulating Ownership Shares in Media Outlets

Even though increased investment from transnational media companies is a necessary step toward increased media freedom in EU member states, the question of how to incentivize or coerce non-media diversifiers into giving up their control over media outlets remains. Higher levels of ownership concentration in media companies are associated with higher levels of ownership influence over the direction of media organizations³⁹ and over media content.⁴⁰ This ownership influence increases when individuals, as opposed to families or other entities, own significant interests.⁴¹ Because there are fundamental democratic values tied to the goods produced by media companies⁴², media organizations should not be susceptible

to ownership practices that directly undermine these values by hindering the media's role as government watchdog. Therefore, EU policymakers should institute ownership share regulations of media organizations. These regulations could limit the amount of ownership influence by instituting ownership percentage caps, ensuring that no individual or family has too much control over media organizations. These regulations could be both preventative and retroactive, ensuring that non-media diversifiers cannot gain controlling interests in media organizations in the future and dismantling the controlling interests that already exist.

RECOMMENDED SOLUTION:

The best way to improve the adherence of member states to EU press freedom laws is a combination of the first, fifth and sixth solutions. The problems that each of these solutions address are evident in all six of the EU member states (Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Italy and Poland) with problematic or bad press freedom scores according to the RSF World Press Freedom Index. These countries lack well-established media education programs and codes of ethics, and the types of education programs described in the first proposed solution could remedy this problem. However, in order for journalists to experience the editorial freedom necessary to practice ethical journalism, policymakers must curtail and reverse the trend of non-media diversifiers buying large interests in media organizations, subsidizing them at a loss and using them to further their own political agendas. By creating regulations that limit ownership shares in media organizations, policymakers can eliminate the incentive for non-media diversifiers to buy financially struggling media outlets. This could create the opportunity for ownership and investment by transnational media companies that have track records for allowing ethical journalistic practices to flourish. Better-educated journalists that hold the government accountable for its actions could generate public interest in their stories, thus offering further incentive for investment from transnational media companies.

36 Stetka, 433-456.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 Hanretty, Chris, "Media Outlets and their Moguls: Why Concentrated Individual or Family Ownership is Bad for Editorial Independence," *European Journal of Communication* 29, no. 3 (2014): 335-350.

40 Stetka, 433-456.

41 Hanretty, 335-350.

42 Brogi, Elda and Parcu, Pier Luigi, "Evolving Regulation for Media Freedom and Pluralism in the European Union," *Utilities Policy* 31, (2014): 256-265.

While a universal code of ethics implemented at the EU level addresses the same problem as improving and implementing media education programs, this solution does not address the problem at its root. EU journalists should not only know what ethical practices to follow, but why they should follow them as well. This can only come from a comprehensive media education program. Government oversight of journalistic practices also understandably raises red flags for many journalists, and media education is a way that journalists can learn about codes of ethics without direct government oversight. While PSM has an important function in many EU member states, it is, by definition, still directly tied to its respective national government. This leaves the potential for government influence over the media hindered, but not eliminated. Online activism may seem like a plausible solution, as the internet allows for immediate response to measures that negatively affect press freedom and most people in the EU have internet access.⁴³ However, the universality of the internet does not equal successful activism, as Milla found out when their campaign had a difficult time gaining support outside of Budapest.⁴⁴ This difficulty had to do with the translation of online activism to real life. Online activism has the potential to be a tool for press freedom advocates, but it does not work well as a foundation.⁴⁵

With all this in mind, implementing and improving media education programs, hindering non-media diversifiers' influence over media outlets and incentivizing investment from transnational media companies is the best multifaceted approach toward journalism that holds the government accountable and keeps the public informed in the EU. 

43 "Internet Access and Use Statistics – Households and Individuals," Eurostat: Statistics Explained, last modified March 28, 2018, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Internet_access_and_use_statistics_-_households_and_individuals#Internet_access

44 Wilkin, et al., 682-697.

45 Ibid.

APPENDIX:



Press Freedom in Europe in 2017, according to the World Press Freedom Index compiled by Reporters without Borders (RSF). Shading ranges from a score of “good” (white) to “very bad” (black).”

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Addressing the Status of Kurds in Iraq: Recovering from the 2017 Independence Referendum

– Zachary Lien

ABSTRACT

In September 2017, leaders of the autonomous region of Iraqi-Kurdistan facilitated an independence referendum that lacked federal, regional, and international support. The referendum backfired, and the region lost substantial land initially gained in the fight against ISIS, relinquished control of the key city of Kirkuk, and suffered economic consequences administered by the Iraqi federal government. These events represent a crucial moment for the recovery of Iraqi-Kurdistan, and failure to properly navigate through this political and economic turmoil threatens the future of an independent Iraqi-Kurdistan. Moving forward, there exist multiple options that may help Iraqi-Kurdistan recover from the referendum: pursue a two-state solution without Kirkuk, create a special status for Kirkuk, reinvigorate international involvement, and focus on internal recovery. Ultimately, this research finds that focusing on internal recovery while reinvigorating international involvement will likely produce the best outcomes for Iraqi-Kurdistan and its citizens.

OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND:

The pursuit for an independent Kurdistan has been a long, arduous journey for the approximately 30 million Kurds in the world. The Kurdish region is divided by borders drawn after World War I, and large populations of Kurds reside in southern Turkey, northern Syria, northern Iraq, and western Iran.¹ The most advanced form of Kurdish autonomy exists in Iraqi-Kurdistan, which is the product of Western intervention in Iraq from the Gulf War to the

1 "Who Are the Kurds?" BBC News. October 31, 2017. Accessed April 02, 2018. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29702440>.

2003 invasion of Iraq.² Since the formation of the 2005 Iraq Constitution, Iraqi-Kurdistan has enjoyed vastly greater autonomy and recognition than Kurds in neighboring states. However, the boundaries of Iraqi-Kurdistan—particularly the inclusion of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk—have not been officially defined, as required by the Iraq Constitution.³

From 2014 to 2017, the campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) enabled the Iraqi-Kurdistan military force—the peshmerga—to expand the region's landmass by 40%.⁴ Kurdish President Masoud Barzani saw this land expansion, which even put Kirkuk under Kurdish control, as an opportunity to utilize newfound leverage,⁵ and Kurdish leadership facilitated an independence referendum on September 25, 2017. While Kurdish leaders in Iraq oscillated between calling the referendum an official declaration of independence,⁶ the international community did not support the referendum. The United States,⁷ the European Union,⁸ Turkey,⁹

Iran,¹⁰ and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)¹¹ expressed condemnation, concern, or disappointment.

The referendum backfired, and Iraqi-Kurdistan is politically and economically at its weakest since 2005. In addition to Iraqi-forces taking over Kirkuk days after the referendum,¹² Iraqi-Kurdistan lost 40% of the land acquired from ISIS,¹³ Kurdish oil exports diminished more than 50%,¹⁴ airports in Iraqi-Kurdistan remained closed,¹⁵ and budget freezes by the federal government exacerbate an already struggling regional economy.¹⁶ These developments, which directly led to the resignation of President Barzani,¹⁷ have produced uncertainty for Iraqi-Kurdistan's future, and some fear that the failed referendum and Iraqi military response cultivated the conditions for a possible civil war.¹⁸ If the Iraq federal government and Iraqi-Kurdistan fail to exit this crisis with a plan, then violent clashes will be more likely. This is

10 Ibid.

11 "Security Council Press Statement on Iraq." United Nations Security Council. September 21, 2017. Accessed April 03, 2018. <https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc13002.doc.htm>.

12 Chmaytelli, Maher. "Iraqi Forces Complete Kirkuk Province Takeover after Clashes With..." Reuters. October 21, 2017. Accessed April 03, 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-kurds-clash/iraqi-forces-complete-kirkuk-province-takeover-after-clashes-with-kurds-idUSKBN1CPOPT>.

13 See Appendix A

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3 Deeks, Ashley S., and Burton, Matthew D. "Iraq's Constitution: A Drafting History." *Cornell International Law Journal* 40, no. 1 (2007): 1-87.

4 Cancian, Matthew Franklin, and Kristin E. Fabbe. "What Iraq's Kurdish Peshmerga Believe." *Foreign Affairs*. September 14, 2017. Accessed April 02, 2018. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2017-08-25/what-iraqs-kurdish-peshmerga-believe>.

5 Rosen, Kenneth R. "An Ominous Future for Kurdistan's Minorities." *The Atlantic*. September 25, 2017. Accessed April 02, 2018. <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/kurdistan-referendum-iraq-isis-turkey-saddam-hussein/540939/>

6 International Crisis Group, *Oil and Borders: How to Fix Iraq's Kurdish Crisis*, 17 October 2017, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/59e70ac14.html>, p. 4

7 United States Department of State, *Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government's Referendum*, Washington D.C, 2017

8 Mogherini, Federica. "Statement by High Representative/Vice-President on the Proposed Kurdish Referendum in Iraq." EEAS. September 19, 2017. Accessed April 03, 2018. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/32450/statement-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-proposed-kurdish-referendum_en.

9 Jiyad, Sajad. "How to Defuse the Iraqi Kurdish Crisis." *The New York Times*. September 27, 2017. Accessed April 03, 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/opinion/iraq-kurds-independence.html>.

a critical moment for Iraqi-Kurdistan's future, and mishandling this process could further deteriorate the possibility of an independent Kurdistan. Likewise, any plan must consider the social and economic well-being of approximately five million Kurds.

PURSUE TWO-STATE SOLUTION WITHOUT KIRKUK

Some argue that genuine recovery is impossible under the confines of Iraqi federalism. Therefore, Iraqi-Kurdistan could continue to pursue independence as their primary objective, even if it requires that Iraqi-Kurdistan forfeit interest in disputed territory. One Kurdish journalist compared the situation to an inevitably failing marriage—arguing that it would be wiser to pursue a healthy divorce than force a loveless marriage.¹⁹ Former US Ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith, suggests that the decision to remain in Iraq is riskier than the pursuit for independence,²⁰ and some analysts recommend a partition plan similar to the treaties that partitioned former Yugoslavia into distinct states.²¹

Certainly, it is risky to prioritize the pursuit of independence above immediate economic and social alleviation, but the structure of the state will influence economic and social prosperity in the long-term. In their analysis of 72 intrastate conflicts between 1945 and 2002, Chapman and Roeder found that 14 percent of *de jure* partition cases experienced a resumption of violence within two years, which was significantly lower than *de facto* separation (50 percent), unitary solution (63 percent),

or autonomy (67 percent).²² These results support the assertion that a two-state solution will be more effective at maintaining peace than alternative arrangements. The loss of Kirkuk—which once produced 55% of Kurdish oil exports—translates to a more economically vulnerable Iraqi-Kurdistan.²³ However, forfeiting claim to Kirkuk could save face for Iraqi leadership and expedite the emergence of an independent Kurdistan.²⁴

CREATE SPECIAL STATUS FOR KIRKUK

Rather than forfeit claim of Kirkuk, Kurdish leadership could pursue negotiations to grant Kirkuk special status, where Baghdad and Erbil share administrative power and revenue alongside Kirkuki leaders. There are several justifications for granting Kirkuk special status. First, Kirkuk is ethnically diverse and economically powerful; the city of over a million people commonly adopt a distinct "Kirkuki" identity, even among Kurdish residents.²⁵ Second, Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution mandates that the Iraqi government collect census and referendum data from disputed territories, including Kirkuk, in order to delineate disputed territories based on the will of the populace.²⁶ However, the Iraqi government failed to meet the 2007 deadline and has since not fulfilled the mandate. Third, in 2009, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) identified Kirkuk as a core source of conflict, and UNAMI ultimately proposed granting special status to Kirkuk.²⁷ Finally, many experts and Kurdish leaders assert that an independent Kurdistan could not survive

19 Nuri, Ayub. "Why Kurdish Independence Is the Only Solution for the World." *Time*. August 14, 2014. Accessed April 03, 2018. <http://time.com/3105066/kurdish-independence-iraq/>.

20 Sulaivany, Karzan. "Remaining Part of Iraq Risky for Kurds: Former US Ambassador." *Kurdistan24*. June 26, 2017. Accessed April 03, 2018. <http://www.kurdistan24.net/en/video/320eaeef-8060-4950-94c2-2b7ffbacdfb>.

21 Barwari, Delovan. "A Two-State Solution for Iraq." *The Huffington Post*. April 26, 2015. Accessed April 03, 2018. https://www.huffingtonpost.com/delovan-barwari/a-twostate-solution-for-iraq_b_6741768.html#

22 Chapman, Thomas, and Philip G. Roeder. "Partition as a Solution to Wars of Nationalism: The Importance of Institutions." *American Political Science Review* 101, no. 4 (2007): p. 689

23 Natali, "Iraqi Kurdistan Was Never Ready for Statehood."

24 International Crisis Group, p. 3

25 *Ibid* p. 14

26 Anderson, Scott R. "The Constitutional Context for Iraq's Latest Crisis." *Brookings Institute*. November 07, 2017. Accessed April 03, 2018. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/11/07/the-constitutional-context-for-iraqs-latest-crisis/>.

27 *Ibid*.

losing all territorial or economic claim to Kirkuk. Therefore Iraqi-Kurdistan has no choice but to pursue some control of Kirkuk.

Advocates of this option note that sharing the influence and revenue of Kirkuk allows both sides to save face to their constituents,²⁸ demonstrates a commitment to diplomacy to the international community,²⁹ improves the economic viability of an independent Kurdistan,³⁰ and revives the integrity of the Iraqi Constitution.³¹ UNAMI affirms that Article 140 could be fulfilled by proposing a negotiated settlement to the public via referendum.³²

REINVIGORATE INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT

To achieve its ambitions, Iraqi-Kurdistan will need more international support than it did in September 2017, since Israel was the only country to openly support the referendum.³³ Specifically, Iraqi-Kurdistan could pursue international involvement in negotiations with the Iraqi-government. Historically, freedom and security of Kurds in Iraq advance when international backers get involved.³⁴ However, in September 2017, President Barzani rejected

public and private offers from the US,³⁵ UN,³⁶ and EU³⁷ to mediate negotiations with Baghdad instead of proceeding with the referendum. After Iraqi forces retook Kirkuk, the UNSC reaffirmed the international community's interest in peace and offered to facilitate dialogue.³⁸ Put simply, international interest exists, but Iraqi-Kurdistan must accept the offers.

Furthermore, this is perhaps an opportune moment to reinvigorate and strengthen UNAMI. Since 2009, UNAMI has had limited involvement in the Kurdish region, and some experts argue that the UNSC should update UNAMI's mandate to include the responsibility to report on Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBs).³⁹ This international specialization on Iraq's DIBs would promote long-term research and negotiations, and it would revive another international actor that can convince the two sides that dialogue fulfills their interests better than escalation. The International Crisis Group notes that, while Iraqi-Kurdistan's ambitions have been set back, the conditions for a reenergized UNAMI are better than they have been in a decade, and an updated report on DIBs can inform the politicians elected in the 2018 election season.⁴⁰

28 International Crisis Group, p. 3

29 Ibid p. 14

30 Alaaldin, Ranj. "The U.S. and Kurdistan: Revise and Rebuild after Kirkuk." Brookings Institute. November 28, 2017. Accessed April 03, 2018. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/11/03/the-u-s-and-kurdistan-revise-and-rebuild-after-kirkuk/>.

31 Anderson, "The Constitutional Context for Iraq's Latest Crisis."

32 "UNAMI Submits Its Reports on the Disputed Internal Boundaries." United Nations Iraq. April 22, 2009. Accessed April 03, 2018. http://www.uniraq.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=307:unami-submits-its-reports-on-the-disputed-internal-boundaries&Itemid=605&lang=en.

33 Kamel, Lorenzo. "Kurdish Independence Vote: A Historical Perspective." Iraq | Al Jazeera. September 22, 2017. Accessed April 03, 2018. <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/kurdish-independence-vote-historical-perspective-170922093133193.html>.

34 Nuri, "Why Kurdish Independence Is the Only Solution for the World."

35 Zucchino, David. "Iraqi Forces Sweep Into Kirkuk, Checking Kurdish Independence Drive." The New York Times. October 16, 2017. Accessed April 03, 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/16/world/middleeast/kirkuk-iraq-kurds.html>.

36 Lake, Eli. "Tillerson Letters Show U.S. Nearly Averted Kurdish Referendum." Bloomberg. October 13, 2017. Accessed April 03, 2018. <https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-10-13/tillerson-letters-show-u-s-nearly-averted-kurdish-referendum>.

37 Mogherini, "Statement by High Representative/Vice-President on the Proposed Kurdish Referendum in Iraq."

38 "Security Council Press Statement on Kirkuk." United Nations Security Council. October 18, 2017. Accessed April 03, 2018. <https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc13036.doc.htm>.

39 International Crisis Group, p. 15

40 Ibid. p. 11

FOCUS ON INTERNAL RECOVERY

Instead of focusing on external ambitions or lobbying, there are experts who recommend that Iraqi-Kurdistan solve internal problems before addressing external concerns. Namely, disunity among the two major political parties—Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)—hinders Kurds' ability to push forward their interests.⁴¹ The KDP and PUK fought a bloody civil war in the mid-1990s, and their respective peshmerga forces remain separate today despite calls for integration within the peshmerga.⁴² In November 2017, one month after Iraqi forces reclaimed Kirkuk, one analyst called the internal struggle for internal sovereignty “the biggest crisis facing the Kurds.”⁴³ Moreover, many Kurds have lost faith in the political establishment due to rampant corruption and elitism,⁴⁴ and that sentiment is inflamed by the fact that the parliament recently went two years without meeting.⁴⁵

Additionally, the poor economic situation in Iraqi-Kurdistan demands attention, with or without Kirkuk. Due to overzealous focus on the oil market, Iraqi-Kurdistan lacks a diverse economic base required for development.⁴⁶ If Iraqi-Kurdistan fails to develop its economy, it will continue to be dependent on Baghdad; even as a state, Kurdistan would likely be subordinate to neighboring states.⁴⁷ One Iraqi-Kurd described the situation, “We don't have

an economy. We have one oil pipeline. We don't have a judicial system. We don't have a united army. We don't have a parliament.”⁴⁸ For some experts, domestic factors make up the primary obstacles on the road to an independent Kurdistan.

RECOMMENDED COURSE OF ACTION:

The September 2017 referendum demonstrates the destructive nature of overconfidence and a fixation on external ambitions. Iraqi-Kurdistan will endure the consequences of this spontaneous and miscalculated referendum for decades. However, the consequences can be mitigated through a concerted effort to improve the internal function of Iraqi-Kurdistan while attracting international support. In fact, the combination of these approaches can generate positive outcomes that may set the stage for a peaceful solution to this sectarian conflict.

As a landlocked nation surrounded by unfriendly states, Iraqi-Kurdistan requires internal reform that unites political parties, combats corruption, develops the economy, and sets the stage for political and financial investment. Currently, the deep-seeded political divisions between the KDP and PUK obstructs development efforts as well as thwarts internal and external legitimacy. Without addressing internal hostility—or the corruption that hostility enables—Iraqi-Kurdistan impairs its own ability to accomplish its goals. Furthermore, the vulnerable regional economy requires a step back from obsessive oil investments, and economic reform must target long-term, internal financing into education, security, and other programs that renew the public's faith. By undertaking internal reforms, Iraqi-Kurdistan can become a more attractive location for political and economic investment to the international community.

Nevertheless, Kurdish leadership must be willing to accept offers for mediation and

41 Gunter, p. 14

42 Cancian and Fabbe, “What Iraq's Kurdish Peshmerga Believe.”

43 Alaalidin, “The U.S. and Kurdistan: Revise and Rebuild after Kirkuk.”

44 Hamakarim, Ako. “The Dim Future of Kurdistan.” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. September 23, 2017. Accessed April 03, 2018. <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/the-dim-future-of-kurdistan>.

45 Jalabi, Raya. “Iraq's Kurdish Parliament Backs Sept 25 Independence Referendum.” Reuters. September 15, 2017. Accessed April 03, 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-kurds/iraqs-kurdish-parliament-backs-sept-25-independence-referendum-idUSKCN1BQ2AV>.

46 Hiltermann, Joost, and Maria Fantappie. “Twilight of the Kurds.” Foreign Policy. January 16, 2018. Accessed April 03, 2018. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/16/twilight-of-the-kurds-iraq-syria-kurdistan/>.

47 Hamakarim, “The Dim Future of Kurdistan”

48 Diehl, Jackson. “Opinion | Why a Referendum Won't Solve Iraqi Kurdistan's Problems.” The Washington Post. July 23, 2017. Accessed April 03, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/why-a-referendum-wont-solve-iraqi-kurdistan-problems/2017/07/23/857326fe-6d68-11e7-b9e2-2056e768a7e5_story.html.

support from the United States, United Nations Security Council, and European Union. The referendum shattered the leverage that Iraqi-Kurdistan once held, and Baghdad holds most of the cards for future negotiations. However, international mediation can balance this leverage, as it has done in the past for Iraqi-Kurdistan. Furthermore, if Erbil demonstrates commitment by accepting international involvement, then it builds a stronger case for reinvigorating UNAMI's involvement and enhancing its influence. By including the study of DIBs into UNAMI's mandate, UNAMI becomes a more capable source of mediation and information. UNAMI can update information on DIBs that involve Iraqi-Kurdistan, apply this information to negotiation sessions, and influence the incoming decision-makers from 2018 elections in Baghdad and Erbil.


Regarding Kirkuk, the Iraqi government currently has little incentive to compromise. Unless Iraqi leadership concludes that granting special status to Kirkuk is necessary for peace, concessions will be unlikely. Perhaps international involvement by UNAMI will balance the scales for negotiations. Regardless, Iraqi-Kurdistan should prioritize and focus on recovery and international lobbying; if granting special status to Kirkuk becomes a realistic option, then investing resources would be wise.

The ability for Iraqi-Kurdistan to properly prioritize solutions will prove to be the definitive indicator of success. Erbil must learn from its mistakes, but the future is not bleak. Investing in good governance practices, institutional reform, economic development, and international lobbying can tear down new and old obstacles on the path towards independence. 🌐

APPENDIX A

Territory lost by Kurds in Iraq

Kurds in northern Iraq voted in a non-binding secession referendum on September 25. **Since then, they have lost 40 percent of the area** they had taken in the fight against ISIL, as Iraqi forces moved in.





Addressing Intergroup Relations in the wake of Europe's Migrant Crisis

– Cami Nichols

ABSTRACT

The migrant crisis for Europe began in 2015 with a major influx of peoples from majority Muslim countries coming in. With this, in recent years there has been a concerning rise of Islamophobia and right-wing nationalism in Europe. States and communities should take a variety of measures to increase exposure to and education of the cultures that are becoming more prevalent in European society. Implementing multicultural education policies, creating specific literacy classes that are tailored to refugee mother populations, and offering media literacy classes to adults that focus on challenging radicalization and hate speech is the best way to decrease tensions among refugee and native populations in Europe. These solutions work towards facilitating community interaction between the two groups, therefore increasing exposure to different cultures and tolerance in tandem.

BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW

Intergroup relations between refugee and native populations in Europe have been steadily declining in the years since the refugee crisis. The crisis in 2015 saw unprecedented numbers of refugees and migrants coming over from conflict areas, most notably Middle Eastern countries such as Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan¹. Applications for asylum within the European Union (EU) were at an all-time high in 2015 and 2016² averaging between 1.2 and 1.4 million applicants³. These refugees come largely from predominantly Muslim countries and starting at the beginning of the crisis Europe has seen a drastic rise in Islamophobia and nationalism,

1 "Asylum Statistics", eurostat, 16 March 2018, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics

2 Ibid.

3 See Appendix A

which only serves to further the divide between refugee and native populations.

Islamophobia in Europe has rapidly increased, beginning in 2015, in a matter that is nothing less than alarming. In 2017 there were thousands of reported instances of Islamophobic attacks including attacks on mosques, criminal attacks and physical attacks against refugee and aid workers, attacks against refugee shelters, and attacks targeting Muslims⁴. There also shows an increase in negative attitudes toward Muslim refugees and immigrants on a more concentrated level with most Polish citizens (between 55 and 76 percent) approving of violent solutions toward asylum seekers, including deportation and detention, and closed borders⁵. The increase in Islamophobic and anti-refugee attitudes has an effect that spans more than just personal attitudes, though.

Over the last election cycle, Europe has also seen a concerning rise in the success of far-right nationalist parties in governments around the continent⁶. Notably, the far-right, and openly Islamophobic, Alternative for Deutschland (AfD) in Germany gained almost 13% of the vote in September 2017. This was an 8% jump from the elections in 2013. Similar far-right parties such as the National Front in France (33.9% of the vote), the anti-Islam Freedom Party in the Netherlands (19%), and others throughout Europe have also gained power and an official voice in their federal governments⁷. With most of these parties campaigning on an anti-Islam anti-refugee platform there are clear ties between negative attitudes towards Muslims and refugees and the rise of nationalism in Europe. Both of these factors have contributed to the state of intergroup relations in Europe.

4 Enes Baykrali et al. *European Islamophobia Report 2017*. Istanbul: Seta, 2018. Accessed March 2018. http://www.islamophobiaeurope.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/EIR_2017.pdf

5 Michal Bukowski, "A New Tide of Racism, Xenophobia, and Islamophobia in Europe: Polish Anthropologists Swim Against the Current" *American Anthropologist* 119, No. 3 (2017)

6 See Appendix B

7 "How far-right parties are faring across Europe," *The Local* online. Last modified October 14, 2017. <https://www.thelocal.fr/20171014/how-far-right-parties-are-faring-across-europe>

The relationship between refugee and native populations in Europe plays an important role in the attitude that each party takes on towards the other and the overall productivity of a nation. Ethnic and racial conflict and subsequent favoritism can lead to slowed economic growth.⁸ While the EU has implemented a variety of programs, such as pre-arrival language classes and youth empowerment programs,⁹ to help ease refugee integration these measures have been mostly voluntary, not very easily accessible, and have not been met with widespread support. There are still measures that need to be taken to further facilitate positivity between the two groups. It's important to address these negatives attitudes in order to have a population that works cohesively towards the betterment of every citizen.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

APPROACH 1

Implementation of Multicultural Education Policies

Education is a key element to the fundamental rights protection that serves as a prerequisite for integration¹⁰. The United Nations (UN) highlights policies of multicultural educational programs when addressing the issue of refugee integration.¹¹ These educational programs are

8 Frank et al. "Does the Leader's Ethnicity Matter? Ethnic Favoritism, Education, and Health in Sub-Saharan Africa" *American Political Science Review* 106, No. 2, pg 294

9 European Commission. *Action Plan on the integration of third country nationals*. Brussels, 2016. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/20160607/communication_action_plan_integration_third-country_nationals_en.pdf

10 Clóidhna Murphy et al, *Immigration Integration and the Law* (London: Taylor and Francis, 2013) 246

11 United Nations. *International Migration Policies: Government Views and Priorities*. New York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2013. http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/policy/InternationalMigrationPolicies2013/Report%20PDFs/z_International%20Migration%20Policies%20Full%20Report.pdf

needed to erase the dichotomy that arises between refugee and migrant children, and native children. In countries where multicultural education policies are unsuccessfully attempted there are negative attitudes towards both educational integration and social acceptance¹². In Switzerland, students with a migrant background were allocated to a special needs classroom due to language and cultural barriers, not based on intelligence level.¹³ This separation shows the holes in these policies implementation, furthers the gap between refugee and native children, and detracts refugee children's education opportunities.

Implementing education policies that mandate a degree of multiculturalism in their curriculum works to facilitate an environment of understanding and cultural exposure. Teachers in the EU have expressed a desire for "embedded" multiculturalism, or multiculturalism integrated throughout a variety of subjects, in their classrooms.¹⁴ A multicultural education policy should be implemented requiring all grades to have a degree of multiculturalism present in their studies in the form of active recognition of religious differences and allowances that come with them, an integrated history model, and availability to language resources.

APPROACH 2

Policy and Welfare Transparency

Welfare offered to refugees is an essential aspect of maintaining a high quality of life after arrival in a new country. However, while this is essential, in public opinion welfare is not well received when it is perceived as being mainly given to refugee or immigrant populations¹⁵.

12 Farah Dubois-Shaik, "Analysing 'Migrant' Membership Frames through Education Policy Discourse: an example of restrictive 'integration' policy within Europe," *European Educational Research Journal* 13, No. 6, pg 724

13 *ibid.* 721

14 Orhan Agirdag et al. "Teachers' Understanding of Multicultural Education and the Correlates of Multicultural Content Integration in Flanders," *Education and Urban Society* 48, No. 6, pg 566

15 Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka, *Multiculturalism and the Welfare State* (Oxford: Clarendon 2006) pg. 27

This is not new. Welfare overwhelmingly is often deemed unfair for certain groups of people and the transfer of this attitude to refugees is not a surprise.¹⁶ This erosion of the view of the welfare state leads not only to intergroup conflict but also to lack of support for welfare policies which could, in the long run, lead to a change in welfare policy that leaves less funding for refugees and immigrants who are trying to resettle. Through the process of building a modern nation-state, a population with a common and homogenous cultural identity is created across geographical, climatic, linguistic, cultural, social and economic differences.¹⁷

Transparency in the welfare state is the only way to combat these negative perceptions that are overtaking many populations throughout Europe. A yearly spending report of welfare programs should be offered to every citizen for the country in which they reside. These reports should include how much money is going to each program, what the program is funding, and what beneficial changes have come from these welfare programs. Increasing transparency of the welfare system will provide the necessary information to both native and refugee populations to decrease the negative view towards refugee welfare programs and promotes understanding between the groups.

APPROACH 3

Increasing Access to Language Communication Classes in Refugee Mother Populations

Refugee mothers have unique circumstances when relocating to a new country to start a new life. Integration and language programs, usually offered online, are grossly unavailable to the demographic of refugee mothers who are isolated in their home as a caretaker and functionally illiterate. As a consequence, this demographic is not reached by ordinary

16 *Ibid.* 147

17 Anne Sigfrid Grønseth, "Tamil Refugees in Pain: Challenging Solidarity in the Norwegian Welfare State." *Journal Of Ethnic & Migration Studies* 37, no. 2 (February 2011): 315-332. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost pg.

integration programs.¹⁸ Immigrants in Europe are judged more harshly by natives based off of their language skills rather than religion, ethnicity, or race.¹⁹ Excluding a specific demographic because of lack of accessibility to language and continuing education courses hurts the community and the relations between refugee and native populations.

In a study done in the Netherlands, a group of refugee mothers was taken and given access to language classes and skills that were previously unavailable to them. These women all reported a stronger sense of confidence and participation in their everyday lives and in their communities because they were able to actively express themselves.²⁰ Creating programs that support refugee mothers that are accessible, taught in a native tongue, and encourage talk about the role of women and children in European society has the potential to be beneficial to entire households of refugees. These programs also inadvertently cause more interaction with native and refugee populations once they have the skills to function in their communities. Which proves to decrease antagonistic feelings towards other ethnicities and refugees in native populations.²¹

APPROACH 4

A Base Cohesive Integration Policy throughout the EU

In 2016 the European Union adopted a plan of action on the integration of third country nationals outlining suggested plans for the member states of the European Union to take in regards to various subsets of integration.²² While made with good intent, these plans

are merely suggestions and have not been effectively implemented EU-wide. This leads to confusion amongst different member states as well as a lack of continuity when dealing with native populations and their understandings of refugee populations. The EU created the European Integration Network (EIN) to communicate openly with member states to gain an understanding of the integration methods being put in place by each individual country.²³

Mainstreaming policy, which has been effective in areas of gender and discrimination²⁴, and making integration a part of EU policies that passed on a daily basis would allow for a base cohesion of integration policy throughout the EU. Recognizing that mainstreaming is a complex process to implement, the EU would find it opportune to pass directives in the interim time before implementation. This allows for member states to see the EU's commitment to a general integration policy as well as establish a base ground for what that might look like. In 2006 Caritas Europa released a document with recommended measures of integration for each member state from non-governmental organization (NGOs) in their state.²⁵ These measures were taken into consideration but not given the attention to detail that they required. Utilizing NGOs within individual member states would help the EU devise a working plan for EU integration.

APPROACH 5

Continuing Education for Adults in Media Literacy

The media is in a privileged position by being able to provide frameworks of information for events we see in our everyday lives. How the

18 Christa Nieuwboer et al, "Learning language that matters A pedagogical method to support migrant mothers without formal education experience in their social integration in Western countries," *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 51 (2016) pg 30

19 Rico Neumann et al. "You're (Not) Welcome: The Impact of Symbolic Boundaries, Intergroup Contact, and Experiences with Discrimination on Immigration Attitudes," *American Behavioral Scientist* (2018) pg. 3

20 Nieuwboer et al pg. 35

21 Neumann et al. pg 3

22 European Commission, *Action Plan on the integration of third country nationals*

23 Thomas Huddleston, "Europe: New Integration Network takes off with first meeting," last modified January 1, 2018. <https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/news/europe-new-integration-network-takes-off-with-first-meeting>

24 Peter Scholten, "Mainstreaming migrant integration? A critical analysis of a new trend in integration governance," *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 83 (2017) pg. 285

25 *NGO Network of Integration Focal Points*, Caritas Europa, October 2006

media shapes a story can have severe impacts on how the public receives it.²⁶ A case study in Nuremberg, Germany showed that when there was an ethnic conflict between refugees and native populations that it was either exacerbated or ameliorated based on how the media represented the situation that was going on.²⁷ Language used in the media such as “irregular migration”, which assumes that refugees who are here are doing it “irregularly” or without permission, lends itself to xenophobic tendencies by creating an overwhelming impression of illegality of refugees who are seeking asylum.²⁸

News and other media outlets have become one of the major ways that native populations are exposed to these groups. Generally, news consumption has been a negative predictor of how native populations might react to refugees.²⁹ Therefore, it is important for adults to learn to look at the media critically. This is especially essential because media tends to over-focus on ethnic and immigrant crime disproportionate to what is really going on.³⁰ Currently, only about 31% of media literacy classes that are offered have focused on challenging radicalization and hate speech.³¹ These classes should focus specifically on these areas. State governments should offer incentives, such as lowered television license fees, to citizens who enroll to best reach the intended population. Increased media literacy will help counter false stereotypes of refugees based on prejudice and misinformation.

RECOMMENDED COURSE OF ACTION

Increasing Education Opportunities Available to Both Refugee and Native Populations

Intergroup relations between native and refugee populations are at an all-time low with the increase in Islamophobia as well as the rise of nationalism in Europe's far-right political parties. By reevaluating education policies that are in place and continuing education opportunities for adults in both populations we are able to facilitate increased understanding between them. All of the proposed solutions have the potential to be successful based on the commitment of the EU and other European member states. However, the recommended course of action for addressing intergroup relations between native and refugee populations is to combine proposed solutions One, Three, and Five and create a plan for education.

Both the media and language skills have been shown to have a significant effect on how native populations view migrants and refugees.³² By creating programs that target minorities within refugee populations to give them the education that is virtually inaccessible, the state is giving them the ability to interact within their communities. Refugee mothers are at a unique disadvantage when it comes to relocating.³³ This presents a unique opportunity for communities to tailor language classes to the specific needs of the community. Creating language programs that differ from the norm will facilitate a more inclusive society by providing equal integration opportunities

In the same breath as language classes comes the inception of media literacy classes. Providing classes on media literacy in the community through local secondary education facilities and offering incentives for adults who finish the classes, promotes a stronger public with vital critical thinking skills and increases interest in these classes. With the ability to recognize biased media broadcasting, the

26 Andrea Pogliano, “News Media and Immigration in the EU: Where and How the Local Dimension Matters,” *Intergroup Relations and Migrant Integration in European Studies* pg 151

27 Claudia Köhler, “Rise and Resolution of Ethnic Conflicts in Nuremberg Neighbourhoods.” *Intergroup Relations and Migrant Integration in European Studies* pg 49

28 Uta Staiger et al. *Refugee Protection, Migration, and Human Rights in Europe*, University College London 2014. <https://www.ucl.ac.uk/european-institute/ei-publications/europe-briefing-refugee.pdf>

29 Neumann pg 18

30 Andrea Pogliano pg 155

31 Martina Chapman *Mapping of Media Literacy Practices and Actions in EU-28*, Strasbourg: European Audiovisual Observatory, 2016


32 Neumann et al. pg. 3

33 Anna Kuroczycka Schultes et al. *The Migrant Maternal “Birthing New Lives Abroad”* (Ontario: Demeter) 2016 pg. 5


public is better equipped to formulate their own opinions based off of interactions and personal knowledge rather than broadcasting.

Within those two solutions is an opportunity for multicultural education policies. Media literacy and language skills are important not only for adults but for children and teenagers as well. The negative attitude toward the use of minority language at school has a disproportionate impact on the Muslim refugee population.³⁴ Introducing media literacy classes in already state-mandated education is an opportunity to give children the necessary skills to become active, empathetic community members. At the same time involving multicultural religion and language curriculum to classrooms allows for the students to gain an understanding of and exposure to the different cultures becoming more prevalent in their societies as the influx of refugees continues. Creating these curriculums in tandem with the continuing education classes for adults allows for ease of transition and cohesive learning throughout member states and the EU, ultimately helping ease intergroup tensions between refugee and native populations in Europe. 🌐

APPENDIX A – ASYLUM APPLICATIONS IN THE EU ³⁵



APPENDIX B ³⁶



35 “Asylum Statistics”, eurostat, 16 March 2018, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics

36 “Election Results for Far Right/ Nazi Parties in Europe”, Last modified October 2017 <https://i.redd.it/j6l0vvjch4oz.jpg>



Addressing Gender Discrimination through Urban Design and Policy Reform in Spanish-Latin American Cities

– Madison Jackson

ABSTRACT

In Latin America, very few people know about or understand the relationship between social exclusion and gender-discriminatory cities. Women face challenges every day from city designs that do not adequately meet their needs, expectations, or urban usage patterns, yet this topic is rarely brought up for discussion in design practices. Gender discrimination is a huge issue, and making urban design more functional for more distinct groups will help combat the inherent “machismo” culture in the region that often inhibits the equal social inclusion of women. The stakeholders in this issue, which include governments, NGOs, city planners and architects, and communities, contribute greatly to either the positive or negative impact that cities have on women. This paper serves to analyze the problem of discriminatory cities, and explore all relevant potential solutions that could improve the lives of those whose presence in cities is not traditionally welcomed by urban design.

BACKGROUND AND INFORMATION

The foundation of discriminatory urban spaces in Spanish-Latin America began during the colonial era, when the Spanish Crown mandated that their viceroyalties designed all budding cities based on a set of mandates called the Laws of the Indies.¹ These orders required the creation of a Central Business District (CBD), or main plaza, as the heart of the city.² They then constructed housing for the most influential inhabitants surrounding the CBD, ensuring easy access to the town’s hub and finest services for a select group, namely European

- 1 Jay Kinsbruner, *The Colonial Spanish-American City* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005), 24.
- 2 Daphne Spain, “On the Plaza: The Politics of Public Space and Culture,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 577 (2001): 173.

males.³ This early city model aimed to create economically prosperous centers. Yet, it also set up cities as inherent agents of social order that discriminated against women, who at the time were confined to the private sphere and excluded from civic matters. Thus, a partisan way of city planning commenced that currently remains as the norm, especially in capital cities with populations over three million. The appeal of urban prosperity drew people to cities, causing Latin America to become the world's most urbanized continent.⁴ The region still holds that title with over 80 percent of people located in urban areas, indicating the need to prioritize well-built cities.⁵ Although urban policymakers and planners attempt to improve many aspects of city life, they disregard a fundamental piece to the puzzle: acknowledging that different genders experience public spaces distinctively and understanding how to create inclusive cities. Conventional gender expectations greatly influence urban development, especially in Latin America where the intrinsic culture of "machismo" restricts women's public presence. For example, transportation aims to move people at peak business hours, even though studies show that women, who use this system of mobility more than men, have movement patterns inconsistent with this model.⁶

This paradigm does not uniquely occur in Latin America. Research findings, mainly from developed nations outside of Latin America, confirm that women and men utilize public space dissimilarly.⁷ A case study of three European urban reform projects concluded that women validate their public presence by

justifying their reasons to go out, such as to run errands.⁸ Contrarily, men enter communal areas out of habit, due to city design measures that standardize their public presence.⁹ Despite the integration of more women in the labor market in the past century, cities have not adapted and still reflect outmoded gender roles and stereotypes.

The list of gender-biased urban standards goes on and on: many zoning laws severely limit housing options for the growing number of women,¹⁰ green spaces contain areas incompatible with girls' activities,¹¹ distant daycares cause constraints for mothers,¹² and women seldom get to voice their opinions in planning meetings,¹³ just to name a few. Over time, Latin American cities have inconspicuously grown into male-dominated spaces that perpetuate discriminatory ideals. Common top-down legislative initiatives, like quota laws, fail to address inadequate city design as a barrier to women's societal involvement. Completing the task of breaking down gender discrimination and empowering women in cities must begin by extending further than current initiatives have, and revolutionizing urban design practices.

SOLUTION 1

Creating specialized governmental agencies to implement research and design projects

Many countries outside of Latin America have already begun gender mainstreaming their cities.¹⁴ In 1992, the government of Vienna created the Office for the Promotion and Coordination of Women's Affairs, a municipal department focused on urban planning

3 Amanda Briney, "Latin American City Structure Model," ThoughtCo., last updated January 12, 2018, <https://www.thoughtco.com/latin-american-city-structure-1435755>.

4 "Urbanization in Latin America," Atlantic Council, published February 5, 2014, <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/articles/urbanization-in-latin-america>.

5 "Urbanization in Latin America," BBVA Research, published July 2017, <https://www.bbvaresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Urbanization-in-Latin-America-BBVA-Research.pdf>.

6 Margrit Eichler, *Towards a Non-Sexist Sustainable City* (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1995), 31.

7 Amanda Micklow, Elizabeth Kancilia and Mildred Warner, *The Need to Plan for Women*, Department of City & Regional Planning, Cornell University, November 2015, 2.

8 Ulla Terlinden, *City and Gender: International Discourse on Gender, Urbanism and Architecture* (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2003), 71.

9 Ibid., 74.

10 Ibid., 34.

11 Terlinden, *City and Gender: International Discourse on Gender, Urbanism and Architecture*, 71.

12 Eichler, *Towards a Non-Sexist Sustainable City*, 17.

13 Ibid., 34.

14 OECD, *Women in the City: Housing, Services and the Urban Environment*, 83-87.

with its own budget.¹⁵ The Office conducted research that revealed major issues women faced instigated by insufficient city design.¹⁶ The government then launched sixty projects to tackle these problems, including widening sidewalks to fit strollers and wheelchairs, redesigning parks to make them more inclusive and designing conveniently located housing complexes that include communal grassy areas and on-site daycares and doctors' offices.¹⁷ Consequently, they have seen more gender-equitable utilization of these areas than before.¹⁸ In 2017, Vienna earned the title as the second most livable city in the world by The Economist, right after Melbourne, which has pursued similar endeavors.¹⁹ Other governments have started to follow suit, but this trend has not caught on in Latin America.²⁰ Little research exists at all about the specific needs of Latina women in urban environments.²¹ Local governments can take the first step by creating commissions or councils, as Vienna has done.²² They then can study patterns of public area usage by gender in order to address the problems in city planning meetings. This would set a gender lens standard in urban design, but would challengingly require garnering district and mayoral support. The government of Vienna successfully established a gender-inclusive city in about twenty years, and Latin America can do the same if city governments take initiative.

SOLUTION 2

Increasing the role of NGOs in urban planning and policymaking

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have emerged as powerful stakeholders that strive to fill gaps in society that governments cannot or will not handle. When surveyed, more than one-third of people residing in cities named NGOs as the most important institution in the creation of gender-inclusive policies.²³ They provide varieties of services and often times indirectly influence policymaking and public decisions. Latin America hosts a plethora of NGOs and these organizations have the potential to elevate the concern of discriminatory city design practices to the public agenda, and empower citizenry to speak up and take action. Although NGOs have a significant presence in Latin America already, urban policymakers and planners need to implement systematic measures to involve them in meetings and conferences, as they can speak up for the needs of many while also providing data to back up their positions.²⁴ Moreover, training programs such as Local to Local Dialogue, facilitated by UN-Habitat and the Huairou Commission, teach grassroots women's organizations how to best organize their missions so as to bring political presence to their communities and create diplomatic relationships with policymakers.²⁵ In order to facilitate cooperation between NGOs and the urban design process, initiatives such as Local to Local Dialogue need to find their place in Latin America. A variety of actors have the opportunity to host these valuable programs, including governments, inter-governmental organizations and even other NGOs.

15 Ibid., 62.

16 Odette Chalaby, "How Vienna Designed a City for Women." Apolitical, published August 23, 2017, https://apolitical.co/solution_article/vienna-designed-city-women/.

17 Eva Kail, "Fair Shared City Vienna – Gender Mainstreaming in Urban Planning," presented at the Global Summit of Women, Paris, June 7, 2014.

18 Chalaby, "How Vienna Designed a City for Women."

19 "The Global Liveability Report 2017," The Economist, published 2017, https://congoesd.files.wordpress.com/2017/08/liveability_free_summary_2017.pdf.

20 Chalaby, "How Vienna Designed a City for Women."

21 Heather E. Wright Wendel, Rebecca K. Zarger and James R. Mihelcic, "Accessibility and Usability: Green Space Preferences Perceptions and Barriers in a Rapidly Urbanizing City in Latin America," *Landscape and Urban Planning* 107 (July 6, 2012): 273.

22 OECD, *Women in the City: Housing, Services and the Urban Environment*, 62, 74.

23 UN-Habitat, "State of Women in Cities 2012-2013," report published in 2013, pg. 11.

24 Ibid., 11.

25 Sarah Silliman, "The Local to Local Dialogue: A Tool for Strengthening Women's Capacity to Negotiate and Partner with Local Authorities," report published by the Huairou Commission with support from UN-Habitat in 2009, pg. 1-3.

SOLUTION 3

Facilitating women's involvement in the community

Women around the world hold untapped potential for solving complex societal problems. The community of Marseilles, France has harnessed citizen's resourceful voices through the development of planning organizations that emphasize women's contributions.²⁶ It started with the founding of the Association Les Femmes et la Ville (Women and the City) in 1990. Its members include social scientists, elected representatives and activists who all work toward the goal of creating a gender-inclusive city.²⁷ This association inspired the formation of other similar organizations, including international and governmental ones, that form a network throughout the city. These organizations empower community women by giving them a forum to voice their opinions, connections to others, and a "strength in numbers" mentality. Latin America has the potential to replicate this model as the region has a long history of community activism. During the economic crisis in Peru in the 1970s, women in the capital pooled their resources together and created community kitchens to feed the hungry.²⁸ These kitchens still exist today, now feeding around half a million people daily, and remain as a shining example of the power of community women's collective action.²⁹ Regarding urban design, a gap exists between planning processes and the inclusion of the input of women. Solving this can happen through the creation of community organizations such as the ones in Marseilles, but which must offer flexible options for getting involved, considering that most women hold

informal labor positions, and therefore have restricted time schedules.³⁰

SOLUTION 4

Breaking down barriers for female planners, architects and engineers

Men overwhelmingly dominate the fields of architecture and urban design.³¹ Even for the small percentage of females that pursue these occupations, endless challenges disadvantage them more often than their male counterparts. They generally occupy low-grade positions and get to take part in influential decisions less.³² Furthermore, women planners have few mentors or role models to look up to.³³ Underrepresentation and discrimination even affects the careers of highly successful women by limiting their recognition in many databases, urbanist conferences and internet resources.³⁴ Statistics about female architects in Latin American are scarce, but public reports in Peru show that only twenty-five percent of registered architects are women.³⁵ Local laws need to mandate that two or more women participate in every planning committee.³⁶ The results of a Norwegian study argue that involving women in the planning process results in designs that show "less emphasis on material values and more concern for human values" while achieving the best use of resources available.³⁷ Theoretically, women will design spaces that work for all women based

26 Yvonne Knibiehler, "Combating Exclusion in Marseilles", paper presented to the OECD Conference on Women in the City: Housing, Services and the Urban Environment, Paris, 4-6 October, 1994.

27 Yvonne Knibiehler, "Combating Exclusion in Marseilles."

28 Jo Beall, "Urban Governance: Why Gender Matters," United Nations Development Program, essay published March 1996, pg. 8.

29 Ibid., 8.

30 Sylvia Chant, "Cities Through a 'Gender Lens': A Golden 'Urban Age' for Women in the Global South?" *International Institute for Environment and Development* 22, 1 (April 2013): 13-15.

31 OECD, *Women in the City: Housing, Services and the Urban Environment*, 73.

32 Ibid., 73.

33 OECD, *Women in the City: Housing, Services and the Urban Environment*, 73.

34 Katrina Johnston-Zimmerman, "Urban Planning Has a Sexism Problem," *Next City*, published December 19, 2017, <https://nextcity.org/features/view/urban-planning-sexism-problem>.

35 Sandra Vivanco, "Latin America: A New Generation of Women Architects," *Places Journal* (September 2012): 2.

36 OECD, *Women in the City: Housing, Services and the Urban Environment*, 73.

37 Ibid., 73.

on their own experiences. However, women graduate from the same universities that do not consider gender as men do, so this does not necessarily guarantee they will plan gender-inclusive cities by nature. Therefore, university architecture programs need to mandate a gender lens into all course curricula. Finally, governments or universities can also provide public encouragement for females in the field to ease the strain of discrimination. Many Latin American cities already have appropriate groundwork in place to take any of these actions.

SOLUTION 5

Reconsidering housing as a way to social inclusion

One of the greatest burdens to single, elderly, low-income, disabled, LGBTQ and other women relates to the availability and location of housing. When women hold unpaid or low-income positions, they often struggle finding affordable housing if not in a dual-income household.³⁸ This can force them to sacrifice location security and move to dangerous parts of cities.³⁹ Latin American countries have put in place various measures to mitigate the housing crisis, yet these do not do enough to aid women due to the narrow focus on poverty that secludes an understanding of gender.⁴⁰ Although many actors have a part in this issue, federal government policies ultimately hold the most power.⁴¹ Governments need to view housing as more than merely places of residence. Under suitable circumstances, proper housing gives women control over their futures, the freedom of independence, the ability to create home businesses, a sense of identity and belonging, a safe place to reside, the opportunity to build credit and so much more.⁴² Federal governments can address the diverse needs of women by creating frameworks

that support social and affordable housing, such as cooperative housing arrangements.⁴³ Many Latin American countries already require zoning permits or urban planning clearances before the completion of any building projects.⁴⁴ Governments need to modify these to ensure the construction of a variety of housing, not just for “nuclear family” style living. Likewise, ensuring affordable housing in close proximity to public transportation allows women to utilize public services, battle stratified labor markets and establish their equal rights to the city.⁴⁵

RECOMMENDED COURSE OF ACTION

Although all of the solutions have potential for success, Latin American cities need a multilateral approach that encompasses design improvement and community development measures. The policies already in place in Latin America are not enough to systematically create societies of gender equality. Only a cooperation between multiple sectors of society will have the strength needed to redesign daunting urban giants home to millions of people. Therefore, a combination of solution one, two, three and four is recommended, as these encompass and involve all of the stakeholders necessary to revolutionize city design.

Governments play an essential role in the issue, and can positively influence the lives of women by implementing housing and transportation regulations using a gender lens. Additionally, local governments need to take responsibility for researching the unique needs of women within their city limits. Globally, many governments have chosen to do this by commissioning city councils with appointed specialists to better understand gender needs in cities. Then, these councils can determine appropriate measures needed to create urban environments that allow for women’s increased

38 Eichler, “Towards a Non-Sexist Sustainable City,” 51-52.

39 Eichler, “Towards a Non-Sexist Sustainable City,” 51-52.

40 Alan Gilbert, “Housing in Latin America,” *Inter-American Development Bank* (August 2001): 61-62.

41 Eichler, “Towards a Non-Sexist Sustainable City,” 51.

42 OECD, *Women in the City: Housing, Services and the Urban Environment*, 25-28.


43 Eichler, “Towards a Non-Sexist Sustainable City,” 16.

44 The World Bank, “Zoning and Urban Planning: Understanding the Benefits,” report published in *Doing Business 2015*, pg. 55.

45 Marion Roberts, *Living in a Man Made World: Gender Assumptions in Housing Design* (London: Routledge, 1991), 63.

social integration. Federal policies may restrict redesign projects in some instances, but this may create an opportunity to put zoning laws on higher agendas. This will lead to governments that prioritize men and women's needs equally.

The strong presence of NGOs in Latin American cities justifies their capacity to influence decisions regarding city layout and infrastructure. NGOs can work alongside planners and architects, but need official consideration in planning meetings and policymaking decisions. The invaluable services that NGOs provide shows their dedication to the community and validates their right to have a formal role in urban design process. As representatives of community activism, grassroots women's organizations can go through training in order to strengthen their cooperation with policymakers. Gender- and development-based NGOs have specialized insight and the ability to conduct the urban research that Latin American lacks compared to other regions of the world, if this responsibility is not relayed to government commissions. NGOs have become powerful stakeholders in the international community regarding other prominent social issues, and they can have a significant part in urban design research and policy, too.

Finally, involving women from the community will not only provide the indispensable insight for instigating change, but will also show them that they are valuable members of society. Voiceless women need opportunities to unite with others through women's organizations, neighborhood associations, city councils and NGOs. Women contribute significantly to urban prosperity through reproductive and unpaid work, while reaping few of the economic and societal benefits that cities offer.⁴⁶ In order to diminish gender discriminations and create lasting changes in gender equality, Latin American needs to embrace women's public presence as equally as men's. This will require the streamlined efforts of national and local governments, NGOs and the community in order to begin the next era of inclusive urban design practices. 

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46 Sylvia Chant, "Cities Through a 'Gender Lens': A Golden 'Urban Age' for Women in the Global South?" 19.



Practicing Ethical Mega-Sporting Events in Developing Countries

– Kimberly Gerken

ABSTRACT:

Developing countries hosting mega-sporting events such as the Olympic games and the FIFA World Cup are suffering from both the excessive cost of hosting these events and from negative social outcomes. While the International Olympic Committee and FIFA espouse ideas of “sports for development,” history has demonstrated that hosting these games are not necessarily a catalyst for development. This paper explores the factors leading to these negative legacies and proposes various approaches that would aid developing countries in receiving both the positive physical and intrinsic value of hosting these games. Finally, this paper recommends a combination of policy actions that should be taken to make the most significant impact on solving this problem.

OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND

Every two to four years, billions of people around the world fill massive stadiums and gather around televisions to watch two of the most prominent mega-sporting events: The Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup. Both of the organizations spearheading these events: The International Olympic Committee (IOC) and Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) make enticing promises to the cities and countries willing to host their mega-sporting events. While a country hosts the World Cup and a city hosts the Olympics, the political institutions internally governing the process are national.

For many developing countries,¹ hosting these games provides a unique opportunity

¹ Inter-governmental organization such as the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations has no official definition of a developing country. Members of these organizations announce for themselves their status as “developed” or “developing”. For the purpose of this paper, developing countries will be defined as countries with a low GDP/GNI per capita ranking low on the Human Development Index

to re-brand themselves in order to impress other countries around the world and to reconfigure structural impediments, such as infrastructure.² The IOC promises that the games will leave a “huge sporting, economic, and social legacy.”³ Respectively, FIFA highlights their legend of promoting fair play, respect, equality, solidarity, and peace through sport.⁴ While these organizations espouse promises of economic and social gains, these favorable outcomes are rarely met.⁵ While spectators anticipate watching these games, the host countries suffer both economically and socially, disproportionately so in developing countries.

In 2014, Sochi, Russia hosted the Olympic games, costing them approximately \$50 billion. These games operated at a huge deficit, workers suffered from abusive employment practices, the authorities evicted citizens from their homes to make room for Olympic related infrastructure, and citizens suffered from restrictions in freedom of speech and discrimination.⁶

Qatar’s 2022 World Cup further demonstrates these fallacies. FIFA’s idea of “peace through sports” came under scrutiny when they awarded the 2022 games to Qatar, even though the country is infamous for exploiting migrant workers. Before the 2022 games even begin, it has been projected that another 4,000 construction related deaths would occur on top of the 1,200 labor migrant deaths between

2010-2013.⁷ These human rights abuses and economic outcomes are common among many mega-sporting events held in developing countries.

While many focus on the recent failures of the Olympic or World Cup events held in developing countries such in Beijing (2008), Sochi (2014), and Rio de Janeiro (2014 & 2016), post ante promises have not been met for a much longer time frame. Regardless of the economic and social costs of these games, these mega-sporting events create an opportunity for the country to achieve their goals.

While these mega-sporting events provide developing countries with a unique opportunity to receive international attention and pursue development, the IOC’s and FIFA’s failure to achieve positive outcomes perpetuates the event-related suffering of developing countries that host these events. The costs of these events have become excessive, and even developed countries have become unwilling to bear the costs.

SOLUTIONS:

The Private Games Model

LA used the Private Games Model in Los Angeles in 1984.⁸ When cities bid to host the Olympics, the interest of corporate sponsors or international sporting organizations often prevails over local interests regarding policy decisions. While the candidate city is traditionally responsible for procuring funds, under the Private Games Model, the bid and a portion of the games are privately financed⁹.

2 Cartwright, Anton. "Can Mega Events Deliver Sustainability? The Case of the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa." In *International Handbook on the Economics of Mega Sporting Events*, edited by Wolfgang Maennig and Andrew Zimbalist, 127-39. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2012.

3 "Celebrate Olympic Games." International Olympic Committee. December 19, 2017. Accessed March 23, 2018. <https://www.olympic.org/the-ioc/celebrate-olympic-games>.

4 "FIFA Legends." FIFA.com. Accessed March 23, 2018. <http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/fifa-legends.html>.

5 Toohy, Kristine, and A.J. Veal. *The Olympic Games: A Social Science Perspective*. 2nd ed. Norfolk, UK: CAB, (2007): 6-7.

6 Gauthier, Ryan. *The International Olympic Committee, Law, and Accountability*. New York, NY: Routledge, (2017): 2-3.

7 Ganji, Sarath. "Leveraging the World Cup: Mega Sporting Events, Human Rights Risk, and Worker Welfare Reform in Qatar." *Journal on Migration and Human Society*4, no. 4 (2016): 221-59. <http://jmhs.cmsny.org/index.php/jmhs/article/view/69>.

8 Burbank, Matthew J., Greg Andranovich, and Charles H. Heying. "Ch. 10 Mega Events and Local Politics." Edited by Wolfgang Maennig and Andrew Zimbalist. In *International Handbook on the Economics of Mega Sporting Events*, 162-67. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2012.

9 Burbank, Matthew J., Greg Andranovich, and Charles H. Heying. "Ch. 10 Mega Events and Local Politics."

The IOC could permanently suspend its rule that the city government must bear the financial risks of bidding for the games. Cities bidding to become a candidate city undergo an extensive process, making financing the bid expensive, and risking a failed bid. It costs cities between 50 million to 100 million to put together an Olympic bid. Tokyo spent \$150 million preparing their failed Olympic bid for the 2016 summer Olympics.¹⁰ Therefore, privately financing the bid eliminates the problem of diminishing public funds when there is no guarantee of being awarded the games and businesses, not the public, stand to profit the most from hosting the games.

If the bid is successful, corporate sponsorship and a portion of television revenues and ticket sales will be used to finance the games. Leading up to and during the entirety of the games, tourism related taxes could be imposed to provide further funds without dwindling public funds.¹¹ This model proved to be economically successful in LA in 1984 as the city produced a \$232 million surplus.¹² While this model would likely not work in states lacking large private corporations, many developing countries could utilize this model such as Qatar and China.

Increased Public Participation

As the cost of hosting these Mega sporting events has become excessive, less cities and countries put forth bids. As developed countries bid less, developing countries, many with exclusive political regimes, have become the most robust bidders.¹³ This phenomenon proves to be problematic when the public

populace already lacks the prospect of political participation. These exclusive regimes use the events to catalyze their own agendas and to reaffirm their own power.¹⁴ Insufficient avenues for public participation throughout the bidding process should be addressed.

Recognizing this trend, the IOC and FIFA could enact measures to ensure public participation during the bidding process. Therefore, bidding cities must demonstrate public support through the submission of written comments from various stakeholders.¹⁵ Any engagements in mass demonstrations against the games could deter these organizations from pursuing these cities as candidates. Opinion polls or public votes could be conducted at the bidding stages¹⁶, and the IOC or FIFA could provide oversight to safeguard against corrupt leaders.

Reinforcing the importance of public participation will break up the current top-down approach to organizing these events where the general populace are left out of the decision making process. Additionally, when accountable to their subjects, the legacy of the games is more likely to be positive. This approach could be easily implemented by both of these organizations, but would be hard for them to safeguard against corruption.

Improving Procedural legitimacy through transparency

It is no secret that corruption exists within these organizations, especially FIFA¹⁷. Since these organizations are autonomous, they are largely unaccountable to the international community. In order to address this problem, the individual votes of IOC members could be made public in order to enhance transparency of the final

10 McBride, James. "The Economics of Hosting the Olympic Games." Council on Foreign Relations. January 19, 2018. Accessed March 23, 2018. <https://www.cfr.org/background/economics-hosting-olympic-games>.

11 Burbank, Matthew J., Greg Andranovich, and Charles H. Heying. "Ch. 10 Mega Events and Local Politics." (2018): 161-169

12 Burbank, Matthew J., Greg Andranovich, and Charles H. Heying. "Ch. 10 Mega Events and Local Politics." (2018) 161-169

13 Hartman, Stefan, and Tjeerd Zandberg. "The Future of Mega Sport Events: Examining the "Dutch Approach" to Legacy Planning." *Journal of Tourism Futures* 1, no. 2 (2015): 108-16. Accessed March 23, 2018. doi:10.1108/jtf-12-2014-0002.

14 Coakley, Jay, and Doralice Lange Souza. "Sport Mega-events: Can Legacies and Development Be Equitable and Sustainable?" *Motriz, SciELO* 9, no. 3 (2013): 580-89. <http://www.scielo.br/pdf/motriz/v19n3/08.pdf>.

15 Gauthier, Ryan. *The International Olympic Committee, Law, and Accountability* (2017) 80-81.

16 Gauthier, Ryan. *The International Olympic Committee, Law, and Accountability* (2017) 80-81.

17 "Fifa Corruption Crisis: Key Questions Answered." BBC News. December 21, 2015. Accessed May 08, 2018. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32897066>.

choice of the host country.¹⁸ Public knowledge of these voting records will increase the accountability of IOC voting members because the public will know which members voted for which host country or city. Identifying members voting for human-right violating states has the potential to expose members acting out of self-interest.

After the vote, a review mechanism could be sanctioned. In the past, the United Nations Office on Sport for Development and Peace could have reviewed the final choice for the host city, ensuring the selected country did not have a substantial high human right abuse record. However, due to the recent closure of this sector of the United Nations (UN), a new partnership within the UN should be created.¹⁹ This partnership could produce increased involvement from the public sector because while the IOC largely interacts with the private sector, the UN interacts with the public sector.²⁰ Involvement from the public sector could also increase both transparency and accountability. However, while this change in internal operational policy could make the IOC and FIFA more transparent and accountable, these organizations lack the incentive to make this change.

Refuse to host IOC or FIFA Events

Both the IOC and FIFA have too much power and enforce a top-down, one-size fits all approach to hosting the games. Into to reduce their power, countries could refuse to bid for the games. In years with solo bidders, the events have been more successful such as Los Angeles in 1984. In the case of the 1984 LA games, negotiating with the IOC contributed to the games positive legacies.²¹

These events have been detrimental to the majority of cities and countries who have hosted them. Therefore, cities could stop bidding to host them. These events are fiscally burdensome to developed countries as well, and over all less countries have been bidding.²² If countries refuse to bid, the IOC and FIFA will face the critical decision to dissolve, to host the games themselves, or exchange autonomy in order to attract bidders. Choosing to host the games themselves would likely entail both paying for the events themselves and making a contract with a willing host country, transitioning the power to the country opposed to the organization. Countries will obtain the right to host the games on their terms if these organizations continue to pursue these mega-sporting events. This decrease in autonomy of the IOC and FIFA are likely needed for the following solutions.

Move events from the Winter Olympics to the Summer Olympics

There are a total of 57 Olympic events. While 42 of these events occur in the summer, only 15 of them occur in the winter.²³ Competing in the summer is unnecessary when sports compete indoors. Out of the 42 sport brackets held in the summer, 20 of them compete in indoor venues.²⁴ Therefore, these sports could easily compete during the winter games. These events include but are not limited to gymnastics, boxing, swimming, and table tennis. The momentum for this shift already exists. Currently, there is a push for basketball to be moved on the account that it is a sport traditionally played and watched in the winter.²⁵

Moving 13 of the events traditionally competed in the summer to the winter games would

18 Gauthier, Ryan. *The International Olympic Committee, Law, and Accountability* (2017): 103-118.

19 "Sportanddev.org." Healthy Development of Children and Young People through Sport. Accessed May 08, 2018. <https://www.sportanddev.org/en/article/news/dropping-ball-critiquing-recent-closure-unosdp>.

20 "Sportanddev.org." Healthy Development of Children and Young People through Sport.

21 Burbank, Matthew J., Greg Andranovich, and Charles H. Heying. "Ch. 10 Mega Events and Local Politics." (2018) 161-169

22 See Figure 1.0 in Appendix

23 "Sports." International Olympic Committee. January 14, 2018. Accessed March 25, 2018. <https://www.olympic.org/sports>.

24 "Sports." International Olympic Committee

25 Wolken, Dan. "Hey IOC, It's Time to Put Basketball Where It Belongs, in the Winter Olympics." USA Today. February 25, 2018. Accessed May 08, 2018. <https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/winter-olympics-2018/2018/02/25/hey-ioc-its-time-put-basketball-where-belongs-winter-olympics/370760002/>.

disperse the costs of hosting the summer games. Economic costs would be dispersed because fewer venues would be needed. This could also decrease environmental degradation, forced evictions, and the loss of life associated with building these stadiums in a developing country because the scale of the event would be decreased. Since the majority of developing countries cannot host the winter Olympics due to climate restraints, and moving some summer Olympic events to the winter would decrease the cost of the games, and increase the capacity of developing countries to host these games ethically, this is a viable solution.

Permanently hold the Olympics in Greece

When a city decides to host the Olympic games, they are responsible for building all the associated infrastructure. The IOC requires 36 venues on top of an Olympic Village.²⁶ These venues are built to hold the capacity of the Olympic games but are not sustainable after the games. Not only are these venues incredibly expensive, but they also often lead to the displacement of locals. Brazilian and Rio de Janeiro authorities dislocated 77,000 people from favelas.²⁷ Additionally, given the size and quantity of these venues, environmental degradation occurs on a large scale.

Therefore, permanently holding the Summer Olympic games in Greece would significantly reduce these burdens. Greece has the most legitimate claim to hosting the games, as they are historically the creators.²⁸ The Summer Olympic games will be restored to Greece in an undeveloped area between Athens and Olympia.²⁹

The IOC will be responsible for building the entirety of the required infrastructure, including an Olympic training center, which will cost between 10 billion to 15 billion dollars.³⁰ The IOC could take out a loan in order to achieve this, but these sunk costs will easily be paid off.³¹

It is unnecessary for new infrastructure to be built every four years. In the past, due to less human and capital mobilization, it was necessary to move the games around the world. In our globalized world, this concept is not needed.

Joint Hosting the Olympic Games

Hosting the summer Olympics provides a challenge because the event is simply too large.³² Given the magnitude of these games, the costs and benefits of hosting the Olympics could be spread by regionally hosting the games. This model has been used on a smaller scale for both smaller mega-sporting events, and within the Olympics games as well. Some events are difficult to host due to geographical restraints such as events competing in natural bodies of water.³³ No one expects host cities to build an artificial sea in the middle of an urban area for the sailing events.³⁴ Competitions taking place outside of the hosting city has occurred on more than one account. For example, during

26 "Andrew Zimbalist on Cost of the Olympics." Interview. *Council on Foreign Relations* (audio blog), February 08, 2018. Accessed March 23, 2018. <https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/andrew-zimbalist-costs-olympics>.

27 Zimbalist, Andrew Zimbalist on Cost of the Olympics" Interview

28 Chrysopoulos, Philiip. "HALC Petitions for Olympic Games to Be Held Permanently in Greece." USA. *GreekReporter.com*. August 23, 2016. Accessed April 10, 2018. <http://usa.greekreporter.com/2016/08/23/halc-petitions-for-olympic-games-to-be-held-permanently-in-greece/>.

29 Zimbalist, Andrew Zimbalist on Cost of the Olympics." Interview

30 Zimbalist, Andrew Zimbalist on Cost of the Olympics" Interview

31 Delevingne, Gus Lubin and Lawrence. "Olympics, Inc: Inside The Secretive, \$6 Billion World Of The International Olympic Committee." *Business Insider*. February 17, 2010. Accessed May 08, 2018. <http://www.businessinsider.com/olympics-inc-inside-the-business-of-the-ioc>.

32 Fetters, Ashley. "The Summer Olympic Sports of the Future." *The Atlantic*. August 13, 2012. Accessed April 12, 2018. <https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2012/08/the-summer-olympic-sports-of-the-future/260982/>.

33 Dure, Beau. "The Olympics Are Too Big for One City to Host. It's Time to Share the Joy." *The Guardian*. April 05, 2016. Accessed April 15, 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2016/apr/05/olympic-games-host-city-share>.

34 Dure, Beau. "The Olympics Are Too Big for One City to Host. It's Time to Share the Joy."

the 2008 Beijing games, the equestrian events were held in Hong Kong.³⁵

Poland and Ukraine successfully joint hosted Euro 2012.³⁶ Recognizing that neither country had the capacity to host the games independently, the countries prepared their bid together. They hoped that through joint hosting, Slav hospitality and culture would be showcased.³⁷ Joint hosting could have the same effect for mega-sporting events.

When hosting the games regionally, states could benefit through increased regional cooperation. Additionally, joint event sharing could also reduce the burdens associated with hosting these events. Cities could largely rely on existing infrastructure because cities could bid to host events that they already have the capacity to host. Finally, the opening and closing ceremonies could be “virtually” hosted, where the region comes together to showcase their diverse cultures.

Towards more sustainable and integrated infrastructure

Both the IOC and FIFA have strict infrastructure requirements that often prompt cities to construct stadiums disproportionately large for the local markets capacity. For example, Brazil spent more than \$3 billion dollars building stadiums in remote locations without professional teams near by for the 2014 World Cup and 2016 summer Olympics.³⁸ Both the host country and these respective organizations need to work together to dissuade from these white elephant infrastructure projects.

Alternative approaches to major infrastructure investments must be made in order for these investments to serve the country in the long run. In order to achieve this, stadiums must be appropriately sized for the city given the city’s existing sporting market.³⁹ The IOC recognizes the need for more sustainable infrastructure and has adapted the motto “Build for legacy, adapt for Games-time (with temporary solutions)”.⁴⁰ For example, Norway constructed a temporary Olympic Village consisting of 200 temporary wooden chalets for the Lillehammer winter games in 1994.⁴¹

Infrastructure investments extend beyond the construction of stadiums. Host cities must have an adequate airport, roads, and other transportation mechanisms such as light rails. Therefore, host countries could spend less money on excessive stadiums, and focus on infrastructure like roads that would benefit citizens long after the games are over. Planning these transportation projects outside the scope of the mega-sporting event assures that designs properly meet the local needs after the event.

Use only existing infrastructure throughout the country

While FIFA selects a country host the World Cup, a city hosts the Olympic games. The success of the Los Angeles (LA) games in 1984 demonstrates the benefits from using existing infrastructure.⁴² The IOC has strict regulations regarding the use of existing infrastructure but in the case of the LA games, the city successfully negotiated with the IOC to allow

35 Dure, Beau. "The Olympics Are Too Big for One City to Host. It's Time to Share the Joy."

36 Ingle, Sean. "Football: Poland/Ukraine to Host Euro 2012." *The Guardian*. April 18, 2007. Accessed April 15, 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/football/2007/apr/18/newsstory.sport10>.

37 Ingle, Sean. "Football: Poland/Ukraine to Host Euro 2012."

38 Manfred, Tony. "Brazil's \$3 Billion World Cup Stadiums Are Becoming White Elephants a Year Later." *Business Insider*. May 13, 2015. Accessed March 24, 2018. <http://www.businessinsider.com/brazil-world-cup-stadiums-one-year-later-2015-5>.

39 *Sustainable Mega-events in Developing Countries*. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Accessed March 24, 2018. http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_29583-1522-2-30.pdf?111209095502.

40 "HOST CITY CONTRACT OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS." September 2015. Accessed March 24, 2018. https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/Host_city_elections/Host_City_Contract_Operational_Requirements_September_2015.pdf.

41 Chalkley, Brain, and Stephen Essex. "Mega-sporting Events in Urban and Regional Policy: A History of the Winter Olympics." *Planning Perspectives* 19, no. 2 (2004): 201-04. Accessed April 9, 2018. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/0266543042000192475?scroll=top&needAccess=true>.

42 Gauthier, Ryan. *The International Olympic Committee, Law, and Accountability* (2017): 33-34.

them to use existing infrastructure because of the lack of bidders.⁴³

Using existing infrastructure significantly reduces the cost of hosting these events. However, very few cities have the sporting infrastructure to support the capacity of these mega-sporting events. Therefore, the IOC could transform their framework to encompass an entire host country, opposed to a host city.

Spreading the events throughout the host country will reduce the burdens associated with hosting these events because individual sporting events will be held in cities that already have the infrastructure. Since no stadiums or other venues will need to be built, labor right violations caused by these events will be essentially eliminated, forced displacement or further environmental degradation will not occur, and the events will not cost \$50 billion. If developing countries establish sporting and transportation infrastructure as a precursor to host such games, they will be more likely to do so in a sustainable way.

Preventing forced evictions

The failure to protect citizens against the possible negative outcomes from hosting these mega-sporting events is common in developing countries.⁴⁴ This includes forced evictions. Forced evictions as a means to make way for development projects happen frequently in developing countries when the country's government is not accountable to their people, and/or they have a weak rule of law.⁴⁵

Forced evictions are prohibited under the UN Declaration of Human Rights. Both Article 17 and 25 acknowledge that forced evictions violate of human rights, and if they occur, adequate resettlement must be attached.⁴⁶ Therefore, while the IOC and FIFA have no enforcement

agency, they could stop voting for human right violating countries. For example, before the vote took place for the 2008 summer Olympics, voters knew about China's long history of human rights abuses, but awarded Beijing the games regardless.⁴⁷ As a result, the Chinese government forcefully evicted hundreds of thousands of people.⁴⁸ This voting pattern was reinforced when China won the 2022 winter Olympic bid.

During the bidding process, voters must seriously consider the consequences of awarding countries known for committing human rights abuses and the host selection questionnaire must require the bid committee to identify any projects that would lead to the displacement of citizens.⁴⁹ Once identifying communities at risk of displacement, a resettlement plan must be implemented and reviewed by the IOC in order to ensure that the plan conforms to international standards. Both FIFA and the IOC should adhere to this policy during their bidding process.

Combating forced labor

When laborers are forced to work under atrocious conditions, the public and private sector have failed. However, private actors directly commit the brunt of human right abuses.⁵⁰ Nonetheless, the committed abuses occur within states, making it critical that the host countries take action. To address this, the host country must have strong laws and practices regarding local business, and these laws must be enforceable.

43 Burbank, Matthew J., Greg Andranovich, and Charles H. Heying. "Ch. 10 Mega Events and Local Politics." (2012): 162-165

44 Gauthier, Ryan. *The International Olympic Committee, Law, and Accountability* (2012): 88-90.

45 Gauthier, Ryan. *The International Olympic Committee, Law, and Accountability* (2012): 88-90.

46 "Universal Declaration of Human Rights." United Nations. Accessed March 25, 2018. <http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/>.

47 "OLYMPIC IDEAL DEMOLISHED: HOW FORCED EVICTIONS IN CHINA RELATED TO THE 2008 OLYMPIC GAMES ARE VIOLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW." November 16, 2006. <http://www.hjil.org/articles/hjil-29-1-hopkins.pdf>:156-159

48 "China: Olympics Harm Key Human Rights." Human Rights Watch. April 17, 2015. Accessed April 09, 2018. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/08/06/china-olympics-harm-key-human-rights>.

49 Gauthier, Ryan. *The International Olympic Committee, Law, and Accountability* (2012): 88-90.

50 Ganji, Sarath. "Leveraging the World Cup: Mega Sporting Events, Human Rights Risk, and Worker Welfare Reform in Qatar." *Journal on Migration and Human Security* 4, no. 4 (2016): 221-59. Accessed March 25, 2018. doi:<https://doi.org/10.14240/jmhs.v4i4.69>.

Before awarding a country a mega-sporting event, it should be determined that they have an adequate capacity to enforce labor standards. The IOC and FIFA will be responsible for setting clear expectations. This will be done through the creation of a "Preferred Suppliers List", which will consist of recruitment agencies engaged in ethical migrant worker recruitment practices.⁵¹ This model has experienced moderate success when addressing forced labor in global supply chains in Brazil.⁵²

Those included on the Preferred Suppliers List will work with both the migrants and the companies. The agency will place the migrant with a responsible company that has demonstrated that their employees have suitable working and living conditions, and their contracts will be clear and dependable.⁵³ This is a top-down approach initiated by the government that assures migrant workers within their countries are treated properly.

During the bidding process, voters must seriously consider the consequences of awarding countries known for committing human rights abuses and the host selection questionnaire must require the bid committee to identify any projects that would lead to the displacement of citizens.⁵⁴ Once identifying communities at risk of displacement, a resettlement plan must be implemented and reviewed by the IOC in order to ensure that the plan conforms to international standards. Both FIFA and the IOC should adhere to this policy during their bidding process.

RECOMMENDED COURSE OF ACTION

Multifaceted Approach: Mitigating negative socio-economical impacts by holding the events in a permanent location

The time has come for the Olympics to find a permanent home. Hosting these events at a permanent location eliminates the majority of the associated consequences. Since the infrastructure would be used continuously, and states would not be responsible for financing the games, the problem of white-elephant infrastructure is removed. Additionally, if forced eviction occurred, it would occur only once. This would make it easier for the IOC and the hosting state to comply with the procedure laid out by the UNDHR.

Greece is not the only country that could serve as a permanent location, but they have a legitimate claim as the historical creators of the games, and they have expressed interest in permanently hosting the games as they have formally proposed the notion to the IOC⁵⁵ Additionally, Christine Lagarde, the Managing Director at the International Monetary fund states "Greece would be an environmentally safe location to host the Olympics every four years and the Games would boost the Greek economy".⁵⁶ Therefore, hosting the Olympics permanently in Greece benefits the state economically due to the influx of tourist, and removes many of the negative Olympic legacies from the table such as white elephant infrastructure, cost over-runs, internal corruption, forced labor, and forced evictions. However, Greece would need to invest in transportation infrastructure such as airports in order to increase game related visitation capacity. Given the economic state of Greece, these could be problematic and would likely have to be financed privately.

In order for this to work, countries competing in these events must pressure the IOC to commit

51 Ganji, Sarath. "Leveraging the World Cup: Mega Sporting Events, Human Rights Risk, and Worker Welfare Reform in Qatar."

52 Proceedings of Addressing Forced Labor in Global Supply Chains: Lessons and Applications of the Brazilian Experience, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC. 90-95.

53 Ganji, Sarath. "Leveraging the World Cup: Mega Sporting Events, Human Rights Risk, and Worker Welfare Reform in Qatar."

54 Gauthier, Ryan. *The International Olympic Committee, Law, and Accountability* (2012): 88-90.


55 "IOC Rejects Bid to Permanently Return Olympics to Greece." UPI. May 14, 1992. Accessed April 10, 2018. <https://www.upi.com/Archives/1992/05/14/IOC-rejects-bid-to-permanently-return-Olympics-to-Greece/1568705816000/>.

56 Chrysopoulos, Philiiip. "HALC Petitions for Olympic Games to Be Held Permanently in Greece."

to holding their events in permanent locations and encourage FIFA to award the world-cup to states with existing infrastructure. To do this, states would need to stop bidding. The permanent location of the winter games will be designated through the standard bidding process. Given the weather dependent nature of the winter games, it can be anticipated that very few countries will bid. Since this step is necessary in order to incentivize the IOC to move the games to a permanent location, it also gives developing countries a chance to continue bidding until they decide that the costs of hosting these events outweigh the benefits. A foreseeable challenge is persuading developing countries like China and Russia to stop bidding. However, if those states continue to bid, they can use existing infrastructure, which leads to lower costs and fewer human rights abuses.


If states stop bidding to host the games, the autonomy of these organizations will decrease because they rely on countries to host their events. With less autonomy, state leaders would have to join forces with the permanent location state and demand that these organizations pay to run their own events. This will incentivize FIFA and the IOC to commit their own capital opposed to exploiting states as a means to keep their events afloat. Although the IOC will absorb the sunk costs of building and maintaining infrastructure, the IOC will still operate at profit because the investment will quickly be paid, meaning they will stay in the market.

Aiming to protect the state recognition and cultural exchange aspect of these mega-sporting events, countries will still bid to “virtually host” the events. Each event year, the host country will be responsible for organizing and executing the opening and closing ceremonies as a means to showcase their state and culture. Therefore, hosting events will adhere to a new standard of obligations and will not be nearly as expensive. As a result, hosting the events will be more inclusive to developing countries that simply cannot afford the current costs of hosting these events. People no longer rely on mega-sporting events being held locally, indicating that the systematic rotation mechanism is outdated. The time has come for the international community to hold FIFA and

the IOC accountable for the negative legacies their events leave in developing countries. It is not acceptable for their financial and political gain to be built upon the suffering of millions around the world. 

APPENDIX

Figure 1.0



https://www.theatlas.com/i/atlas_B1ZMBEB1g@2x.png

ADDITIONAL WORKS CONSULTED

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"Mega-sporting Events Must Not Undermine Human Rights." OHCHR | Mega-sporting Events. Must Not Undermine Human Rights. Accessed March 30, 2018. <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/MegaSportingEvents.aspx>.

"Melbourne 1956 Makes History as Equestrian Events Take Place in Sweden." Australian Olympic Committee. November 12, 2016. Accessed April 12, 2018. <http://corporate.olympics.com.au/news/melbourne-1956-makes-history-as-equestrian-events-take-place-in-sweden>.

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Interview with
Maura Connelly
American Diplomat

Narrator: Maura Connelly

Interviewer: Catherine Yenne, Elly Yenne

Date: 02/08/2018

Location: Martin Institute

Transcribed by: Isabel Robles

Date: 02/14/2018

IN: When you are working with the group supporting the global coalition to counter ISIL, did you find that the Levant area had gone through changes that were hard to overcome between the time that you worked in that region and now? Were there a lot of progressive changes?

Connolly: I wouldn't say the changes were progressive, unfortunately because of the spread of ISIS in the region into Syria, the changes that took place in Syria and then in Lebanon were disturbing. It was a real security threat to Lebanon to have these ISIS forces roaming around Syria, and we had worked really closely with the Lebanese armed forces and others to try to make Lebanon more capable of preventing them from entering the country. So, the fact of ISIS was a problem around the region not just in the countries where it was present, but also the surrounding countries.

IN: Lebanon is feeling much if not the majority of the impact from the refugee influx from the Syrian Civil War; in your opinion, in what ways can the country improve on its ability both to support this increasing refugee population while keeping the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals in mind because obviously the stability there presents challenges.

Connolly: I'm not sure the Lebanese really have the resources on their own to do more than they are doing, even though they get a lot of support from the international community to meet the humanitarian needs of the Syrians.

Lebanon had always had this kind of migratory Syrian population come in for harvests and that kind of thing, Syrian workers were present in Lebanon for construction, so there's always been a traditional kind of economic cooperation between the two countries. The problem I think for Lebanon has been trying to absorb, not just workers who had been there before, but additional people who come into the country, families, the children. The children need schools, they all need medical care, so this was just an exponential increase really leading to demands of the Lebanese state, so I think it really was all the Lebanese could do to help them as far as they have. The situation of the refugees is not good, they need more help, but really I think that responsibility has fallen and continues to fall to the international community.

IN: Please compare the support of individual nations for Lebanon to that of IGOs like the EU or the UN, how does that compare?

Connolly: Canada has been a strong supporter of humanitarian causes for a long time, (and in my speech) last night I was talking about Canada in its role vis a-vis the Palestinian refugees, in the context of the current refugee crisis in Lebanon, Canada is certainly one of the big donor countries, but it doesn't have any kind of coordinating role per se, because that frame work was specific to the peace process. I think there are a number of countries who are traditional donors and they are accustomed to dealing with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (for example) and some other UN programs like the World Food Program which

are in a position to respond to crises like this. But you know, their mandate is emergency based, and if you now it's going to last six months or a year or two years . . . and so now this crisis has been going on in Lebanon ever since the refugees first started coming in 2011, so what you get is donor fatigue and I think all of the donors have to keep working with the UN Agencies just because you know that just because it has been going on a long time, doesn't mean the needs aren't still there.

IN: Right, so have many of them dropped out, because of donor fatigue?

Connelly: You know as governments change, sometimes funding levels go up and down, in addition with the EU, because the EU as an organization is a big donor, sometimes the individual European countries may provide bilateral donation to the UN instead of via the EU, or the opposite - they may skip individual donations thinking "oh no we're covered by the EU" so you know the funding levels kind of fluctuate depending on those decisions.

IN: Switching gears, how do places such as the Temple Mount in Jerusalem influence Israeli-Arab relationships?

Connelly: Well each side has a separate history, the Israelis call it the Temple Mount harkening back to the second temple, and Palestinians call it the Haram esh-Sharif because they associate it with Mohammad's flight into heaven. So, each of them has a

very distinct narrative for the same piece of geography; this happens in a lot of places. So it makes their claims to that particular territory, to the average observer they both have a good claim, so in terms of diplomacy how do you solve that, how can you make arrangements that help them share it, how do you get the parties to agree to share it in the first place? At times its looked like it could happen and other times it's been harder. Right now, just to get into specifics the actual custodian of the Haram esh-Sharif/Temple Mount is Jordan, and Israel of course controls the old city around it, so it's really a function of Israeli-Jordanian cooperation, which is easier because there is a peace treaty between the two countries, so they do have some basis for dealing with each other on these things.

IN: So, do you see sort of relations in that area serve influence relations in the whole of Levant region, or do the Israeli-Jordan relationships stay right centered in that area?

Connelly: No, they are pretty specific. If something bad happens in Jerusalem, then you feel the repercussions around the region and Jordan takes criticism for not having prevented it from happening if it's at the Temple Mount. But I don't think that there is equally ripple effective good things happening just because they have a peace agreement it's really each of Israel neighbors has their own set of problems with Israel and Israel has its own set of problems with each of them and they all have to be worked out.

IN: How does the nature of the different histories influence opportunities to peace? Is strict separation with walls the best way to do it, or is it worth trying to be a more cohesive and how does the future in that respect look?

Connelly: Historical, religious, and cultural disagreement makes it much more difficult find any kind of common ground because then you have sort of mutually exclusive claims to things and they're not necessarily trying to be pragmatic about it. Though, in Northern Ireland at some point they all decided it was better to have peace than not, but they didn't like each other more, they ultimately decided "alright we're going to have to do this because the other way is not working." We haven't seen that yet in the Middle East.

IN: Do you think it will happen soon? Is there a threshold for success?

Connelly: I don't see the signs for it right now, but maybe. The Middle East is subject to these kind of seismic changes and maybe we need another seismic change before you know, everything gets reorganized on the ground.

IN: Changing gears again, how different is the role of the US versus the role of the UN in peace negotiations?

Connelly: The UN because it's subject to the direction of its member states is best, it operates best when it's undertaking Good Offices. It's important to note that the UN can't

really have its own position on these kinds of things, so instead they might try to facilitate, provide a space, bring people together, put them in the same room, provide some kind of tangible support to the actual negotiation effort - but it's very rare I think that you can say that the UN took a specific view point on a dispute.

The US is very different, because we operate from an entirely different point of view. We have our foreign policy, we have our interests, we have our values and we pursue them. Generally, we think it's in our interests to have peace, specifically in the Middle East we think it's in our interest to have peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Whether we are able to facilitate that, depends on a lot of factors. It depends on the quality of our diplomacy, it depends on our commitment, it depends on the degree to which we're willing to spend a lot of prestige and capital on it but at the end of the day it really depends on whether or not the parties want to make peace. You can't make them do it; they have to want to do it.

The UN is often very helpful to us, in that kind of supportive role. The UN at the end of the day, they want peace between their members and so they will contribute a lot in that respect, but they can't really, I don't think they can take the sort of stance the US does when it is engaged in the argument. We say something like "the line is drawn here, but how much worse would it be if we drew the line 300 yards over here, seems like a good idea, why don't you consider it? No, you won't consider that? How about 15?" The UN doesn't really get into that kind of substantive bargaining, not in a Middle East situation.

IN: *This is kind of a generalization, but if you could name one thing that would improve US and Middle Eastern relations what would it be and why? It's hard to separate all the different situations into one thing, but do you think there is something that maybe if we pursued more aggressively maybe it would help?*

Connelly: You know what? We're coming off a period where a lot of the Arab countries felt that they didn't have sufficient contact at high levels with the US, and that kind of continues into the Trump Administration because they have been sort of less activist in terms of foreign policy in the region and when you saw President Trump go to Saudi Arabia and they gathered together all the representatives of the Gulf Countries and it was a big deal, it was kind of aimed at making him happy but it was also kind of a celebration of "we want the US back, we want to really engage with them", so I think the single most important thing and including Israel and Turkey and other countries in the region, is just a more sustained engagement on our part, kind of being out there, being part of the discussion.. We have to get our ambassadors out there, we have to get the Secretary of State looking at this area. You have to get ambassadors in place. All of that helps. 🌐



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